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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation seeks to disclose the reconciling power of Christian preaching, 
and examine the homiletical task through the lens of Jesus’ command to “love your 
enemies.”  Because the heart of Christian preaching lies in the Word of God revealed as 
the Prince of Peace, Gospel proclamation and reconciliation are perpetually intertwined.  
God’s message of reconciliation has irrupted in history through a Son who not only 
forbids the killing of enemies, but also commands his followers to love them.  Yet, in the 
wake of history’s bloodiest century, Christians continue to sanction divisive, violent 
responses to those considered strangers and enemies—even those who also claim the 
name “Christian.”  The time is ripe for an analysis of the proclaimed Word of God as a 
potent catalyst for reconciliation. 
The church needs a theology of preaching that offers an alternative to the world’s 
language about enemies.  My contention is that a theological investigation of enemy-
language will have a positive impact on the theory and practice of Christian preaching, 
while unearthing new possibilities for churches and other faith communities beset by 
seemingly insurmountable conflict.  I challenge presumptions about who our enemies 
truly are through descriptions of the rhetorical, theological, and homiletical elements of 
gospel proclamation in communities torn by conflict.  What I finally hope to show is that 
because God has entrusted the church with the message of reconciliation, preaching is 
then an inherently reconciling practice, unintelligible apart from its nature as an address 
to God’s former enemies.  Reconciling sermons address and sustain churches with 
cruciform speech, or gospel-shaped language redeemed by God’s Spirit, through which 
  v 
disciples are summoned to recognize and embody the forgiveness of the crucified yet 
risen Jesus, and equipped to exemplify, as ambassadors of reconciliation, the radical 
consequences of Christ’s lordship. 
Methodologically, the dissertation pursues a theological analysis of preaching 
based on the relationship between the God of Jesus Christ and humankind.  This 
reconciliation encompasses all things, past, present, and future.  Such an assertion 
proceeds from a paradox:  the world rejects Christ, and yet God has reconciled the world 
through Jesus on the cross (2 Cor. 5:18).  Consequently, as Richard Lischer has said, 
reconciliation is the “animating principle” of preaching.  God’s reconciling action in 
Christ is the essential, constitutive homiletical thrust.  Thus, sermonic language must 
align itself with God’s reconciling action in Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection.    
The dissertation advances these claims through a theoretical analysis of the 
“enemy” as it occurs in theological discourse, biblical interpretation, homiletical rhetoric, 
and constructive theologies of preaching and reconciliation, as well as through 
theological investigations of the preaching of Will Campbell, and sermons directly 
related to The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  Overall, the 
dissertation combines the traditional disciplines of homiletics, theology, biblical 
interpretation, and rhetoric with contextualized field studies of “reconciling sermons.”  
The ultimate hope of this work is to invite the field of homiletics and the church it serves 
toward a more comprehensive acknowledgement of the crucial, reciprocal relationship 
between preaching, reconciliation, and peacemaking.      
 
 
  vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOR ERIN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT	  ..............................................................................................................................................	  IV	  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	  ......................................................................................................................	  IX	  
LIST	  OF	  ABBREVIATIONS	  ................................................................................................................	  XIII	  
INTRODUCTION	  ......................................................................................................................................	  1	  
CHAPTER	  1:	  	  ENEMY	  LANGUAGE	  ....................................................................................................	  12	  1.1	  	  KARL	  BARTH	  ON	  RECONCILIATION	  .............................................................................................................	  12	  1.2	  	  WHO	  IS	  AN	  ENEMY?	  .......................................................................................................................................	  18	  1.3	  	  “THE	  CRIMINALS	  WITH	  HIM!”	  .....................................................................................................................	  37	  1.4	  	  MIROSLAV	  VOLF	  AND	  STANLEY	  HAUERWAS	  .............................................................................................	  41	  1.5	  	  CONCLUSION	  ....................................................................................................................................................	  53	  
CHAPTER	  2:	  	  SIGNS	  AND	  WONDERS	  ..............................................................................................	  56	  2.1	  	  SYNTHESIZING	  AUGUSTINE	  AND	  MILBANK	  ...............................................................................................	  57	  2.2	  	  THE	  ‘ECLIPSE’	  IN	  RETROSPECT	  ....................................................................................................................	  72	  2.	  3	  	  TOWARD	  A	  RECONCILING	  LITERAL	  SENSE	  ...............................................................................................	  77	  2.4	  	  ELLUL,	  BRUEGGEMANN,	  AND	  PROPAGANDA	  .............................................................................................	  84	  2.5	  	  A	  JOURNALISTIC	  HERMENEUTIC	  ..................................................................................................................	  93	  2.6	  	  PRACTICING	  A	  RECONCILING	  HERMENEUTIC	  ........................................................................................	  100	  2.7	  	  CONCLUSION	  .................................................................................................................................................	  104	  
CHAPTER	  3:	  	  RECONCILING	  RHETORIC	  ......................................................................................	  106	  3.1	  	  CLASSICAL	  PERSUASIONS	  ...........................................................................................................................	  108	  3.2	  	  RHETORIC’S	  AUGUSTINIAN	  SHIFT	  ............................................................................................................	  113	  3.3	  	  BURKEAN	  PERSUASION:	  	  COOPERATION	  AND	  IDENTIFICATION	  .........................................................	  118	  3.4	  	  ARE	  WE	  PERSUADED?	  ................................................................................................................................	  122	  3.5	  	  PREACHING	  ‘DOWNHILL’	  ...........................................................................................................................	  129	  3.6	  	  KENOTIC	  RHETORIC	  ....................................................................................................................................	  138	  3.7	  	  THERE	  IS	  A	  BALM	  IN	  GILEAD	  .....................................................................................................................	  147	  3.8	  	  CONCLUSION	  .................................................................................................................................................	  153	  
CHAPTER	  4:	  	  RECONCILED	  BASTARDS	  .......................................................................................	  155	  4.1	  	  UNSYSTEMATIC	  THEOLOGY	  .......................................................................................................................	  157	  4.2	  	  CAMPBELL’S	  SEARCH	  FOR	  COMMUNITY	  ..................................................................................................	  167	  4.3	  	  CAMPBELL’S	  IDENTIFICATION	  AND	  AUTHORITY	  ...................................................................................	  182	  4.4	  	  CAMPBELL	  AS	  PROPHETIC	  PREACHER	  .....................................................................................................	  197	  4.5	  	  CONCLUSION	  .................................................................................................................................................	  208	  
CHAPTER	  5:	  	  SEEKING	  THE	  PEACE	  OF	  THE	  CITY	  .....................................................................	  209	  5.1	  	  LIGHTEN	  OUR	  DARKNESS	  ..........................................................................................................................	  212	  5.2	  	  DESCENT	  INTO	  DARKNESS	  .........................................................................................................................	  217	  5.3	  	  LIGHTS	  IN	  THE	  DARKNESS	  .........................................................................................................................	  223	  5.4	  	  RECONCILING	  SERMONS	  .............................................................................................................................	  234	  5.5	  	  CONCLUSION	  .................................................................................................................................................	  250	  
  viii 
CONCLUSION	  .......................................................................................................................................	  255	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY	  ..................................................................................................................................	  263	  
BIOGRAPHY	  .........................................................................................................................................	  273	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ix 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
 Years from now, when someone asks me about my time at Duke Divinity School, 
I hope they will be prepared for a typical Southerner’s nostalgic response—made 
complete by wistful staring off into the distance.  These years have been the best of my 
life, as the joys of rigorous academic study, teaching, and preaching have combined with 
the joys of starting a family.  I leave this place with a heart heavy with gratitude for all 
the people who have guided and supported me along the way. 
Charles Bugg, my preaching professor in seminary, stands tall in my life.  I thank 
him for saying, “You ought to pursue doctoral work.”  He also introduced me to my wife.  
It goes without saying that much of my happiness in life traces back to him. 
I would never have found the way to doctoral studies apart from Elizabeth 
Newman, my first theology professor.  She profoundly shaped my thinking early on, and 
set me on the path to deeper investigations of peacemaking and reconciliation.   
I continue to cherish my friendship with Rev. Larry Wilson.  He introduced me to 
Will Campbell, and also showed me that it is possible to tell the truth of the gospel even 
when it is hard.  I admire his ability to be—simultaneously—a Baptist preacher and a 
Christian.   
I thank the members of First Baptist Church, Mt. Gilead, NC, who called me at 
age 24 to be their pastor, and gave me grace and patience I did not deserve.  I especially 
thank Johnny Almond, Trey Lincoln, Carolyn Plowman, and David and Mary Troutman. 
While at Duke, I have studied with professors for whom I hold the deepest 
admiration:  Susan Eastman, Stanley Hauerwas, Emmanuel Katongole, Randy Maddox, 
  x 
Sujin Pak, and Bill Turner.  I hope each of them will see their impact on my thinking in 
the pages that follow.   
I am grateful to my colleagues in the Th.D. program, especially Liz DeGaynor 
and Donyelle McCray. 
Key ideas and preliminary versions of two chapters in this dissertation were first 
delivered as papers at three gatherings of the Young Scholars in the Baptist Academy.  I 
wish to thank Roger Ward and the YSBA Steering Committee for their generous 
invitations to present my work. 
I’m grateful to Will Willimon, who influenced me as a preaching pastor long 
before I met him at Duke.  He helped me clarify my thinking about Karl Barth and Will 
Campbell.   
Curtis Freeman, my professor, friend, and fellow church member, epitomizes the 
description, “A gentleman and a scholar.”  I am always wiser for his counsel, and lucky 
to call him a friend. 
I was thrilled when Gregory Jones agreed to join my dissertation committee.  I 
also remain indebted to him for the ways his theological work enriched my pastoral 
ministry.  
Geoffrey Wainwright was gracious to accept me for an independent study on 
theology and language.  I remain enamored by his encyclopedic knowledge of theology, 
his devotion to the church, and his comprehension of cricket. 
  xi 
Ellen Davis has been an exceptional mentor and friend, and has given me rare 
opportunities to teach under her guidance.  She is an extraordinary professor whose 
prophetic witness extends far beyond the lectern and pulpit. 
There is no way to measure Chuck Campbell’s influence on me.  Listening to him 
in the classroom or the pulpit, I am reminded of the liturgical salutation, “Lift up your 
hearts!”  I have treasured his friendship and wisdom.  
 My joy in studying at Duke has been grounded all along in the wise counsel and 
friendship of my advisor, Richard Lischer.  The elegance of his character shines through 
in the elegance of his preaching.  He has taught me the gospel of reconciliation.  I 
treasure the memory of walking alongside him in the small crowd outside Duke Chapel, 
just before he preached a Good Friday sermon.  As we followed the Stations of the Cross, 
I thought to myself, “Here is a man who keeps promises.”  He has been one of God’s 
greatest gifts to me. 
My dearest friend of all, Paul Baxley, has been a constant encourager during my 
studies.  A brilliant mind, a careful exegete, and an excellent preacher, he is the most 
gifted and effective pastor I know.  He read much of my work, and offered priceless 
feedback.  He was also the first person to say to me as a teenager, “Have you considered 
that God might be calling you into ministry?”   
 I could not have done this work without the help of four beloved people in my 
life—my aunt, Jane Walters; my in-laws, Steve and Suzanne Sidebottom; and my mother, 
Diane Dennis—each of whom has gone to extraordinary lengths to care for my children 
while I worked.   
  xii 
I will always be in awe of the beauty of my mother’s selfless Christian witness.  
My father, Bill Dennis, is truly a disciple of the “Great Physician.”  I thank them both for 
their unconditional love, and for making me go to church. 
A very special thank you to Liam and Ozzie, my dissertation “co-authors.”  You 
fill my days with joy. 
 Finally, to Erin, my love, and my peace:  I dedicate this work to you. 
 
AUSTIN M. DENNIS 
THIRD SUNDAY IN LENT, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  xiii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
BATF    Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms  
BCC    Beloved Community Center 
CWP    Communist Workers Party 
GAPP    Greensboro Association of Poor People 
GPD    Greensboro Police Department 
GTCRP   Greensboro Truth and Community Reconciliation Project 
GTRC    Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
FBI    Federal Bureau of Investigation 
ICTJ  International Center for Transitional Justice 
KKK  Ku Klux Klan 
LTF    Local Task Force 
NRSV    New Revised Standard Version 
SBC    Southern Baptist Convention 
SCLC    Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
WVO    Workers Viewpoint Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 
INTRODUCTION 
“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was 
God” (John 1:1, NRSV1).  The Word “became flesh and lived among us, and we have 
seen his glory, the glory as of a father’s only son, full of grace and truth” (1:14).  This 
Word, through whom God “created the worlds,” is the reconciling Word.  For through 
this Word God “reconciled us to himself,” and “has given us the ministry of 
reconciliation” (2 Corinthians 5:18).  Having entrusted this message to us (5:19), God 
makes this appeal through us:  “Be reconciled to God.  For our sake he made him to be 
sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God” (5:20-
21).  The reconciling Word, through whom “God spoke to our ancestors in many and 
various ways by the prophets,” comes to us in these last days by a Son (Heb. 1:1).  Jesus 
Christ reveals God to us as this the reconciling Word, “heir of all things,” “the reflection 
of God’s glory,” and “the exact imprint of God’s very being,” who “sustains all things by 
his powerful word” (Hebrews 1:1-3). 
 Throughout this dissertation, it will be my aim to show the reciprocal relationship 
between preaching and reconciliation.  I will describe preaching as a reconciling practice 
that is crucial to the church’s life and mission.  I also aim to show how reconciliation is 
dependent upon the proclamation of the reconciling Word.  When the Word is “lifted up,” 
he draws all people to himself (Jn. 12:32), so that reconciliation anywhere, between 
anyone, bears traces of the one who has reconciled us to God on the cross.  We do not 
move from enmity to friendship in pure silence, but by the language God has given 
                                                
1 All Scripture quotations are from the New Revised Standard Version unless otherwise noted. 
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human beings “for peace and mutual upbuilding” (Romans 14:19).  The peculiar nature 
of this language lies in its bearing likeness to Jesus, who fully reveals to the world the 
image of God.  According to St. Athanasius, this language is a grace bestowed on human 
beings by God through the Word Jesus.  This grace is   
namely, the impress of His own Image, a share in the reasonable being of the 
very Word Himself, so that, reflecting Him and themselves becoming reasonable 
and expressing the Mind of God even as He does, though in limited degree, they 
might continue for ever in the blessed and only true life of the saints in paradise.2 
 
The cornerstone of this dissertation is the theological claim that God’s mission of 
love to the world is a reconciling mission, the end of which is the new creation of beloved 
community.  The disclosure of God’s mission through proclamation sets the bond 
between preaching and reconciliation.  The two subjects reach their culmination in Jesus 
who “came to Galilee, proclaiming” (Mark 1:14).  Therefore, we can no longer say 
preaching and reconciliation exist in exclusive dimensions or in categorically separate 
academic concentrations.  In Christ, preaching and reconciliation are inextricably and 
perpetually intertwined.  In theory and in practice, preaching and reconciliation exist in 
partnership with one another.  They serve and energize one another.  So it is possible to 
say not only that reconciliation is constitutive of the practice of preaching, but also that 
preaching is an essential part of the church’s reconciling mission.  When the church calls 
the practice of preaching a “service of the Word,” it should recognize such a service as 
having an inherently reconciling purpose.  If it is a service of the incarnate Word of God, 
the constitution of this proclaimed word will exhibit reconciliation as a preeminent 
                                                
2 St. Athanasius, On the Incarnation (Crestwood, NY:  St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2002 [1944]) 28. 
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feature of Christ’s life, death, and resurrection.  This is another way of articulating what 
Geoffrey Wainwright has called the “material density” of the Word of God: 
To speak of Jesus Christ as ‘the Word of God’ is to name his person.  This person 
came to expression in the thick texture of his human life.  His ‘flesh’ is 
constituted not only by his body, born of Mary, but by an entire range of words 
and deeds, by his interactions with his historical contemporaries, and by the 
events which surround and mark his career.3 
 
To preach, then, is to engage with the “thick texture” of Jesus’ mission, fully submitting 
to the gravitational pull of the reconciling Word’s “material density.”   
 As a linguistic practice, preaching is also embodied.  Preaching is a bodily 
practice for the preacher, to be sure, but it also has consequences for the body of Christ, 
and for all human bodies.  This fact manifested itself to me in full force during pastoral 
ministry in a rural North Carolina church.  Through the course of my pastorate, I 
discovered just how powerful preaching could be (and how weak).  I enjoyed the warmth 
of my church’s fellowship, and continue to be inspired by the beautiful people I came to 
know and love there.  Yet, several times, I was stunned by some people’s visceral 
reactions to my sermons.  I came of age as a preacher during the heat of the disastrous 
Second Iraq War, and often—some would say too often—preached of how the gospel 
exposes the folly of war, and how the church is an alternative to war.  This meant that I 
made some “enemies.”  But this also confused me, because I was convinced those same 
people were still my neighbors and friends.  I maintained close friendships with church 
members and other people in the community with whom I had deep disagreements.  I lost 
                                                
3 Geoffrey Wainwright, For Our Salvation:  Two Approaches to the Work of Christ (Grand Rapids:  Wm. B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1997) 10. 
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a few friendships as well, despite genuine efforts to be reconciled with them.  I hold onto 
the hope that when the time is fulfilled, we will truly know one another and fully love one 
another, as Christ knows and loves us. 
During this time I took cues from my former professor of theology, Elizabeth 
Newman, and immersed myself in the works of Stanley Hauerwas, John Howard Yoder, 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and the preaching of Will Willimon.  My poor congregation had to 
endure an often painful and confusing spiritual journey as I tried to articulate these ideas 
Sunday after Sunday.  I will always be grateful for their patience and grace.     
 Two watershed events from those years stand out to me.  The first was an issue 
regarding the American flag, which enjoyed a prominent place in that stunningly 
beautiful sanctuary.  There had been a skirmish about the flag’s placement during the 
previous pastorate, and it was all the pastor could do to keep the church from installing a 
permanent flag—with a concrete footing—in the church’s front yard.  To that pastor’s 
credit, the church did not.  Yet, the issue continued to fester, as some in the congregation 
feared my anti-war stance would lead me to “take the flag out.”  Early one Sunday 
morning, as people began trickling into the sanctuary, a member of the church cursed at 
my music minister for failing to return the flag to the sanctuary after a wedding the day 
before.  I had often heard grumbling whenever the flag was removed for such events, but 
when I heard my colleague had been cursed, it angered me.  Instead of removing the flag, 
I secretly removed the heavy, brass cross from its central placement on the altar table, 
and hid it behind the wall of the baptistery.  Then I went on vacation.  Two Sundays later 
it was still gone.  After three weeks, the same music minister found the cross, and put it 
  5 
back on the altar table.  No one ever mentioned the cross’s absence, which convinced me 
of how deeply blind we are to our idolatry. 
 The second moment came when I read Richard Lischer’s The End of Words:  The 
Language of Reconciliation in a Culture of Violence.  I was spellbound by it, for it 
enabled me to finally articulate the spiritual renovation I had been undergoing for several 
years.  It calmed me, gave me courage and confidence, and began to make me a better 
preacher than I would have been otherwise.  My preaching found new energy, and I 
became more intentional about helping my congregation see the world around them 
theologically.  I began to view preaching as a means to enable people to understand 
themselves as participants in the story of salvation Scripture narrates.  The book also 
helped discipline me to preach theologically in the particular ways Scripture suggests.  
Simply put, The End of Words revealed the gospel to me in a way that helped me “go on.”  
I read it backwards and forwards, and continue to revisit it and cherish its wisdom.  I 
view this dissertation as an attempt to continue the conversation Lischer started in that 
book.  If I have built on his work in any way, it is grace. 
 I have written this dissertation with the preaching pastor in mind, especially those 
who preach in contexts of division caused by what Martin Luther King, Jr. called the 
three evils of “racism, militarism, and materialism.”  It also bears mentioning that the 
opening convocation of my first semester in seminary was September 11, 2001.  I do not 
know what the final “bookend” of my life’s ministry will be, but I do know the first one 
was a vision of utter horror—two towers engulfed in flames, human bodies falling from 
their windows, and the President standing atop the rubble of ashes and charred bodies to 
  6 
tell the nation, “I can hear you [applause].  I can hear you.  The rest of the world hears 
you [applause].  And the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us 
soon [tumultuous applause].”  Since that day, America has descended further into a 
miasma of fear and violent revenge.  We are all under constant surveillance, for the 
“enemy” could be anyone, anywhere.  The current President is reviled for pursuing 
peaceful negotiations with old enemies, even while he coordinates drone warfare on new 
ones.  With these realities in mind, I regard this dissertation as an “emergency homiletic.”  
I want preachers to see that preaching reconciliation is a matter of life and death—for the 
body of Christ, for the bodies of human beings, and especially for the bodies of our 
supposed “enemies.” 
Angela Dienhart Hancock has recently demonstrated the urgency of preaching in 
Karl Barth’s concern for the body of Christ during the rise of the Third Reich.  Bypassing 
the University at Bonn’s own curriculum and course listing, he commenced an 
“emergency homiletic,” as Hancock calls it, in order to sound an alarm for the German 
church.  Having foreseen the potential for the myriad horrors of World War II, Barth 
presented lectures on preaching in an effort to equip students to resist the German 
church’s capitulation to the Nazi state, and to offer the German people an alternative 
language of redemption.  Faithful preaching, for Barth, was not only the underlying 
purpose of his Church Dogmatics, but also a practical matter of life and death.  Preaching 
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that forgets this principal aspect of its identity and vocation is, as Barth termed it, 
“heartless.”4 
The corporeal nature of preaching also designates it as a practice of the church 
with sacramental power.  Like baptism and Eucharist, the preached word is a means by 
which God saves us, and draws us into ever-deepening communion with the Father, Son, 
and Holy Spirit, and with all the saints.  With its predisposition towards conversion, 
confession, and celebration, the practice of preaching should also be considered an 
accomplice to the sacrament of reconciliation (or penance).  In Embodying Forgiveness, 
Gregory Jones provides an account of forgiveness as an embodied practice, constituted 
by the church’s liturgical practices of preaching, hymn singing, prayer, baptism, and 
Eucharist.  Drawing on Alasdair MacIntyre’s definition of “practice,”5 Jones develops a 
theology of forgiveness not as an isolated act, but as a way of life.  Understood in relation 
to this Aristotelian-based approach, forgiveness is a communal practice, the goods 
internal to which are realized in the form of reconciled relationships.  What he calls 
“reconciling forgiveness,” where forgiveness makes possible a return to fellowship 
between the formerly estranged, involves “learning the habits and practices necessary to 
                                                
4 Angela Dienhart Hancock, Karl Barth’s Emergency Homiletic, 1932-1933:  A Summons to Prophetic 
Witness at the Dawn of the Third Reich (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2013) 131. 
5 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed. (The University of Notre Dame Press, 2007 [1981]) 187.  He 
defines ‘practice’ as follows:  any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence, which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, 
with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the goods and ends 
involved, are systematically extended. 
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resist the desire for revenge, and struggling to have those desires transformed by God’s 
spirit into desires for love.”6 
 The terms “forgiveness,” “reconciliation,” and “peacemaking” are not purely 
interchangeable, but they are deeply connected to one another.  In this dissertation, I have 
sometimes come near to conflating the latter two terms.  I have done so in order to 
emphasize the peaceable character of the reconciling practice of preaching.  John Howard 
Yoder defines peace from an eschatological perspective, calling it “the goal in light of 
which [the pacifist] acts, the character of his action, the ultimate divine certainty which 
lets his position make sense.”7  Barth also connects these terms when he says theology 
“has the character of peace.  Its origin is the reconciliation of the world with God as it is 
resolved in God’s eternal will and fulfilled in time at Calvary.  This reconciliation and 
therefore this peace are revealed in the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead.”8 
Reconciliation is a peaceable practice, but it is also a means to peaceful ends.  In 
the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus describes the disciples as blessed peacemakers (Mt. 5:9), 
and proceeds to institute a practice of reconciliation for their life together:  “When you 
are offering your gift at the altar, if you remember that your brother or sister has 
something against you, leave your gift there before the altar and go; first be reconciled to 
                                                
6 L. Gregory Jones, Embodying Forgiveness:  A Theological Analysis (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 1995) 277. 
7 John Howard Yoder, The Original Revolution:  Essays on Christian Pacifism (Scottdale, PA: Herald 
Press, 2003 [1971]) 53.  I do, however, resist the term “pacifist.”  One reason is that pacifism is understood 
to mean different things even among Christians.  Another reason is that the label “pacifism” tends to 
domesticate the way of life it represents, placing the burden of proof on “pacifists” rather than on the 
(presumed to be “normal”) people who would sanction killing in the name of God, country, self-defense, 
etc. 
8 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/2, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh:  T & T Clark, 1956) 314. 
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your brother or sister, and then come and offer your gift” (5:23-24).  Their communal 
practice of reconciliation is the basis for their identity as peacemakers.  As we will see 
later in the dissertation, the City of Greensboro’s pursuit of truth and reconciliation was 
also integral to their seeking peace for victims and their families, as well as for the 
community at large.  To be concise, I understand peacemaking and reconciliation to be 
practices that have overlapping origins in the person and work of Jesus Christ.  These 
practices intermingle as they proceed from and ultimately end in him. 
 Overall, my intention is to present a cohesive argument about the theological and 
practical connections between preaching and reconciliation.  Methodologically, the 
chapters move from theory to application.  Chapter One presents a theological 
consideration of enemy language in Barth’s Dogmatics as it compares and contrasts with 
that of two other leading theologians, Miroslav Volf and Stanley Hauerwas.  I propose a 
Barthian theology of reconciliation as a cornerstone for the proper homiletical use and 
understanding of enemy language in Christian communities.  The chapter includes an 
analysis of one of Barth’s sermons, preached to a congregation of prisoners in 
Switzerland. 
Chapter Two uses enemy love as a metaphor for an approach to biblical 
interpretation for preaching.  Beginning with the nature and purpose of language, I 
encourage resistance to the “original violence” (Milbank) of a strict literal sense, and 
argue for a recovery of pre-modern exegesis in the form of Rowan William’s “diachronic” 
reading of Scripture.  Such a hermeneutic will have “journalistic” characteristics, will 
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resist propagandistic attempts to contrive false enemies, and will focus the preacher’s 
attention on reconciliation for the sake of human bodies. 
Chapter Three cautions against preaching’s blind acceptance of persuasion as the 
essence of rhetoric because it denies the complexity of the divine Word, and often derails 
gospel proclamation from its original function, purpose, and infrastructure.  Using 
Kenneth Burke’s rhetorical theory, I commend “identification” and “cooperation” as 
more preferable categories for Christian preaching.  Finally, I define what I call “kenotic 
rhetoric,” en route to an assessment of the how the preacher in Marilynne Robinson’s 
novel, Gilead, practices reconciling rhetoric. 
In Chapter Four, I showcase the preaching of a significant figure in the racially 
divided American South, Will Campbell, who uniquely epitomized the reconciling Word 
through his life and preaching.  I explore how his methods of identification, his 
ecclesiological imagination, and his outstanding witness for racial reconciliation are 
theologically grounded in the sovereignty of a God who has already reconciled the world 
in Christ. 
 In the final chapter, I narrate the Greensboro Massacre of 1979 from a theological 
perspective, in order to show how preaching has played a crucial role in seeking and 
establishing “the welfare of the city.”  Describing them as “lights in the darkness,” I 
examine the testimonies and sermons by preachers who played key roles in the 
establishment and legacy of the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  
I conclude with a call to hope, offering a portrait of Greensboro as a place where 
the reconciling Word continues to flourish.  I commend what has come into being there 
  11 
as life, and that such abundant life has become light for many people.  Indeed, the light 
shines in the darkness, and the darkness does not overcome it.
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CHAPTER 1:  ENEMY LANGUAGE 
A woman once asked Karl Barth, “Herr Professor, can I be sure that I will see 
my loved ones in heaven?” 
“To be sure,” he replied, “you will see not only your ‘loved ones’!”1 
 
   
1.1  KARL BARTH ON RECONCILIATION 
Throughout Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics, there are curiously diverse 
applications of the term “enemy” as a category crucial for understanding God, God’s 
relationship to humanity, and interpersonal human relationships.  Barth’s magnum opus, 
which is concerned with providing the church the proper grammar to say “God,” raises an 
important question:  Can Barth’s theological language promote a renewed understanding 
of Scripture, and provide a grammatical platform for preaching that encourages the 
healing of ecclesial divisions that contribute to the world’s violence?  Or does his sparing 
use of enemy language in a blood-soaked century undercut his doctrine of reconciliation, 
and diminish the contributions he might make to preachers who “seek the peace of the 
city”?  These questions call for an exploration of Karl Barth’s theology of reconciliation 
as it relates to his use of the term “enemy” as a theological concept in the context of 
Christian communities.  I will first emphasize key elements of Barth’s doctrine of 
reconciliation before engaging particular passages in which Barth’s use of enemy 
language is explicit.  The chapter concludes by juxtaposing Barth’s approach to enemies 
with those of Miroslav Volf and Stanley Hauerwas, in order to show why the means of 
recognizing “the enemy” matters for a reconciling homiletic. 
                                                
1 Eberhard Busch, Barth (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2008) 15. 
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Beginning his foreword to Volume IV/1, Barth places the weight of his 
Dogmatics on the foundations of his Doctrine of Reconciliation. Within this doctrine, 
several overarching themes provide a theological framework upon which fundamental 
questions about his use of enemy language may be addressed.  “To fail here is to fail 
everywhere.  To be on the right track here makes it impossible to be completely mistaken 
in the whole.”2  A brief survey of these themes seeks to illuminate Barth’s theology of 
reconciliation for the purposes of this investigation.  
First and foremost, Barth believes the heart of the Christian message is primarily a 
statement, made by those assembled in the Christian community, that it is God who is 
with us as God.  “God with us” is the core of the Christian message that moves from a 
narrower usage among those who already “know it but are always learning it afresh,” to a 
wider usage incorporating “‘us’ other men who have always to learn it afresh because we 
do not yet know it, although we can know it.”3  “God with us” is not an object of 
investigation or speculation, but an event, an act, of which we may be witnesses.  God 
simply is, and his being is what makes our existence possible.  “The divine being and life 
and act takes place with ours, and it is only as the divine takes place that ours takes 
place.”4 Far more than being a statement about humanity’s general existence as the will 
and work of God, “God with us” speaks of a single and particular event that has 
significance for all time and space—the salvation of humankind.  “God with us” is God’s 
                                                
2 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV/2, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh:  T & T Clark, 1956) ix. 
3 Ibid., 5. 
4 Ibid., 7. 
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Yet and Nevertheless, his not merely coming alongside human beings, or to be before or 
behind them, but God’s becoming human for humanity’s sake. 
God’s condescension to be with us results in our being exalted to God—not to be 
God or like God, but to be in fellowship with God.  This new fellowship with God “does 
not mean the extinguishing of our humanity, but its establishment…our true and highest 
activation.”5 God’s condescension also means there is included in the statement “God 
with us” a corresponding “We with God.”  We are “summoned…lifted up…awakened to 
our own truest being as life and act...set in motion by the fact that in that one man God 
has made Himself our peacemaker and the giver and gift of our salvation.”6  This 
summoning, lifting up, and awakening enables our participation in God’s being, our 
absorption into the history of the acts of God, our sharing in the grace of God’s 
condescension to us, and our freedom to exist and live responsibly as the Christian 
community.  “This ‘We with God’ enclosed in the ‘God with us’ is Christian faith, 
Christian love, and Christian hope,” the heart of the Christian message.7 
 Barth is emphatic in his belief that we understand the meaning of “God with us” 
in the name and person of Jesus Christ.  Jesus Christ is Lord.  Jesus Christ is God.  Jesus 
Christ is Emmanuel, God with us, and God in the work of reconciliation.   
The name of Jesus Christ covers the whole power of the Christian message 
because it indicates the whole of its content, because at its heart, which is 
normative for the whole, it is a message about Him, and therefore a message 
about the event of that ‘God with us.’8 
 
                                                
5 Ibid., 14-15. 
6 Ibid., 14. 
7 Ibid., 15. 
8 Ibid., 18. 
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Jesus Christ is very God and very man, the one in and through whom God simultaneously 
condescends to and exalts sinful humanity.  He is the first and eternal Word of God, the 
knowledge of whom is the subject-matter, origin and content of the doctrine of 
reconciliation.  Jesus is the key to understanding the whole of the Dogmatics, and 
especially the doctrine of reconciliation.  He is the Son of God who makes his way into 
the “far country,” the act whereby God, in God’s own power and will, humbles himself to 
become the brother of humanity.  In every aspect and part of this doctrine, Jesus Christ is 
“the beginning and the middle and the end.”9 This does not mean God has given up being 
God in becoming a creature.  “God gives Himself, but He does not give Himself away.”10 
God’s condescension to humanity in Jesus is precisely how God is revealed and 
reconciliation is achieved.  In this Jesus, who is the Word of God, the church finds the 
way to the realm of words in which it is made able to speak about God.  Jesus creates the 
possibility of reconciling speech, and inaugurates for the faithful the way to utter the truth 
that once upon a time was unspeakable.  In fact, “apart from and without Jesus Christ we 
can say nothing at all about God and man and their relationship one with another.”11 
Barth defines reconciliation as “the fulfilment of the covenant between God and 
man.”12  Reconciliation is the maintenance, restitution and resumption of a harmonious 
relationship and fellowship that used to exist between God and humanity, but that became 
threatened with annihilation.  That original fellowship, which came under threat, but is 
                                                
9 Ibid., 125. 
10 Ibid., 185. 
11 Ibid., 45, emphasis mine. 
12 Ibid., 22. 
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now restored and fulfilled in Jesus Christ through reconciliation, Barth describes as 
covenant.13  “Jesus Christ is the Word and work of the eternal covenant.”14  He is the 
content, subject, and basis of this act of atonement.  What God begins with Israel, Jesus 
brings into completion as the Mediator, the God-Man, God’s gift of grace to humanity 
made manifest by Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection.  Jesus Christ “is the atonement.”15  
He is “the eschatological realisation of the will of God for Israel and therefore for the 
whole race.  And as such He is also the revelation of this divine will and therefore of the 
covenant.”16  The “covenant as the presupposition of reconciliation” refers to the 
reconciliation made complete in the pre-existent Deus pro nobis, who is the first and 
eternal Word, of which Jesus Christ is the content and form.  Reconciliation transpires in 
the refusal of this Deus pro nobis to abandon the world and humanity in the unlimited 
need of its situation, in God’s will to bear this need as his own, his taking humanity’s 
need upon himself, and crying with humanity in its need.17 
Crucial to this investigation is Barth’s belief that the resurrection of Jesus did not 
occur merely spiritually or metaphysically.  Jesus’ resurrection from the dead was not, as 
Bultmann believed, a result of a spontaneous and simultaneous welling up of Easter faith 
among the disciples.  The disciples did not induce the resurrection through warm 
recollections of their time together with Jesus.  Rather, the resurrection of Jesus Christ 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., 54. 
15 Ibid., 34, emphasis mine. 
16 Ibid., 35. 
17 Ibid., 215. 
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from the dead was an event, following the scandal of the cross, that occurred within time 
and space.  The resurrection  
has necessarily to do with an event [as] something which cannot be disputed on 
any exegesis which is in any way sound or permissible.  And we can widen the 
circumference of agreement which can be presupposed: the New Testament is 
speaking of an event in time and space.18 
  
This resurrection from the dead is “the verdict of the Father,” the vindication of 
God’s saving purpose for man.  “The resurrection of Jesus Christ is the great verdict of 
God, the fulfilment and proclamation of God’s decision concerning the event of the 
cross.”19  
Barth’s theology of the Holy Spirit emphasizes the historicity of the resurrection 
of Jesus as the verdict of the Father.  “The Holy Spirit is the awakening power in which 
Jesus Christ has formed and continually renews His body, i.e., His own earthly-historical 
form of existence, the one holy catholic and apostolic church.”20  It is God the Holy Spirit 
who is about the business of reconciliation in Christ’s body as it exists in the earthly-
historical Christian community, the gathering of justified humanity.  We can know 
nothing at all about God and God’s relationship to humanity apart from this awakening 
power.  Therefore, we cannot truly comprehend the nature and purpose of reconciliation 
apart from God’s reconciling activity as it occurs in and through the church.  To be sure, 
it is not by humanity’s own power that it is able to participate in the divine act of 
reconciliation.  If reconciliation is to take place “in the Christian community and 
Christian faith,  
                                                
18 Ibid., 337. 
19 Ibid., 309. 
20 Ibid., 643. 
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…if man is to will what of himself he cannot will and do what of himself he 
cannot do, then it must be on the basis of a particular address and gift, in virtue of 
a particular awakening power of God, by which he is born again to this will and 
ability, to the freedom of this action, and under the lordship and impulse of which 
he is another man, in defiance of his being and status as a sinner.  God in this 
particular address and gift, God in this awakening power, God as the Creator of 
this other man, is the Holy Spirit.21 
    
 The above overview of key themes creates the necessary context for further 
exploration of Barth’s use of enemy language.  It provides the infrastructure for further 
discussion by defining the terms of the theological assertions Barth claims are the 
foundations of his Dogmatics:  that God is God, that he is with us, and that we are with 
God.  God is with us particularly in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, in 
whom God fulfills his original covenant with Israel, and in whose Spirit God continues to 
proclaim his love for the world through God’s elect, the church.  Most importantly, this 
overview confirms that henceforth every mention of enemy-language within the 
Dogmatics falls within the purview of a theology that confesses a God who has already 
reconciled the world in Christ. 
 
1.2  WHO IS AN ENEMY? 
 Enemy is in one sense a polyvalent word for Barth.  He defines it in various ways, 
and applies the term in several different contexts.  Yet, those contexts are always 
contained within the theological scope of his Dogmatics.  One cannot comprehend 
Barth’s enemy-language apart from his doctrine of reconciliation, in particular.  Barth is 
both careful and strategic when using the word enemy, whether in its singular or plural 
                                                
21 Ibid., 645. 
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form.  Discussions involving enemy-language never define enemy in any generic sense.  
In each instance, the term has a distinct meaning for the Christian community, a meaning 
that would be unintelligible apart from the context of the church.  For example, it 
becomes clear that Barth does not believe anyone can presume to know who or what their 
true enemies are apart from their relationship with Jesus Christ.  “On the little stool which 
he thinks is a throne, man does create facts.”22  These facts are not really facts but 
illusions. 
And there begins the whole misery of the moral battle of everyone against 
everyone else, in which, whatever position we take up or line we adopt or banner 
we follow, we are always deceived about our friends as well as our enemies, 
wronging the former just as much by our affirmation as the latter by our negation, 
sowing and reaping discord as the children of discord.23 
  
 One is able to discern an enemy only through participation in the reconciling 
activity of God through the church, the body of Christ in its earthly-historical form.  A 
non-Christian or unbeliever could not assume mutual understandings and shared 
definitions of enemy terminology with a confessing Christian.  Barth’s strict 
christocentric grammar conscripts enemy-language for the church.   
 Barth speaks of the church’s mission being not to deny the mission of the state, 
but to include and transcend it.  He models how to practice his claim in the way he speaks 
of the enemy.  Though the state has tried to determine who the enemy is for everyone 
under its jurisdiction, the Christian includes the state’s definition of enemy only to 
transcend that definition through the Christian practice of loving enemies—of requiting 
                                                
22 IV/1, 447. 
23 Ibid., 451. 
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“like with unlike.”24  In doing so, the mission of the church “resists and overcomes the 
enemy, the man who refuses to accept the message of reconciliation.  For it does not 
recognise him seriously as an enemy.  It does not allow him to persist in his hostility to 
the extent of provoking retaliation.”25  The enemy is the one who refuses to accept the 
message of reconciliation.26  Though the state has told everyone—including the 
Christian—who the enemy is, the Christian transcends the state’s definition, receiving the 
enemy while refusing to become his enemy.  The word enemy appears to be a universally 
accepted term when the state defines it, yet despite the state’s official framework, the 
Christian is not seduced.  Even within this framework, “he does not refuse communion to 
the enemy, but to evil.  And for this reason he seeks it even with the enemy.”27  Because 
the Christian has accepted God’s message of reconciliation in Jesus, he is able to 
recognize those who have not yet done so, and to respond to them as one who knows 
what those outside the Christian community do not yet know. 
 From this perspective of Barth’s, it would seem that a Christian could never truly 
have enemies, especially if he continually seeks communion with them.  Is it a 
contradiction to identify as an enemy someone with whom communion is sought?  Does 
this mean the Christian’s enemy is also simultaneously his neighbor?  At times, Barth 
                                                
24 II/2, 720-21 
25 II/2, 721. 
26 Here Barth seems to suggest every non-Christian would be a Christian’s enemy.  But just prior to this 
claim, Barth says, “As Christians themselves were reconciled to God when they were still enemies (Rom. 
5:16), so now they must undertake and fulfill the ministry of reconciliation (2 Cor. 5:18) while others are 
still enemies” II/2, 720.  The implication is that the Christian who recognizes reconciliation is also able to 
recognize when others reject reconciliation.  In this recognition, Christians are able to discern precisely 
who the “enemy” is, and therefore who it is Jesus is calling them to love. 
27 Ibid. 
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moves freely between these two seemingly contradictory terms—neighbor and enemy.  
The Christian has a neighbor in one to whom he shows mercy.  “We see and have a 
neighbor when we are wholly the givers and he can only receive.”28  But in the same line 
of thought, the neighbor can also be an enemy.  “We see and have [a neighbor] when he 
cannot repay us and especially when he is an enemy, someone who hates us and injures 
us and persecutes us.”29  The neighbor and the enemy of the Christian can be one and the 
same person.  The neighbor and the enemy are the same person especially when the 
enemy hates, injures, and persecutes us (the “us” is in reference to Christians).  The 
enemy’s injurious intentions heighten the necessity of the Christian to respond to an 
enemy as a neighbor, as this one in need of the unconditional mercy of the Christian.  
Barth extends a parallel idea from Jesus’ command in Matthew 5:44 that the disciples 
should love their enemies.  “This destroys the whole friend-foe relationship, for when we 
love our enemy he ceases to be our enemy.”30   
 Barth believes the act of what the New Testament calls love can only take place 
between Christians.  This does not mean the Christian community is an end in itself, but 
that it exists for the sake of the world, so that the love between Christians serves as a 
“representative manifestation of the action for which all are determined.”31  This love is, 
therefore, not a universal love of humanity.  It is not agape for everyone.  The love of 
                                                
28 I/2, 419. 
29 Ibid. 
30 IV/2, 550. 
31 Ibid., 805. 
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God and of Jesus can neither be practiced by all, nor addressed to all, with the following 
exception:   
It is in respect of the love demanded in Mt. 5:43-48—not also but specifically—
for the enemy, for the persecutor of the community, to be addressed to him in the 
form of intercession...As the most interesting and relevant form of the non-
Christian the enemy is proleptically received into the community when he is 
loved and not hated.32 
   
 The love exchanged between members of the body of Christ occurs within the 
Christian community, which, with the exception of the enemy’s piercing it, remains a 
closed circle of disciples.  The Christian is ready to love everyone, but the love he is 
ready to give can only come from within the Christian community that knows how to 
love.  The opportunity to love the enemy is that unique circumstance in which Christians 
may display the extraordinary quality of Christ’s love formed in them by the fellowship 
of believers. 
 There is a similar dialectic in the Dogmatics in relation to whether God has 
enemies.  Just as the Christian may have an enemy who is simultaneously a neighbor, so 
God has enemies whom he simultaneously loves and draws close to himself as friends.  It 
is an example of the Yet and Nevertheless of God’s reconciling the world to himself in 
Jesus Christ that humanity is both God’s enemy and friend.   
So far as God’s revelation as such achieves, what only God can achieve, namely, 
the restoration of man’s communion with God, destroyed, nay annihilated by us, 
so far as, in the fact of revelation, God’s enemies are already His friends, 
revelation itself is reconciliation.33 
   
                                                
32 Ibid. 
33 I/1, 468 (409). 
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On the one hand, yes, God has enemies.  We are God’s enemies.  We are the 
enemies of God “because our disposition to Him is hostile.”34  We are “defiant sinners, 
the obstinately godless, the open enemies of God.”35  We are God’s bitterest enemies.36  
To be God’s enemy is the “guilty determination of our existence.”37  To be God’s enemy 
is to be hopelessly lost, given to perdition without mercy or refuge, counsel or help.  “All 
men have to look...and see themselves as they really are, and confess that their cloaks are 
only cloaks, and that in reality they too are manifestly enemies of God.”38   
 There are no exceptions.  There is no haven where the Christian, who is caught up 
in participation with God’s activity on the world’s behalf, is exempted from this enemy 
status.  Even the likes of Enoch, Moses, and Elijah hold no special place in this sense, 
and they have no ability to choose to die “gladly” or “full of years.”  There is no such 
general privilege.  That each of them did so amounts to “an extraordinary intervention of 
God...They themselves have no capacity to choose such an end.  They are all God’s 
debtors and enemies.  Of themselves, they can only die an evil death.”39 
 Humanity is God’s enemy because of the negative act of its rebellion against 
God’s grace.  Humanity is particularly the enemy of God in that it is the enemy of the 
grace of God.  Humanity in its hostility toward God rejects God’s free gift of himself.  It 
is precisely to human beings as the rejecters of God’s grace that  
                                                
34 IV/1, 515. 
35 IV/1, 282. 
36 I/2, 380.  
37 II/1, 398. 
38 III/3, 222. 
39 III/2, 637. 
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God’s choice has given that which was inaccessible to him and undeserved by 
him—and  more, that which he has positively rejected—the grace of God.  This 
grace is for him, the enemy of God, in spite of his enmity and in spite of his 
negative act, rejecting his representation of himself as rejected, forgiving his sins, 
as the justification of the godless.40 
 
 God gives himself to humanity but is rejected by humanity, in spite of the fact that 
God has given himself fully to all people on the cross.  It is this person, the human being 
as hater of God, who in spite of God’s grace continues to hate God and be hateful to God, 
that God recognizes as his enemy.  “From eternity God knows every man to be this 
enemy.”41 
 On the other hand, though humanity is God’s bitter enemy, there is hope for 
humankind established from eternity in Jesus Christ.  “Those who come to Christ were 
already sons of God in his heart, though in themselves they were still his enemies. And 
since they had been predestined to life, they were given to Christ.”42  Apart from God’s 
condescension to humanity in the person and work of Jesus Christ, we would be left to 
destruction, to God’s anger and judgment.  Left to our own devices, we would have 
incurred divine judgment and wrath.  Thus, because of God’s redeeming work in Jesus, 
humanity cannot remain God’s enemy. 
Indeed the first and essential thing that He has decreed for [man] in His Son is his 
election to covenant with Him.  He loves His enemies, the godless:  not because 
they are godless; not because they seek to be free of Him; but because He will 
not let them break away; because in consequence they cannot really break away 
from Him.  What is laid up for man is eternal life in fellowship with God.43 
  
                                                
40 II/2, 317. 
41 Ibid., emphasis mine. 
42 II/2, 328 (Barth quoting Calvin; the above is translated from Latin). 
43 II/2, 319. 
    
 
25 
 Humanity is God’s enemy, but by God’s grace that is not the end of the matter.  
“God loves man as this enemy.”44  In this love for humanity as his enemy we see the full 
disclosure of the sovereignty of God, who loves human beings despite their being 
unworthy of His love.  God “loves him notwithstanding his unworthiness and hostility.  
Indeed, He loves him just because of it.”45 
 While “the falsehood of man is the great enemy which resists the divine promise 
declared in the prophetic work of Jesus Christ, but which is at once smitten and routed by 
the immanent power of this promise, the power of the resurrection of Jesus Christ,”46 
humanity also manages to make God its enemy.  Humanity seeks its own way.  People 
believe they can be free without God, and make decisions on their own apart from God.  
A person in his stupidity, in his sloth and misery, becomes a person of disorder.  “And as 
we become and are men of disorder, God necessarily becomes a stranger and enemy.  For 
He is a God of order and peace.  He is the Creator and Guarantor of the peace designed 
for man in his own nature as the soul of his body.”47  In the folly of its pride, humanity 
has not only become God’s enemy, but has also made God its enemy.  Such is the nature 
and cause of the utter hopelessness of humanity apart from God’s determination to save it.   
 Humanity cannot save itself.  “Man may think that he can and should be gracious 
to himself, but this is impossible.  He thinks and acts as his own helper, but believing that 
he is his own best friend he is all the time his own worst enemy.”48  Indeed, humanity, as 
                                                
44 IV/2, 767. 
45 Ibid. 
46 IV/3, 434. 
47 IV/2, 460. 
48 IV/1, 465. 
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believer in itself as such, becomes a stranger to itself, an enemy of faith in God’s “divine 
readiness” to help humanity in its dire need.  “The enemy of this faith...is man’s faith in 
himself.”49  This rejection of God’s graciousness constitutes a sickness in humanity 
manifested in its confession of sin both in the world and in itself.  Human beings confess 
in a “friend-enemy relationship” to God when, in the instance of their presupposing 
God’s opposition to all things human, they forget that God is the gracious God.  A person 
confesses as 
God’s detective, policeman and bailiff, against various things in the world and 
the Church, and, if he is sincere, supremely against himself.  For the fact that a 
man is basically at war against himself can only lead him in his confessing to war 
against others, just as in confessing against others he will always be led back to 
the war against himself.50 
 
 Though at times such confessing seems a sincere act, it betrays a fundamental 
assumption that God stands against his creation.  This amounts to a perversion that breeds 
“doubt and hatred against God in others and supremely in himself!”51  It is a sign of 
humanity’s rejection of God’s reconciliation.  This rejection of God’s free gift makes 
humanity its own worst enemy.  Human beings fail to comprehend not only that God has 
acted to save them despite their sin, but that only God can accomplish their salvation.  
Barth illumines the distinction in biblical Greek between καταλλάσσειν (reconciling), 
which is said only of God, and καταλλαγῆναι (being reconciled) said only of humanity.52  
God does the reconciling.  Human beings can only be the passive recipients of the gift 
only God can give. 
                                                
49 III/1, 40. 
50 III/4, 81. 
51 Ibid., 82. 
52 IV/1, 74. 
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 To acquire character—which Barth calls “a work of the grace of God on 
man”53—a person must realize he is in this particular struggle against himself.  His 
acquisition of character occurs through “a very different and more difficult struggle than 
the one against strange influences, external authorities etc. can ever be—a struggle in 
which he must take the field not only for but primarily against himself and press on to 
freedom.”54  Humanity’s pride causes it to turn away from God toward itself, to become 
curved in upon itself (Augustine).  This is exactly what is wrong with humanity.  The 
pride-fueled movement away from God alienates humanity from God, makes God 
humanity’s enemy, and invites the wrath of God.55  In the final analysis, humanity 
becomes an enemy both of God and of itself in this betrayal of God.  We cannot realize 
or acknowledge and confess this on our own.  We may know it “solely from the divine 
accusation levelled against us, and therefore solely from the Word of God.”56 
 At the same time, God and humanity also have several enemies in common.  One 
of those enemies is, literally, nothing.  Nothing, or “nothingness,” is that which aims to 
destroy human beings, that does not let people breathe and live, that harasses them with 
fear and pain, and as such is both the enemy of God and of humanity.  “God Himself 
engages the nothingness...and opposes and contradicts its onslaught on His creation and 
triumph over His creature.”57  Nothingness is the uncompromising adversary, the 
“negative which is more than the mere complement of an antithetical positive,” the 
                                                
53 III/4, 388. 
54 Ibid., emphasis mine. 
55 IV/1, 533. 
56 III/2, 30. 
57 IV/2, 225. 
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antithesis to God Himself and to “the totality of the created world.”58  It can only be 
active in creation as an absolute alien that opposes and contradicts all positive and 
negative elements of creation, though it has “no substantive existence within creation.”59  
Nothingness is “aberration, transgression, evil.”60  It can only be perceived and discerned 
through the knowledge of Jesus Christ, who became flesh, who revealed God to us in the 
flesh, and who therefore is the source of all Christian knowledge.  In Jesus, God has 
already defeated this enemy of nothingness.  He stands victorious over nothingness, 
having made it to be impotent by the incarnation through which He revealed its true 
nature and threat.61  Because nothingness is God’s enemy, “because it is He who allows it 
to be this, because He has made the controversy with it His affair, it cannot be an eternal 
enemy or have perpetuity.”62 
 Another common enemy between God and humanity is sin, which relates directly 
to nothingness.  God  
opposes and contradicts sin because it is sin which opens the door for the 
invasion of His creation by nothingness, because in sin the creature delivers itself 
up to it, itself becoming futile and chaotic. He is wrathful against His own true 
enemy, which is also the true enemy of man, when He is wrathful against sin.63 
  
 Sin is a complex term, as Barth defines it both as an enemy of God and humans, 
but also as something that causes humanity to become an enemy of God.  When a person 
sins, he places himself against God as an enemy.  Sin is a verb and a noun, an act and an 
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61 Ibid., 312. 
62 Ibid., 362, original emphasis. 
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entity.  In both its forms, though, it remains a common enemy between God and 
humanity.  Sin turns creature and creation against the grain of God’s saving activity on 
behalf of his creatures and his creation, and against God’s intentions for humanity.  Just 
as Adam’s sin opened the door to creation’s invasion by nothingness, every sin of every 
person opens the door to nothingness again and again.  Apart from God’s triumph over 
sin in Jesus Christ, nothingness would continue in its threat toward creation unabated. 
 Death is the primary obstacle for God in his victory over sin and nothingness, 
making death, itself, yet another enemy in Barth’s Dogmatics.  Death is the 
“condemnation and destruction of the creature...the offender against God and the last 
enemy.”64  But by Jesus’ resurrection from the dead, God reveals that he has put an end 
to death, and to the onslaught of nothingness and its power to destroy humanity.  In his 
incarnation, Jesus, who is God, exposes himself to annihilation by death, but confirms his 
victory over it in being raised from the dead.   
In Him, i.e., in contradistinction to Him, nothingness is exposed in its entirety as 
the adversary which can destroy both body and soul in hell, as the evil one which 
is also the destructive factor of evil and death that stands in sinister conflict 
against the creature and its Creator, not merely as an idea which man may 
conceive and to which he can and does give allegiance but as the power which 
invades and subjugates and carries him away captive, so that he is wholly and 
utterly lost in fact of it.65 
  
 Thus far, this exploration has revealed the diversity of enemy language Barth uses 
to illustrate his claims about God, God’s relationship to humanity, and relationships 
between people.  It is clear that Barth believes God has enemies.  Mainly, those enemies 
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include humanity, nothingness, sin, and death.66  Human beings have numerous enemies, 
as well, including God, nothingness, sin, death, and other humans.  On the other hand, the 
enemy relationship between God and humanity is not permanent or concretized.  Human 
hostility toward God has been overcome in Jesus Christ, who, as “God With Us,” has 
stood in humanity’s place and abolished the hostility between us and God.  God is not 
inimical toward humans, though a person in his sin may choose to remain hostile to God.  
Even then, God lovingly seeks to expose his foolishness and hostility, and to lead him 
into the truth that God has already achieved reconciliation between himself and humanity 
in Jesus Christ.   
 Though Barth speaks of God having enemies in the present tense, it seems he only 
does so to clarify what he believes is theologically true.  Barth even bypasses any use of 
enemy language that is resigned to the permanency of inimical relationships.  The 
trajectory of his language and his entire Doctrine of Reconciliation suggests what is 
theologically true about God is that, in the person and work of Jesus Christ, God has 
abolished humanity’s status as an enemy.  Quoting Romans 5:16, Barth says, “Christians 
were reconciled to God when they were still enemies.”67  Since Jesus has taken on man’s 
flesh and identified himself with the enemies of God, man can no longer be God’s enemy, 
for then Jesus would be implicated.  This is impossible, since then Jesus, who is very God, 
would be set against God.  God would be divided against himself.   
                                                
66 It may be helpful to note a peculiar instance in which Barth refers to the Gospel as having enemies, 
which he calls nominal Christians:  “And to-day, it is not the righteousness of works which is the enemy of 
the Gospel, but the indifference and the secularism of the masses who are only nominally Christian” (I/2, 
655). 
67 II/2, 720. 
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 It is also clear that Barth sees Christians’ enemies as those who approach the 
community from the outside with inimical, harmful, and injurious purposes.  The enemy 
of the Christian is the one who rejects the love the Christian offers, who continues to do 
violence, mock, persecute, and denigrate the church in spite of the love extended to him.  
This is part of Barth’s interpretation of Jesus’ admonition in the Sermon on the Mount to 
“love your enemies.”  Because it is an address to his disciples—those in his immediate 
circle, seated before him as those eager to listen, those who have accepted his call to 
come and follow—there is no reference to animosity other than the particular kind that is 
directed from the world to the church.  After all, the Sermon is not merely an address to 
the general public, though anyone within earshot of Jesus’ witness is welcome to join the 
disciples and follow him.   
 What remains to be seen is whether the case can be made that Barth could 
conceive of Christians being enemies with each other.  Barth assumes a kind of 
impenetrable unity among Christians; they remain united in a cohesive unit in terms of 
their turning to embrace their enemies.  They can do so in complete confidence that God 
has already arranged their success in this endeavor.  
Christians do not need to form a party in the struggle against the wicked, but can 
and must continue undismayed to tread the way of fellowship with the latter, 
because God has long ago taken sides against their violence, has long since 
barred their way so that although they may rattle the bolt they cannot open the 
door.68 
 
 For Barth, God is united with himself in his abolishing the hostility between 
himself and humanity, and God approaches humanity as one entity in this act of 
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redemption.  Likewise, Christians, as the members of one Holy Apostolic and Catholic 
church, approach their enemies as one entity.  As a loving fellowship of disciples, they 
constitute the unified Body of Christ.  The wicked compose another entity, as is seen in 
the way Barth depicts them as one distinct side in this meeting, which is “objectively 
controlled by the order which God, the Father of Jesus Christ, has established and 
confirmed even in the world outside the church, His Son being the King and Ruler over 
all powers, and ruling as such in might.”69  The point is that Barth leans away from any 
gray area in which a Christian could define another Christian as an enemy.  Christians 
have enemies, yes, but Barth never sets a conversation in the context of Christians 
considering other Christians as enemies.  His interpretation is that, from cover to cover, 
the Bible does not refer either to Israel’s or the church’s enemies as coming from within 
their respective faith communities.  Barth sees a specific kind of enmity as constitutive of 
a Christian’s true enemy, an enmity born out of the rejection of the church’s testimony 
and visible witness of God’s reconciling activity in Jesus Christ.  Therefore, a Christian is 
by definition incapable of this kind of enmity toward another Christian, since in order to 
have such enmity one must stand outside the saving knowledge of Christ’s life, death, 
and resurrection.   
 Has Barth been careful in his use of enemy-language and its multiple 
applications?  Has he given enough thought to how beneficial this aspect of his 
theological-grammatical model might be for the church as it is drawn into participation in 
God’s reconciliation of the world?  Would it be fair to ask how the church catholic should 
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navigate the world Barth describes?  Does Jesus’ imperative, “Love your enemies,” apply 
to hostility between Christians?  Can there be hostility without enmity?70 
 Barth has not sidestepped these important questions.  For Barth, the brutal fact 
that Christians have already killed and continue to kill other Christians cannot override 
the truth about God that Barth exhaustively asserts on biblical grounds, that in Jesus 
Christ “all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through him God was pleased to 
reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, by making peace through 
the blood of his cross.”71  The reconciliation has already taken place.  Sin and death have 
already been defeated.  God has reconciled humanity to himself in Jesus Christ.  There 
are those who acknowledge this truth and live by it, and those who do not.  The divisions 
in the church caused by those in the latter category Barth calls “a dark mystery, a 
scandal,” for “the disunity of the church is a scandal.”72   
If a man can acquiesce in divisions, if he can even take pleasure in them, if he 
can be complacent in relation to the obvious faults and errors of others and 
therefore his own responsibility for them, then that man may be a good and loyal 
confessor in the sense of his own particular denomination, he may be a good 
Roman Catholic or Reformed or Orthodox or Baptist, but he must not imagine 
that he is a good Christian.  He has not honestly and seriously believed and 
known and confessed the una ecclesia.  For the una ecclesia cannot exist if there 
is a second or third side by side with or opposed to it.  It cannot exist in 
opposition to another Church.  It cannot be one among many.73 
 
 Furthermore, Barth believes “the co-existence and opposition of the Churches in 
place of the one Church has...been a very potent factor for evil,”74 meaning, in part, that 
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71  Colossians 1:19-20. 
72  IV/1, 676-677. 
73  Ibid., 676. 
74  Ibid., 677. 
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division in the church has been both a cause and a catalyst for the world’s violence.  In 
these statements we detect Barth’s pain resulting from a shortage of words to explain 
even Christians’ hatred of one another.  It is as though Barth literally comes to the end of 
words when categorizing these utter failures as “mystery” and “scandal.”  He provides a 
way for the church to speak about its own who are in opposition to one another, who 
harbor murderous enmity toward one another.  Yet, it is hard to bear the heavy weight of 
Barth’s argument that some Christians are simply not good Christians (he does not say 
they are not Christian, but that they are not good Christians).  If Barth is right, even these 
bad Christians must be included as members of Christ’s body, a body that bleeds most 
profusely from its self-inflicted wounds. 
 What this exploration reveals, though, is that Barth is mercurial in the way he uses 
enemy language.  For example, an inconsistency emerges in his speaking of a person 
being his own worst enemy, while at the same time not allowing for a Christian to be the 
enemy of another Christian.  If a person, whether Christian or not, can be his own worst 
enemy, why cannot a Christian consider another Christian an enemy?  If a person, even a 
Christian, considers himself his own worst enemy, what is to prevent him from 
considering another member of the church—a member of the same body, of which his 
own body is a part—as an enemy?  Furthermore, it is doubtful that Barth’s theological 
agenda, and his own refusal to acknowledge Christians’ being enemies of one another, 
would prevent a Christian in the sight of another Christian’s rifle, or at the mercy of 
another Christian’s machete, from considering his combatant as an enemy.   
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 But this is not, and should not be, unthinkable.  Ironically, Barth’s theology of 
reconciliation fills these grammatical gaps.  Whether Barth himself provides the church 
with a grammar that permits a Christian to consider another Christian an enemy or not, 
his conviction that God has already reconciled the world to himself in Christ guides his 
intentional avoidance of naming Christians as enemies of one another.  Here is where 
Barth’s theology of reconciliation provides guidance for the church’s use of enemy-
language.  Even though Barth wrote in the midst of a century of World Wars and 
genocides in which millions of Christians slaughtered one another, he refuses to depart 
from the New Testament’s own refusal to establish a language whereby Christians may 
categorize one another as enemies.  Because God is God, we can only be whoever God 
says we are.  If the God who is fully revealed in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ says he has reconciled all people to himself, and Christians are witnesses of this 
truth, then confessing Christians who regard other Christians as enemies have simply 
forgotten who God says they are.  If their language toward one another is unintelligible as 
Christian speech, then it is a fallen language they speak.  It is sinful speech.  For if it is 
through hearing that we are saved, it is through speech that the world of God’s kingdom 
is revealed to us.  If a Christian holds his sword to another Christian’s throat and calls 
him an enemy, he tells a lie.  It may be a “factual lie,” in the sense that the one speaking it 
may believe he is telling the truth, but it is still a lie.  In God’s eyes, they are neighbors 
who either lack the capacity to name one another as such, or refuse to do so.   
  Such a refusal would be tantamount to committing the unforgivable sin.  For 
Barth, it is not suicide that constitutes the unforgivable sin, but works righteousness—
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acting on the belief that we earn grace apart from God’s merciful acts.75  Works 
righteousness is rooted in the belief that God is not the merciful God he says he is.  In all 
three synoptic Gospels in which Jesus refers to the unforgivable sin, he does so following 
a Pharisaic challenge to his divine authority to cast out demons.  The common link 
throughout Matthew, Mark, and Luke on this matter is blasphemy—irreverent speech, or 
impious speech against God.  It is an unforgivable sin to speak as though God has not 
done in Jesus what Jesus says God has done through him by the power of the Holy Spirit.  
The unforgivable sin is a sin of speech—a trespassing utterance.  After mentioning the 
unforgivable sin in Matthew, Jesus says, “I tell you, on the day of judgment you will have 
to give an account for every careless word you utter, for by your words you will be 
justified, and by your words you will be condemned” (Matt. 12:37). 
 For a Christian to call another Christian an enemy is an unforgivable sin.  It is 
unforgivable because it denies not only that the Christian’s brother-oppressor is forgiven, 
but that the Christian-victim is also forgiven.  Christians are those who forgive because 
they have been made participants in the saving knowledge that God has forgiven them.  
Though a Christian may be the victim of another Christian’s violence, by calling him an 
enemy, he has rejected the truth that his murderer is also his neighbor, joined to him in 
baptism, forgiven, and, therefore, deserving of the unlimited forgiveness commanded by 
Jesus to be extended between church members.76 
                                                
75 For Barth’s discussion on suicide and the unforgivable sin, see III/4, 404ff. 
76  i.e. Matthew 18:21-22. Peter’s language sustains my point.  He does not describe the one who has sinned 
against him as “enemy,” but “brother.”  This brother is a “member of the church,” as the NRSV translates it, 
due to the context of Matthew 18’s detailed description of how the baptized are to relate to one another. 
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 This will be of small consolation to the Christian who is about to have one of his 
appendages severed by another Christian.  Nevertheless, the truth the martyrs have told 
by their deaths is that no matter who threatens the body, the one to be feared is God, who 
has authority to cast into hell.  If the church has long been so unfaithful that its members 
have neglected to cultivate the kind of language already given to them as a gift in the 
Scriptures (and to which Barth points us), and have thus wounded, maimed, and killed so 
many of their own as a result, then preachers must stand among those worthy of blame.  
Those to whom the message of reconciliation has been entrusted have been too slow to 
proclaim the truth Barth has challenged us to remember, which is that God has already 
made his decision about us: 
The man who is isolated over against God is as such rejected by God.  But to be 
this man can only be by the godless man’s own choice.  The witness of the 
community of God to every individual man consists in this:  that this choice of 
the godless man is void; that he belongs eternally to Jesus Christ and therefore is 
not rejected, but elected by God in Jesus Christ; that the rejection which he 
deserves on account of his perverse choice is borne and cancelled by Jesus 
Christ; and that he is appointed to eternal life with God on the basis of the 
righteous, divine decision.77 
 
 This is more than an assertion.  Here, Barth strikes the gavel in favor of 
Scripture’s peculiar grammar, including Jesus’ characteristic refusal to pit Christians 
against one another as enemies.   
 
1.3  “THE CRIMINALS WITH HIM!” 
John Marsh calls Barth’s prison sermons a “hidden ministry,” by which Barth 
exercised his “wonderful power to enter into the situation of the audience, and to speak 
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most relevantly to it.”78  One sermon, in particular, distinguishes itself as a homiletical 
test case for my argument about Barth’s use of enemy language, and leaves no doubt as 
to whether Barth personally applied his complex theology of reconciliation in a most 
challenging homiletical context.  Entitled, “The Criminals With Him!”, the meditation 
takes its inspiration from only one verse of Scripture, Luke 23:33:  “They crucified him 
with the criminals, one on either side of him.”  Through the concepts of identification, 
reconciliation, and communion, the ensuing proclamation shatters any presumptions 
about who is included in Christian community and who is not, who the enemy is and is 
not, and most of all, who it is that most surely constitutes the body of Christ. 
 Throughout the sermon, Barth accentuates the similarities between Jesus and the 
two criminals.  They experience the same public abuse, endure the same punishment, and 
meet the same fate.  “They are linked in a common bondage never again to be broken, 
just as the nails that fastened them to the piece of wood would never break” (76).  Jesus 
suffered the same lot they did.  He was “with them and they were with him” (78).  As 
well, the criminals “hang on their crosses with him and find themselves in solidarity and 
fellowship with him” (76).  In these particular ways Jesus not only identifies himself with 
the criminals—to be “numbered with the transgressors” (Isa. 53:12)—but achieves 
greater solidarity with them than with the disciples.  Unlike the disciples,  
in this hour [the criminals] could not abandon him, they could not sleep.  
Willingly or not, they were forced to watch with him many long hours on the 
cross.  Nor could they escape his dangerous company.  They could not very well 
deny him, being publicly exposed as his companions (77-78). 
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 Inasmuch as the criminals were united in solidarity with Jesus, Barth claims 
something else happened inwardly and invisibly in Jesus that could not have happened in 
the criminals with him.  He asserts that though Jesus was “a man like us,” he was “at the 
same time different from us because in him God himself was present and at work” (79).  
Barth reasons that this is the God who was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself (2 
Cor. 5:19).   
In Jesus, God took upon himself the full load of evil; he made our wickedness his 
own; he gave himself in his dear Son to be defamed as a criminal, to be accused, 
condemned, delivered from life unto death, as though he himself, the Holy God, 
had done all the evil we human beings did and do (80). 
 
Preaching to prisoners, Barth then provides what is arguably his most direct and eloquent 
definition of reconciliation:  “This is reconciliation:  his damnation our liberation, his 
defeat our victory, his mortal pain the beginning of our joy, his death the birth of our life” 
(80).  That one of the criminals “shared in the general, blind and hollow mockery” is “not 
important enough to invalidate the promise given so clearly, so urgently to both of them, 
indeed without distinction” (81).  Barth maintains that God’s reconciliation supplants this 
particular criminal’s obdurate mockery so completely that the unrepentant criminal 
remains—in spite of himself—one of two principal witnesses to God’s action in Jesus 
Christ.   
 “What witnesses they were!” Barth continues.  “How directly and closely these 
two not only saw with their eyes and heard with their ears but experienced in their flesh 
and in their own dying hearts: ‘broken for you, shed for you!” (82).  Though the disciples 
had recently shared the bread and cup of communion with Jesus, the two criminals 
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participated “not as mere spectators,” but in communion “with him, in the indissoluble 
bond uniting them,” where their own blood was shed (82).  Because they were the first to 
suffer and die with Jesus, they were also the first to be gathered by the promise Paul 
offers, that “if we have died with Christ, we believe that we shall also live with him 
(Romans 6:8)” (82).  If this is not scandalous enough, Barth continues:  
the promise is given only to crucified criminals, who are utterly compromised 
before God and before men, who move relentlessly toward the end and cannot 
escape this destiny by their own doing.  For men like these Jesus died.  And mark 
this:  precisely these, and these only, are worthy to go to the Lord’s Supper (83). 
 
 With his conclusion, Barth places Peter and the other disciples “in line behind” 
the two criminals, who are the first to identify with Jesus, to witness firsthand the 
consummation of his reconciling mission, and the first to commune with him by sharing 
in his cup of shed blood.  Furthermore, “men of all times” stand in line behind these 
criminals.   
We are such people, all of us—you in this house which is called a prison, with all 
the burden that brought you here and with your particular experiences in this 
place—those others of us outside who have different experiences and yet are, 
believe me, in the same predicament.  In reality we all are these people, these 
crucified criminals (83).     
   
If we think we are not also counted among the lawless, it is because we are not “ready to 
be told what we are” (83).  Herein lies one of the critical keys for unlocking Barth’s 
imagination about enemies.  If the first certain Christian community was composed 
entirely of criminals—one repentant, and the other resolutely hostile—where does that 
leave the rest of those who identify as members of the body of Christ?  According to 
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Barth, it leaves us in the back of a long line, the front of which is headed by two unnamed, 
condemned thieves. 
 
1.4  MIROSLAV VOLF AND STANLEY HAUERWAS 
What remains to be seen is how contemporary Christian theologians navigate the 
boundaries of enemy-language, and how Barth’s peculiar use of enemy-language 
perseveres through recent scholarly developments.  Miroslav Volf, a Croatian who taught 
in the midst of the war in Yugoslavia, has offered an extraordinary analysis of Christian 
identity in relation to the “other.”  His argument is all the more compelling for having 
been constructed with a direct view of the artillery-scarred buildings of his native country.  
Volf had just given a lecture in early 1993, during some of the most horrific violence by 
Serbs against Croats, when Jürgen Moltmann posed a jarring question, “But can you 
embrace a četnik?”79  Exclusion and Embrace is the result of Volf’s agonizing journey of 
being “pulled in two directions by the blood of the innocent crying out to God and by the 
blood of God’s Lamb offered for the guilty.”80  Does Volf’s argument expose cracks in 
the Barthian foundation laid above?  
 In Embrace, Volf resists a clear definition of the term “enemy,” opting instead to 
enfold all enemies in the larger purview of the “other.”  Unlike Barth, who sustains a rich, 
                                                
79 Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace: A Theological Exploration of Identity, Otherness, and 
Reconciliation (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996) 9. “Četnik” is a complex, centuries-old term, though the 
modern definition dates from the early 20th century through the wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In the 
context of Moltmann’s question, a četnik referred to Serbian nationalists who, in Volf’s words, were 
“sowing desolation in my native country, herding people into concentration camps, raping women, burning 
down churches, and destroying cities.” 
80 Ibid. 
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dialectical image of the enemy, Volf establishes the “other” as the common denominator 
for a terminology capable of describing human identity and difference.  For Volf, the 
“other” is not necessarily an enemy, but an enemy is always categorically “other.”  As a 
result, his use of other-language effectively supersedes enemy-language as the definitive 
terminology for his theology of reconciliation.  “We are who we are not because we are 
separate from others who are next to us, but because we are both separate and connected, 
both distinct and related; the boundaries that mark our identities are both barriers and 
bridges.”81  One’s identity completely dissolves in the absence of a relationship of 
reciprocity, of giving and receiving from the other.  We cannot be ourselves apart from 
the “other.”  The “other” is relationally constitutive of one’s identity.   
Drawing on Moltmann and John of Damascus, Volf establishes Trinitarian 
grounds for constructing a theology of reconciliation with the “other.”82  God the Father 
is the source of divinity, according to Moltmann, for “without such a source, it would be 
impossible to distinguish between the three persons; they would collapse into one 
undifferentiated divine nature.”83  The Son simultaneously “‘comes from’ and ‘goes to’ 
the Father, but the Father has ‘given all things into his hands’ and ‘glorifies the Son’ 
(John 13:1ff.; 17:1).”84  Each person of the Trinity is distinct from the other, not 
immanently, but economically.  The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are neither mere 
persons nor autonomous “relations,” but persons-in-relation, each perichoretically self-
                                                
81 Ibid., 66, original emphasis. 
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83 Volf, Embrace, 180. 
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giving to and “mutually indwelling” in the other.  “The Father is the Father not only 
because he is distinct from the Son and the Spirit but also because through the power of 
self-giving the Son and the Spirit dwell in him.  The same is true of the Son and of the 
Spirit.”85  Having thus “secured” the persons of the Trinity “from the dual threat of 
dissolution and inequality,” Volf posits the relational dynamic of the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit as the basic model for harmonious human relationships.  “God came into the 
world so as to make human beings, created in the image of God, live with one another 
and with God in the kind of communion in which divine persons live with one another.”86   
But a theological problem arises if we pursue Volf’s “other” language to its 
logical conclusion.  The Trinitarian precepts on which Volf depends arose in 
communities committed to certain practices, such as baptism, preaching, and Eucharist, 
which make apostolic faith in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit intelligible to the world.  
Yet, Volf writes with an assumption that all people can recognize the “other,” no matter 
what their identity may be.  That is, Volf assumes we know who the “other” is with as 
much certainty as the Godhead recognizes within itself, in the perfect harmony of divine 
interrelationship.  We cannot assume the “otherness” that accounts for the distinctiveness 
of each person of the Trinity is analogous to human relationships in universal terms.  This 
is tantamount to any human community projecting its own diversity onto the Godhead.  If 
otherness within the Godhead could be understood outside a confessing community of 
Christians, we might then have to admit the absurd possibility that Jesus, by his death and 
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resurrection, somehow reconciles the preexistent “otherness” inherent in the distinctions 
between the Persons of the Trinity.  If this were true, Volf’s own valid Trinitarian 
observations—which rightly defend the distinctions between the three Persons—would 
fall apart.   
Volf does not explain the qualitative differences between the divine Persons-in-
relation in a way that justifies his universal application of other-language for reconciling 
purposes.  The church that confesses faith in the Trinity is constituted and sustained by 
particular kinds of practices that are neither universally applicable nor universally 
understood.  In other words, Volf does not clarify what makes it possible for all people to 
understand who their “other” is.  Thus, either Volf’s expression of Trinitarian language is 
flawed, or other-language is too generic a means toward reconciling ends, and we must 
acknowledge that there needs to be a more detailed account of the qualities or levels of 
identity between human persons-in-relation as they are drawn ever deeper into the inner 
life of God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.   
Ultimately, other-language bypasses the manner in which Scripture, and Jesus in 
particular, equips us to recognize who our enemies truly are.  When it comes to concrete 
implementation, other-language places the human self at the center of reference.  We 
must first locate ourselves before determining the other’s identity from our own point of 
view.  Consequently, the other is not simply “the other,” but “the other-than-me.”  Such 
language potentially neutralizes any real ecclesiological identity or difference between 
individuals and communities, thereby ironically reestablishing Foucalt’s 
“hypermodernism”—which Volf attempts to outmaneuver—by obliterating all 
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boundaries, and effectively reducing every person to a kind of interchangeable hominid 
“other.”  From this position, even baptized Christian sisters or brothers are essentially as 
strange to one another as they would be to those of different traditions of faith and 
practice.  Despite Volf’s Christian perspective, he provides no ecclesiological practice as 
a point of reference for understanding or acknowledging the admittedly porous but no 
less real boundary between Christian and non-Christian.  It does matter for the church’s 
reconciling practices whether the agent of hostility and bloodshed is a Christian or not.  
The church, under the authority of Matthew 18, prescribes a particular approach to 
excluding and embracing a četnik who is also a “brother.”87  
It is not the case, however, that Volf’s other-language is bereft of Scriptural 
influence.  Every New Testament word translated as “reconciliation” or “reconcile” holds 
in common the root word, άλλασσω (to exchange; transform), which is derived from 
ἀλλος, which means “the other.”  Whether in Paul’s letters, Jesus’ use of the word in 
Matthew, or Luke’s use of the word in Acts, the basic function of the word remains the 
same.  The New Testament uses forms of the word “reconciliation” to indicate or 
promote the occurrence of a transformative, redemptive exchange with “the other.”  In no 
instance is a form of άλλασσω used to facilitate anything other than estranged parties 
moving from enmity to friendship.  Whether the reconciliation occurs between God and 
humankind, or between humans, the use of the root word άλλασσω only has a proper 
New Testament origin when it is used to denote exchange between individuals or groups 
who are or have been estranged.  Additionally, the very etymological structure of 
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άλλασσω encapsulates and performs the divine and human action the word signifies.  
Nevertheless, the overarching narrative of the New Testament employs these words with 
the church’s particular practices in mind, so that the embrace of the “other” is contingent 
upon the unique clarity afforded to Christian communities by those practices.  Thus, an 
ecclesiologically determined enemy-language that makes the God of Jesus Christ the 
center of reference offers a more substantial framework for a theology of reconciliation. 
 Volf’s language reveals that the community of which an enemy is a part, and the 
traditions that have shaped the enemy, are subjective in light of the preexistent, 
universally recognizable, objective “fact” that the enemy is the “other.”  Consequently, 
when it comes to human relationships, the most rudimentary element of a person’s 
existence cannot be baptismal identity but the human condition.  An enemy is not 
necessarily the one who rejects God’s message of reconciliation in Christ, as it finally is 
for Barth.  On the contrary, the enemy is anyone who intends to do harm to others.  
Because the linguistic dichotomy is other/other or us/them, instead of neighbor/enemy or 
brother-sister/enemy, the enemy could be anyone—Christian or not.  Such language 
relapses into humanist assumptions about reconciliation Volf tries to avoid, and bypasses 
the kind of Christ-centered ecclesial identity assumed to be constitutive of the church’s 
ability to discern enemies in the New Testament.  For all the good that can come of an 
understanding and embrace of the “other,” the theological substructure of other-language 
is linguistically insufficient for a robust Christian theology of reconciliation.  Volf would 
strengthen his argument with a fuller description of how divine communion might 
manifest itself through the church’s reconciling practices.  
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 Ironically, one of the church’s most contentious theologians offers just such an 
account.  Stanley Hauerwas, who has persistently called the church to work with its own 
peculiar grammar, posits the practice of Christian preaching as a central means by which 
the church may discern its enemies.  He believes there is a Christian way to speak that is 
not available to those who have not yet been “habituated by the language of the faith.”88  
Hauerwas views his theological task as a teacher primarily as an attempt to teach 
Scripture-shaped speech.  He challenges Christians to eschew any attempt “to save the 
world from danger by appealing to ‘universal values’ that result in justifications to coerce 
those who do not share what some consider universal.”89  Hauerwas’ logic frustrates 
attempts to speak of the “other” in humanist fashion.   
Christians do not believe in the ‘human.’  Christians believe in a God who 
requires we be able to recognize as well as confess our sins.  Exactly because 
Christians are in lifelong training necessary to be a sinner, it is our hope that we 
might be able to discern the evil that so often is expressed in idealistic terms.  So 
what Christians have to offer is not an explanation of evil, but rather a story, and 
a community formed by that story, that we believe saves us from the idols of the 
world.90   
 
Preaching this particular story is the means by which the church may become 
linguistically habituated to recognize enemies.   
 In his most direct description of the relationship between preaching and enemies, 
Hauerwas defines the “activity of preaching” as “the proclamation of a story that cannot 
be known apart from such proclamation.”91  A primary task of such proclamation is to 
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89 Ibid., 31.  
90 Ibid., 32. 
91 Hauerwas, “Preaching As Though We Had Enemies,” First Things, May 1995, 48. 
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“attack” the church’s enemies, for without enemies, there can be no Christianity.  
Moreover, he claims, “Christianity is unintelligible without enemies.  Indeed, the whole 
point of Christianity is to produce the right kind of enemies.”92  Good preaching must 
provide “a sense of where the battle is, what the stakes are, and what the long-term 
strategy might be.”93 
Not unlike Barth, Hauerwas identifies various types of enemies.  For example, 
“Caesar” is one of the church’s most pernicious enemies.  So are nihilism, tolerance, 
pietism, and war.  He castigates Protestant liberalism—which he believes is the modern 
result of Caesar’s having become a member of the church—for having “no enemies 
peculiar to being Christian,” and for going to church “to be assured we have no 
enemies.”94  Similarly, nihilism is the church’s enemy because it reduces the faith to 
interminably contingent “values.”  Nihilism actively exchanges the overarching narrative 
of the gospel for commodified values, effectively producing people “who believe they 
should have no story except the story they choose when they have no story.”95  This story, 
which Hauerwas says is “clearly a lie,” is essentially, 
the story of freedom and is assumed to be irreversibly institutionalized 
economically as market capitalism and politically as democracy.  That story and 
                                                
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., 47. 
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sexism, racism, homophobia.” 
95 Ibid., 48.  This maxim gets to the heart of the matter of recognizing enemies, for it exposes a severe 
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the institutions that embody it is the enemy we must attack through Christian 
preaching.96 
 
Liberal social orders prefer the story of freedom to the story of truth because truth 
is incompatible with the story of tolerance ingrained in such social orders.  This tolerance 
is really intolerant of the ultimate truth claims the church is called to make.  Inevitably, 
though liberalism in its postmodern form realizes “no unbiased viewpoint exists that can 
in principle insure agreements,” its institutions continue to underwrite pluralistic societies 
by violent means.97  For this reason, among many others, war is another enemy preaching 
should attack.  Thus, Hauerwas’s claim that “Christians are in a war against war,” and 
that “to be a Christian is to be made part of an army against armies.”98  The Christian 
weapon in this war is the sword of truth, and the means of wielding this sword are 
preaching and sacrament.   
The great magic of the Gospel is providing us with the skills to acknowledge our 
life, as created, without resentment and regret.  Such skills must be embodied in a 
community of people across time, constituted by practices such as baptism, 
preaching, and the Eucharist.99   
 
 One might counter that Hauerwas’s enemy-language is too combative, and that 
his manner of speaking may actually serve to encourage Christians to take up the sword 
of violence.  This is a mistake, for Hauerwas’s overall argument about enemies is a 
nuanced thread running throughout much of his life’s work as a theologian.  He 
commonly refers, as he does in the present article—and as Barth also does—to a person 
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98 Ibid. 
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being his own worst enemy.  He recognizes that preaching against the kinds of enemies 
described above provokes strong reactions.  “After all, the enemy (who is often enough 
ourselves) does not like to be reminded that the narratives that constitute our lives are 
false.”100  By describing even individual Christians as enemies of themselves, Hauerwas 
upends the common criticism directed at him, which is that he is a “sectarian, fideistic, 
tribalist.”101  On the contrary, his recognition that Christians are first their own enemies 
demonstrates an awareness that the dichotomy of church and world he asserts actually 
runs straight through the human heart.  “‘Church / world’ is not ‘us vs. them,’ it’s 
‘me.’”102 
 Hauerwas emulates Barth’s habit of describing “enemy” dialectically.  But there 
is another facet of his theological approach to consider, one that includes but envelops his 
descriptions of enemies presented above.  In perhaps his most popular work, The 
Peaceable Kingdom, Hauerwas provides a Christology that complements Barth’s 
conscription of enemy-language for the church, and doubles down on his own claim that 
Christianity is unintelligible without enemies.  In fact, we will see that Hauerwas’s 
Christology makes the phrase, “No enemy, no Christianity,” reversible, so that we might 
also just as confidently say, “No Christianity, no enemy.”  By understanding Jesus’ life as 
having the same proportional weight as his death and resurrection, Hauerwas’ 
                                                
100 Ibid. 
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51 
Christological account makes faithful Christian discipleship a prerequisite for the 
discernment of one’s enemies. 
 Hauerwas recognizes as deeply problematic the construction of Christologies that 
regard Jesus’ life as immaterial to the task of interpreting his death and resurrection.  
Such Christologies “emphasize the cosmic and ontological Christ,” but “tend to make 
Jesus’ life almost incidental to what is assumed to be a more profound theological 
point.”103  The church and its theologians have neglected to see that Jesus’ death and 
resurrection are actually subsequent to the narrative portrait of his life.  We cannot know 
Jesus without following Jesus, for “the form of the Gospels as stories of a life are meant 
not only to display that life, but to train us to situate our lives in relation to that life.”104  
Hauerwas anticipates the charge that he has turned the gospel into a moral ideal by 
affirming the equal weight of all three aspects—Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection.  To 
demote, in practice or through interpretative attention, any one of these three dimensions 
of the Gospel accounts results in the simultaneous diminution of all three.  “Without the 
resurrection our concentration on Jesus would be idolatry, but without Jesus’ life we 
would not know what kind of God it is who raised him from the dead.”105 
 Neglecting Jesus’ life in this way has a deleterious effect on the church’s 
performance of the Sermon on the Mount.  The view that Jesus’ life and work is 
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inconsequential to the church’s understanding of his death and resurrection leads 
inevitably to the conclusion that the Sermon’s demands are too idealistic.   
To believe so is to lose the eschatological context of Jesus’ teaching.  To be sure, 
Jesus’ demand that we forgive our enemies challenges our normal assumptions 
about what is possible, but that is exactly what it is meant to do.  We are not to 
accept the world with its hate and resentment as a given, but to recognize that we 
live in a new age that makes possible a new way of life.106 
 
  What Jesus’ life manifests is the reality of the new age in which the church is 
given the power, by God’s grace, to practice as a community those skills that would 
otherwise be impossible—skills such as the forgiveness of enemies.  The life of faith, 
then, is “fundamentally a social life.  We are ‘in Christ’ insofar as we are part of that 
community pledged to be faithful to this life as the initiator of the kingdom of peace.”107  
Grace means there is no a priori understanding of peace that Jesus happens to exemplify, 
but that God has given us a concrete way of peace in the life, death, and resurrection of 
Jesus Christ.  Justification by faith, therefore, comes by “initiation into the new 
community made possible by Jesus’ death and resurrection.”108  It is Jesus’ whole life, 
including his death and resurrection, that reveals the kingdom of God.  And it is this 
whole life to which the disciples have been not only invited, but also made able by God’s 
grace manifest in Jesus to follow. 
 What is finally at stake in Hauerwas’ Christology is how much we should 
emphasize the distinctiveness of the person of Jesus Christ, and whether anyone can 
know their enemies apart from the entire narrative arc of Jesus’ life, death, and 
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resurrection.  By declaring “it is only from him that we can learn perfection—which is at 
the very least nothing less than forgiving our enemies,” and by making the church the 
locus of such learning, Hauerwas substantiates Barth’s conscription of enemy-language 
for the church, and provides an additional footing to the claim that the practice of faithful 
Christian preaching is incomprehensible apart from the reconciling ends to which 
christocentric grammar points us. 
 
1.5  CONCLUSION 
Preachers have been given the task of cultivating the church’s speech in light of 
Scripture’s refusal to describe Christians as enemies of one another.  Those called to 
preach must teach the church how to respond to what God has already done in Jesus 
Christ.  Now the challenge is for congregations to narrate their life together by the speech 
God has revealed in Christ, so that, at all costs, they learn to make room at the table for 
their enemies.  If Christians would have this extraordinary grammar written on their 
hearts, it would only be because their journey began in hearing the correct grammar first.  
This is not a fantasy; it is a real possibility that lies just on the other side of every 
reconciling sermon. 
The primary intention of a homiletical performance of Barth’s theology of 
reconciliation would be to cultivate a radical imagination, catalyzed by this renewed 
implementation of Scriptural language through preaching, that has a diminishing effect 
on the perceived permanency of our current divisions.  If the aim of the reconciling 
sermon is not to force Christians to rein in their careless enemy-language, but to witness 
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to the truth about the way the world is from God’s perspective, then a reconciling sermon 
preached from a platform with Barthian pillars would enable a particular community to 
see itself as inextricably part of the same Body as another community with whom it has 
seemingly insurmountable disagreements.  The goal is to nurture the retrieval and 
cultivation of cruciform language that would enable those with reconciling intentions to 
serve as witnesses of the reconciliation God has enacted in Christ’s life, death, and 
resurrection.   
Indeed, what Barth calls “the strange new world of the Bible” is not an imaginary 
world.  The reconciling sermon is not an offering of principles for how Christians can 
make the world a better place, but an act that enables us to understand God and one 
another in light of what God has already done and continues to do in our midst.  A 
reconciling sermon reveals, on the Bible’s own terms, the ways in which God’s will is 
being done that have thus far remained invisible to us.  Such reconciling speech makes 
the new world visible.  It describes what Christians should do, but it first manifests who 
the baptized already are in light of God’s forgiveness—people called to convert our 
enemies to neighbors through the radical love of Christ.   
Both Barth and Hauerwas place this burden largely upon the practice of preaching, 
for it is through preaching that the church is given the grammar to recognize its enemies.  
Reconciling sermons are constituted by the gift of God’s language, given to us in 
Scripture, manifested in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, and entrusted to the 
church for the glorification of our forgiving God.  Would not the implementation of such 
reconciling language serve as a witness to the world of the grammatical faithfulness 
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required to rekindle the church’s ongoing participation in God’s reconciling mission?  
Hopefully, this display of Barth and Hauerwas’s own careful use of enemy language will 
provoke preachers to pursue a more faithful grammar for the church.  By unleashing from 
their pulpits the torrential truth that Christians have no enemies that God has not already 
either defeated or called neighbors, they may call the church to live faithfully into the 
reality its own language has already revealed.  Indeed, to be on the right track here will 
make it impossible to be completely mistaken in the whole. 
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CHAPTER 2:  SIGNS AND WONDERS 
 “At the very least…granting theological concerns priority will involve a return 
to the practice of using Scripture as a way of ordering and comprehending the 
world rather than using the world as a way of comprehending Scripture.”   
STEPHEN FOWL, THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE1 
 
 Having explored the theological limits of enemy-language, we focus now on Holy 
Scripture as a matrix of reconciling language for preaching.  To preach in a reconciling 
way, one must begin with the language of Scripture, since it is through Scripture that the 
church substantiates the truth that Jesus Christ, by his life, death, and resurrection, has 
erased the hostility between God and human beings,   
For if while we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through the death of 
his Son, much more surely, having been reconciled, will we be saved by his life.  
But more than that, we even boast in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, through 
whom we have now received reconciliation (Rom. 5:10-11).   
 
Preachers find their primordial energy in this act of boasting in the God of Jesus 
Christ, who has enlisted God’s enemies into God’s own mission.  Preaching, then, is the 
gospel addressed to former enemies.  It is the risen Jesus walking through his 
congregation at the end of hostilities.  So, reconciling language may do nothing less than 
awaken people to the truth that Jesus Christ has declassified human beings as enemies of 
God and one another.  Indeed, it is God’s nonviolent action in the person and work of 
Jesus Christ that gives birth to all the church’s speech.  Apart from this reconciling Word, 
the church forfeits the richness and depth of biblically determined language, and becomes 
susceptible to a language of violence.   
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 While the previous chapter offers an approach to reconciliation through a renewed 
theology of enemy-language, chapter two proposes an approach to biblical interpretation 
that enables and sustains the practice of preaching to “former enemies.”  It contends in 
part that preaching, as a witness to the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, is essentially 
a non-violent practice of the church.  More precisely, preaching is inherently a 
peacemaking practice when its language retains semantic consistency with and proceeds 
figuratively from the crucified, risen, nonviolent word of God.   
First, I will show how a synthesis of the semiotic theories of Augustine and John 
Milbank illuminate the intrinsically reconciling nature of biblical language.  Then, using 
Hans Frei’s The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, I will trace the emergence of the kinds of 
modern biblical interpretation that neglected theological concerns, and present the 
version of the literal sense of Scripture most suitable for reading Scripture for 
reconciliation.  This literal sense essentially fuses pre-modern exegetical (literal, 
allegorical, tropological, anagogical) and modern historical methods, in order to 
encourage a “journalistic reading” of Scripture’s narrative correspondence with and 
permeation of the complex histories of particular places.  Such interpretation privileges 
theological over historical-critical methods, but circumscribes both approaches in a 
reconciling hermeneutic that “seeks the peace of the city” (Jer. 29:7).  Finally, I will 
analyze a sermon by Ellen Davis as a practical example of how we might use the 
reconciling hermeneutic I describe. 
 
2.1  SYNTHESIZING AUGUSTINE AND MILBANK 
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Augustine points toward a comprehensive view of the telos of the Bible’s language.  His 
discussion of signs and things shows how language may operate figuratively, and how 
preaching puts theological language in service to the love of God and neighbor.  In Book 
1 of De Doctrina Christiana, he writes, “All teaching is teaching either of things or signs, 
but things are learnt through signs.”2  Things that are strictly things, like logs, stones, and 
sheep, “are not employed to signify something.”3  Alternately, signs are “those things 
which are employed to signify something.”4  There can be things that also serve as signs 
of other things, as well as signs “whose whole function consists in signifying.”5  
Augustine provides the following, more complete, definition of a sign in Book 2: 
A sign is a thing which of itself makes some other thing come to mind, besides 
the impression that it presents to the senses.  So when we see a footprint we think 
that the animal whose footprint it is has passed by; when we see smoke we 
realize that there is fire beneath it; when we hear the voice of an animate being 
we observe its feeling; and when the trumpet sounds soldiers know they must 
advance or retreat or do whatever else the state of the battle demands.6 
  
 Though many kinds of things may also serve as signs, words are the most prolific 
type of sign.  “Words have gained an altogether dominant role among humans in 
signifying the ideas conceived by the mind that a person wants to reveal.”7  Words as 
signs may be either literal or metaphorical.  “They are called literal when used to signify 
the things for which they were invented,” and “they are called metaphorical when the 
actual things which we signify by the particular words are used to signify something 
                                                
2 St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine. Translated by R. P. H. Green (Oxford University Press, 1997 
[2008]) 8. 
3 Ibid., 8. 
4 Ibid., 9. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 30. 
7 Ibid., 31. 
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else.”8  So, for example, “ox” may denote the literal living thing called “ox,” or it may 
refer metaphorically to a “worker in the gospel,” as Paul means in 1 Cor. 9:9 and 1 Tim. 
5:18, when he quotes Deut. 25:4, “You shall not muzzle the ox that treads out the grain.”9   
 This distinction between literal and the metaphorical signs determines 
Augustine’s use of the fourfold sense of Scripture, where there is a literal sense and a 
spiritual, or figurative, sense.  The literal sense has to do with the “letter,” or plain sense.  
It attends to the historical narrative and teaches events.  Despite that, “one must take care 
not to interpret a figurative expression literally,” so as not to devolve into a merely carnal 
and stunted reading.10  Then there is the spiritual sense, of which there are three types:  1) 
allegorical, which has to do with faith, or what to believe, 2) tropological or moral, which 
indicates what to do, and 3) anagogical, which asks, “To what end?” and aims at the 
purpose or ultimate hope of the text.  Finding the spiritual sense in Scripture is crucial for 
Augustine, for there lies the deeper meaning the Holy Spirit intends.  One remains in a 
carnal—that is, restricted or finite—understanding by failing to understand literal words 
as metaphorical.  It is “a miserable kind of slavery to interpret signs as things, and to be 
incapable of raising the mind’s eye above the physical creation so as to absorb the eternal 
light.”11   
 R. A. Markus observes the implications of Augustine’s attention to the 
possibilities for limitless transcendence through the kind of signification the spiritual 
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senses make possible.  “Language arises from the conflict of this impossibility [of mutual 
transparency between human minds] with the natural human need for community.”12  It is 
the human urge to discover ever deeper meanings in signs that constitutes the 
communication needed to create and sustain a community.  Augustine is concerned to 
show that discerning the significations of things is a fundamental human need.   
To ‘enjoy’ something that is less than the ultimate, infinite satisfaction, that is to 
say, to allow the will to rest in its possession; or to wish to ‘enjoy’ it, that is to 
say, to limit desire to its attainment, without pointing to a further horizon, is a 
perversion of the natural and rational order of willing.  To allow desire to cease 
in this way is premature closure of the Christian life, a denial of the restlessness 
in the depth of the human heart.13 
 
To reduce all language, especially biblical words and texts, to the literal sense as 
Augustine defines it is to rob language of its inexhaustible potential for rendering 
meaning within communities and between individuals.  It is unthinkable for Augustine to 
prohibit figurative interpretations of words as signs.  “We thwart this drive of our nature 
only at the cost of blocking off the process of learning and growth that living in the midst 
of this realm of limited and unstable things ought always to remain.”14  Such an 
interpretive approach frustrates any full immersion in a linguistic community and 
prohibits the healing of its ruptures.15  A denial of the latent power of metaphor to signify 
things inexorably and exponentially prevents human beings from living toward their 
ultimate purpose.   
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This is not to say that any individual or community may employ language to serve 
purely human desires, with no regard for divine limits.  Augustine explains that some 
things are to be enjoyed (frui), some are to be used (uti), while others function to be both 
enjoyed and used.16  Scripture is a thing to be both enjoyed and used, but for a specific 
purpose—for our enlightenment and enablement toward salvation by divine providence, 
and “to build up this double love of God and neighbor.”17  Moreover, Augustine calls for 
every human being to be loved on God’s account, while God should be loved for 
himself.18  “This reward is the supreme reward—that we may thoroughly enjoy him and 
that all of us who enjoy him may enjoy one another in him.”19  In order to nurture and 
sustain their love of God and neighbor, Christian communities must prioritize the work of 
discovering ever-deepening significations and interpretations derived from things 
signified.  “To seek meaning is to enact transcendence.”20  But this transcendence is a 
particular kind with a particular telos.  It is a transcendent hermeneutic birthed and 
harnessed by God the Father, through Jesus Christ the Son, by the power of the Holy 
Spirit.  As Christian speech, it “renews itself and conveys life from generation to 
generation from inexhaustible fountains.”21 
 The church does this in the wake of Peter’s sermon in Acts 2, in which Peter 
reinterprets the significance of biblical events for the new age inaugurated by the gift of 
                                                
16 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, 9. 
17 Ibid., 27. 
18 Ibid., 21. 
19 Ibid., 25. 
20 Arnold and Bright, 102. 
21 Amos N. Wilder, Early Christian Rhetoric: The Language of the Gospel (Peabody, Massachusetts: 
Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 1964) 17. 
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the Holy Spirit at Pentecost.  Quoting the prophet Joel, Peter connects the following 
phrase to the present moment:  “In the last days it will be, God declares, that I will pour 
out my Spirit upon all flesh.”22  These are among the very first words of the 
proclamation, which constitute the sermon’s first interpretive move involving Scripture.  
This move initiates a distinguishing mark between the Christian and Jewish communities, 
where, R. A. Markus says, the former have “an openness to the New Testament context 
within which the things spoken of in the Old Testament receive a further meaning.”23  In 
deference to Jewish interpreters, we should not say that only Christians may pursue 
“further meaning” from the literal sense.  The Christian community is, however, given 
the task of generating fresh interpretations in faithful response to Jesus Christ.  Peter 
begins his proclamation with a midrashic commentary on Israel’s Scripture in the wake 
of Easter.  The “last days” are no longer days yet to come, but effectively describe the 
present day and all days succeeding Christ’s resurrection.  The literal sense of the “last 
days” retains its historical meaning as a prophetic vision, but this literal sense is now 
subsumed by a previously impossible figurative sense.  The last days that were heretofore 
only expected are now a present reality in God’s gift of the Holy Spirit.  Peter’s speech 
bears witness to the risen Jesus through words that signify exponentially greater meaning 
and significance for God’s people. 
 Augustine’s theory of language allows for unlimited and unchecked linguistic 
significations so long as we orient these significations toward their proper ends.  The 
                                                
22 Acts 2:17. 
23 Arnold and Bright, 104. 
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church’s language has a telos.  It expands and stretches forth from its particular roots in 
choreographed ways.  Augustine believes language about God is eternal, but not 
equivocal, because he believes this is the nature of God.  “It is because God is eternal that 
God is present to all and every time in Augustine’s life.  God need not be a creature of 
change to be attentive to changing creatures.”24  So the openness of metaphorical 
language radiates analogously from God’s own nature, but this freedom of signs 
signifying things does not move toward chaos.  Janet Martin Soskice is right to say in 
relation to metaphor, 
Perhaps the gaze of God is like the gaze of the artist on the completed painting.  
Each and every pigment is discreet, and no mark is laid down carelessly...each 
brush stroke has been laid down, one by one; yet when the painting is complete, 
we apprehend it in a single vision.   But the painting is not ‘time-free’; rather, it 
is a condensed temporality.  We gaze on it as on a complete and consummated 
whole bearing all the marks of its making.25  
 
Indeed, metaphorical interpretation of Scripture should respect appropriate 
limits—though, “limits” is not as appropriate a descriptor as “divine boundaries,” for 
Augustine provides us with a theory of language that has its true end in God.  His famous 
statement, “Our hearts are restless until they rest in Thee,” contains the algebraic formula 
for the telos of theological language.  We may better understand this in terms of fractal 
imagery.  The closer one looks at a fractal image, the more one notices how its intricate 
details are statistically consistent with one another.  Even the minutest shapes proceed 
from the same algorithm, and so cannot remain in place apart from their basic, 
arithmetical formula.  Metaphorical language may issue forth infinitely, but only as it 
                                                
24 Janet Martin Soskice, The Kindness of God: Metaphor, Gender, and Religious Language (Oxford 
University Press, 2007) 33. 
25 Ibid., 34. 
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remains consistently parallel or linguistically cooperative with God’s intentions.  We 
interpret Scripture faithfully when we read under the guidance of the Holy Spirit of a 
reconciling God whom Jesus Christ brings into sharp relief by his life, death, and 
resurrection.  This interpretive work never ends until it ends in God.  It also does not 
work, it does not build up the church, unless its end is the love of God and neighbor. 
John Milbank’s theological project complements Augustine’s as he examines the 
foundations of language in The Word Made Strange.  Here he expands Augustine’s 
linguistic theory to show how Christian language constitutes its own narrative, one that 
needs no endorsement from other, supposedly more “real,” narrative structures.   
Christians, like everyone else, are scions of language, bound to structures in 
which reality is already ‘worked over.’  Like everyone else we assume that our 
constant revisions of our language are evidence that it is indeed reality we are 
dealing with, but either the entire Christian narrative tells us how things truly are, 
or it does not.  If it does, we have no other access to how things truly are, nor any 
additional means of determining the question.26 
 
 Milbank demonstrates the grounds for the counter-assertion of the biblical 
narrative over and against all competing narratives’ claims to truth.  He is concerned to 
                                                
26 John Milbank, The Word Made Strange (Oxford:  Blackwell Publishers, 1997) 250.  He makes this claim 
in a discussion about the failure of Niebuhrian realism and its assumption that there is some neutral reality 
“out there” where Christians may contribute their wisdom.  Max Stackhouse’s critique of Milbank misses 
the mark:  “Does the logos of God not underlie all areas of life, as those in other fields can see at the depths 
of what they do if they go deep enough?” [Journal of Religion, 78 no 4 O 1998, pp. 640-641].  Stackhouse 
overlooks the fact that a phrase like going “deep enough” abets a natural theology Milbank rejects.  Apart 
from a community liturgically shaped and led by the Holy Spirit, going “deep enough” will not be enough 
to discern the logos of God.  But we must add a caveat here, which is that the practice of preaching has 
always employed secular modes of communication in order to bear witness to the gospel.  Ted Smith has 
shown how certain secular rhetorical techniques, which shocked the sensibilities of Christian congregations 
in the early 19th century, have become second nature for modern preachers (see Smith, The New Measures: 
A Theological History of Democratic Practice [Cambridge University Press, 2007]).  Christians cannot 
avoid linguistic cross-pollenization when addressing people with the news of God’s activity in the world.  
The distinctively Christian culture of a local church body always risks exchanging its linguistic habits with 
a constellation of other competing cultures, habits, and practices.  Nevertheless, I am arguing that preaching 
toward reconciling ends requires reorienting all sermonic language, even, and perhaps especially, language 
“plundered from the Egyptians.”  A reconciling hermeneutic is the first step towards such reorientation. 
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show that the source of words discloses the way we think, and that we must determine 
whether the source of our words is theological or anthropological.  In a thick historical 
analysis of the relationship between signs (signum), things (res), and words (verbum—
which are really signs), Milbank traces the evolution of linguistics from Augustine to the 
present wake of the linguistic turn.  He surmises that the linguistic turn, which brought an 
end to the confinement of linguistic theory to the substance-based metaphysical 
infrastructure of empiricism and rationalism, is in fact a “theological turn” because of its 
origins in Christian critiques of philosophical assumptions about language.  Milbank’s 
theological account of the linguistic turn leads him to the conclusion that human being is 
linguistic being that participates in the divine linguistic being.27      
 Milbank laments the literal sense’s gradual replacement of allegorical, 
tropological, and anagogical readings of Scripture.  The increased emphasis on this 
“positive (i.e. positivistic) univocal, discourse” eventually led to “the loss of the idea that 
the res was also signum, and the confinement of scriptural reading to the literal sense.”28  
The modern dichotomy between signs and things originated in empiricist accounts of the 
origin of language, which “were founded on a name/correspondence semantic theory 
(‘equivalence’), allied to a metaphysics of substance, and a clear distinction of res and 
signum.”29  The violence of this semiotic approach is the linguistic origination of the 
violence of atheistic epistemologies, which assume human difference automatically 
creates barriers to peace.  The presumption here, that “things are the way they are, and 
                                                
27 Milbank, Word Made Strange, 2. 
28 Ibid., 95. 
29 Ibid., 96. 
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that’s the way they are going to be,” belies the modern project’s attempt to delimit 
language to modernity’s vision of a “fixed,” empirically verifiable world.  The act of 
distinguishing res from signum actually establishes res as a thing that exists in and for 
itself.  Thus, instead of serving a creativity analogous to the life of God, the division of 
signs and things serves death.  “This complete but potent character of the sign is a 
function of its lifelessness.”30  Yet, God as logos, as “total sign-being,” has, through 
Christ’s resurrection, come to “signify absolutely for us” by redefining “the sign of 
language as life, as eternal logos in the resurrection.”31  Jesus Christ is the “final sign.”  
By his life, death, and resurrection, he has revealed the telos of all language. 
 Milbank believes the linguistic foundations of the four-fold sense (and Aquinas’ 
complex literal sense)32 were right from the beginning, because they assumed the 
inexhaustible abundance of an eternally creative God.  Since, in the logos, sign and thing 
are unified in essence and orientation, language is freed again to imitate the unfettered-
yet-harmonious action of a generous God.  The word “reconciliation” in the New 
Testament corroborates Milbank’s conclusions.  Another look at the basic Greek word for 
reconciliation (αλλασσω) reveals what Milbank calls “plentitude.”  That is, the word is a 
highly versatile, potent, and dynamic word at its core.  For it linguistically discloses 
infinite possibilities for the exchange of enmity for friendship between God and 
humankind, and also grammatically displays the act of reconciliation within itself as a 
                                                
30 Ibid., 138. 
31 Ibid., 139. 
32 Aquinas redefined the literal sense to mean that there could be many “literal” senses of the same passage.  
Since the author of Holy Scripture is God, Aquinas believed, and God is not limited to any one meaning in 
a text, it is conceivable that there could be many faithful interpretations that expand forth from the one 
literal sense—like a jazz improvisation from set chords—into numerous faithful renderings. 
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sign of the thing (reconciliation) it signifies.  In άλλασσω, the fertile, unified, reciprocal 
relationship between res, signum, and verbum is on full, aesthetic display.33  
By conflating signum and res, pre-modern interpreters of Scripture enabled 
participation in the infinite abundance of Scripturally rooted meaning as analogous to the 
inexhaustible creativity of the Trinity.  Consequently, the history of Christianity displays 
the creative potential of “unlimited semiosis” as the alternative to the inherent violence 
and “mystical nihilism” of modern and postmodern thought, which proceed from an 
assumption of “original violence.”  Part of Milbank’s theological project has been to 
dispel the philosophical myth, posited by Hegel and subsequently Karl Marx, that the 
heart of all reality is chaos and violence.  The lowest common denominator of the 
universe, the progenitor of all language, is something like pandemonium.34  
In contrast to Marx and Hegel, Milbank believes human difference does not 
threaten creation, but is part of God’s design for it.  His counterassertion is that violence 
is always secondary to the peace revealed in Jesus Christ and grounded in creation.  
Christianity “recognizes no original violence.  It construes the infinite not as chaos, but as 
a harmonic peace which is yet beyond the circumscribing power of totalizing reason.  
                                                
33 Additionally, the word “reconciliation” began its migration to the English language with the Latin 
Vulgate’s choice of reconciliatio as the most accurate translation of the Apostle Paul’s word, καταλλαγή, 
the Greek noun for the English “exchange,” see John W. de Gruchy, Reconciliation:  Restoring Justice 
(Minneapolis:  Fortress Press, 2002) 24.  Apparently, Paul originally adapted this word through his 
preaching and letters in service to the new Christian ministry of reconciliation.   
34 I use this particular word intentionally, in order to recall John Milton’s conclusion to Book 1 of Paradise 
Lost in which he describes the fallen angel, Mulciber—who had been an architect in heaven—constructing 
Pandæmonium, the “high capital of Satan and his peers.”  The form of the word in its modern usage is 
pandemonium, and is presently defined as “noisy confusion” and “loud disorder.”  Yet, it originated as 
Milton’s own invention—a combination of the Greek words pan (all) and daemonion (little demon), 
meaning “all the demons.” See Milton, Paradise Lost, introduced by Philip Pullman (Oxford University 
Press, 2005) 38. 
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Peace no longer depends on the reduction to the self-identical, but is the sociality of 
harmonious difference.”35   
The philosophical separation of res and signum is an unfortunate consequence of 
this original violence, as well as an act of linguistic violence that shackles the Scriptural 
imagination.       
[The notion that] the scriptures are ‘the content nebula of all possible archetypes’ 
depends entirely (for Christianity) on the belief in the incarnation of the logos, 
and ‘allegory’ in its specifically Christian usage (after Origen) is precisely the 
protocol which decrees that all the res referred to in the Old Testament point 
forward to Christ, and that Christ himself embodies an inexhaustible range of 
meanings which anticipates every individual and collective future.  In fact it is 
only this particular coding which unleashes the symbolic polysemy.36 
 
 Milbank’s reformulations of Aristotle’s terms, poesis and praxis, provide the 
setting for the unleashing of “symbolic polysemy.”  Milbank defines poesis as “an act 
which passes over into something external,” “a logic for the establishment of meanings,” 
a fundamental activity and mode of knowledge concerned with aesthetics and the 
beautiful as they escape one’s control as contributions to history.37  Poesis differs from 
praxis, which “is an act which remains within the subject,” an “intentional act” 
completely determined by its own habitus as it proceeds strictly towards its own telos.38  
Poesis, which does not nullify praxis but absorbs it, supposes that all human action and 
knowledge create an excess of meaning.  So, it is not that  
later history dispossesses us of an intentional act (praxis) once controlled by us 
and properly our own, but rather that to act at all is always to be dispossessed, 
always continuously to apprehend ‘more’ in our own deed once it ‘occurs’ to us, 
                                                
35 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) 5.   
36 Milbank, Word Made Strange, 94. 
37 Ibid., 123-124, 127. 
38 Ibid., 123-124. 
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than our first hazy probings toward the formulation of a performance could ever 
have expected.39 
 
This does not entail “a tragic distortion of good intentions which cannot foreknow 
future circumstances (Hegel), but rather a simultaneous and risky openness both to grace 
and the possibility of sinful distortion.”40  Such openness as a characteristic of human 
creativity is analogous to the ever-deepening, eternal, and prodigal creativity of God.  
Consequently, the Aristotelian privileging of praxis over poesis fails, for praxis cannot 
provide a way for one’s actions to be received by others without their either threatening 
to displace another’s actions, or their “disappearing” into another’s reception.  Poesis, on 
the other hand, more completely manifests the divine plentitude41 in which humans may 
mimetically participate in creation (i.e., as stewards of language).  Human action imitates 
the Trinity’s own divine life when we see human difference as an opportunity for, rather 
than a hindrance to, a peace born of charity.  So the Christian is not merely a moral 
person, in possession of a good conscience, “who acts with what he knows of death, 
                                                
39 Ibid., 126. 
40 Ibid., 127. 
41 Milbank clarifies his notion of “plentitude” by saying, “To believe in plenitude is to believe in the 
already commenced and yet-to-come restoration of Creation as Creation.  Within this belief alone, as 
Nietzsche failed to perceive, one can cease to be ‘moral.’  This belief is belief in resurrection.  As 
resurrection cancels death, and appears to render murder non-serious, it restores no moral order, but 
absolutely ruins the possibility of any moral order whatsoever.  That is to say, any reactive moral order, 
which presupposes the absoluteness of death.  For the Christian, murder is wrong, not because it removes 
something irreplaceable, but because it repeats the Satanic founding act of instituting death, or the very 
possibility of irreplaceability, and absolute loss...For in the resurrected order, in the life of our vision of 
God in his final Christic manifestation, the occasion for the exercise of death-presupposing virtue (as Paul 
says) drops away, and only charity-gift and counter-gift  remain,” Word Made Strange 229.  For an 
expanded discussion of plentitude, see pp. 219-231. 
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scarcity and duty to totalities.  He has a bad conscience, but a good confidence:  for he 
acts with what he does not know but has faith in.”42 
 Milbank helps us recognize that the seeds of division and violence reside in 
linguistic formulations sustained by epistemologies of scarcity, or theories of knowledge 
based on the presupposition that texts’ meanings are severely limited.  Hermeneutics 
resulting from such epistemologies serve the power of death by counteracting the 
polyvalent nature of Scripture.  Many interpretive strategies can and do build up the 
church, either as hermeneutics of suspicion or trust.  Nevertheless, the Bible is not a 
cadaver.  Reading Scripture for reconciliation requires a disavowal of a “hermeneutic of 
death.”  Pursuing a fixed or perpetually static meaning of a text inevitably leads to a 
departure from the infinitely generous logos of God.  At the moment of this departure, 
human linguistic being rejects participation in divine linguistic being, and the space for 
embracing multiple valid interpretations diminishes to the point where transformative 
exchange between Christians and their enemies becomes unthinkable.43 
 Milbank’s imaginative semiotic conclusions help prepare the way for a 
reconciling hermeneutic in harmony with the nonviolent nature of the word of God.  
Language is not begotten from, nor is it beholden to, chaos.  Genesis describes God’s first 
                                                
42 Milbank, Word Made Strange, 231. 
43 The Christian reception of an enemy not as such but non-seriously illustrates an application of Milbank’s 
concept of the linguistic unleashing of God’s “plenitude.”  As the refusal of complicity with the word 
“enemy” as a res that exists within and for itself, signified by a verbum/signum that is intelligible to any 
community no matter its linguistic culture, this reception is an embrace of the abundant life made possible 
by Christ’s resurrection.  The church begins to embrace its enemies through the practice of a peculiar 
language that does not, and by definition cannot, take enemies seriously as enemies.  God has given the 
church a Word, a Logos, in Jesus Christ, whose nature as a fusion of both sign and being linguistically 
establishes ever-deepening communion between God and humanity as the central aim for reading Scripture. 
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word as interrupting and transforming chaos into beauty and goodness.  Verse 3 of the 
Gospel of John reveals the logos in this way, “All things came into being through him, 
and without him not one thing came into being.”  The logos of God, in any of its 
threefold forms,44 moves toward us from God with the reconciling nature of Jesus.  The 
basic character of Scripture, constituted as it is by what Milbank has called “symbolic 
polysemy,” is as eternally hospitable to its readers as Jesus is to the world.  Through 
Scripture, the logos gathers its interpreters toward itself as Jesus draws all people toward 
himself on the cross.  As well, this dynamic logos frustrates attempts to tame, kill, or treat 
it as though it were a lifeless word.  Like the word of God who is Jesus, the word of God 
in Scripture absorbs our violent attempts to suffocate and relegate it to a strict literal 
sense.  When interpreters cynically, ignorantly, or unrepentantly impose themselves on 
the word, the word bears their stripes and exhausts their negligence and cruelty.  When 
readers kill and bury the word, it rises again, revealing itself by its own will and in its 
own time. 
                                                
44 The Word of God has the following threefold form according to Barth:  Christian proclamation, Holy 
Scripture, and revelation.  All three forms of the Word correspond formally to the inner life of God as 
shared by the three Persons of the Trinity, and find their unity in the Word who is Jesus Christ.  “One form 
of the Word of God cannot be separated from another.  No particular form has more or less value than 
another. The revealed Word of God we know only from the Scripture adopted by Church proclamation, or 
from Church proclamation based on Scripture.  The written Word of God we know only through the 
revelation which makes proclamation possible, or through the proclamation made possible by revelation.  
The proclaimed Word of God we know only by knowing the revelation attested through Scripture, or by 
knowing the Scripture which attests revelation” (CD I/1, 121).  Moreover, when Barth calls the Bible the 
Word of God, he means it in the same sense that Christian proclamation and revelation are the Word of 
God, which is that God has gracefully become an “event” in the human word of the Bible.  If the language 
of God becomes an event in the human word of the Bible, “if the Bible speaks to us thus of the promise, if 
the prophets and apostles tell us what they have to tell us, if their word imposes itself on us and if the 
Church in its confrontation with the Bible thus becomes again and again what it is, all this is God’s 
decision and not ours, all this is grace and not our work” (Ibid., 109). 
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2.2  THE ‘ECLIPSE’ IN RETROSPECT 
Hans Frei has shown how biblical interpreters marginalized the theological 
concerns Augustine and Milbank advocate, concerns that have historically served the 
upbuilding of the church.  He states, “The choice of the logical priority of the subject 
matter over the words is the fateful decision of late eighteenth century hermeneutics.”45  
In his discussion of the hermeneutical options available at the end of the nineteenth 
century, Frei argues that what led to the limited expressions for the meanings of biblical 
narratives was a turn toward strictly historical and philosophical criticism, and away from 
a search for truth.46  Historical critics viewed subject matter in an acutely different way 
than pre-modern exegetes by separating it from its depiction or cumulative narrative 
rendering.47  For modern historians devoted to historical-criticism,  
historical accounting, by almost universal modern consent, involves that the 
narrative satisfactorily rendering a sequence believed to have taken place must 
consist of events, and reasons for their occurrence, whose connections may be 
rendered without recourse to supernatural agency.48 
  
In this sense, truth and true events can only be those that are empirically, 
historically verifiable.  Whatever the “real history” is, it cannot be ultimately determined 
by what the biblical text itself describes.  The factuality of biblical narrative is beholden 
to this real history for its authentication.  Once this dichotomy calcifies, the literal sense 
of Scripture becomes so separated from figural interpretations that the latter begin to look 
                                                
45 Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
Hermeneutics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974) 254. 
46 Ibid., 249-250. 
47 Ibid., 14. 
48 Ibid. 
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like forced, arbitrary impositions of unity on a group of diverse texts.49  “No longer an 
extension of literal reading, figural interpretation instead becomes a bad historical 
argument or an arbitrary allegorizing of texts in the service of preconceived dogma.”50 
 In the wake of the preference of logical priority of subject matter, Frei describes 
the three most prevalent options for hermeneutical approaches at the dusk of the 
nineteenth century.  The first option saw subject matter as ostensive, or as having an 
external reference, “i.e. the meaning of the narratives is the state of affairs in the 
spatiotemporal world to which they refer.”51  There were three divisions of this camp, 
consisting of the supernaturalists, naturalists, and those who believed the biblical authors 
were simply lying to gain power over others.  Supernaturalists believed “the meaning of 
the narratives corresponds to their authors’ intention, and that the intention is literal,” and 
also that the author is trying to “give a reliable report of spatiotemporal occurrences.”52  
For them, even the miracles are literal.  Naturalists, on the other hand, “dropped the 
literalistic interpretation of individual miraculous reports,” and directed interpretation 
primarily to the “vindication of the possibility of some sort of nonmiraculous historical 
occurrence in back of individual reported incidents.”53  The third camp believed the real 
intentions of the evangelists were to design tales “to enable them to perpetrate a spiritual 
                                                
49 Ibid., 37. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., 256. 
52 Ibid., 257. 
53 Ibid., 260. 
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power grab.”54  Each of the latter three cliques held in common their commitment to 
determining a narrative’s status by its “extramental, datable occurrences.”55 
 Devotees of the second option rejected the notion of ostensive subject matter in 
biblical narratives.  Instead, narratives transfer ideals; meaning is found in “the ideas or 
moral and religious truths (Gehalt) stated in them in narrative form.”56  There were two 
sub-groups operating within this option.  The first believed these ideas and truths were 
“inseparable from the author’s intentions,” and thus proceeded from “deliberately 
contrived allegories and fables.”57  This approach relies on locating the author’s intention 
in the allegorical meaning, and spurns any questioning of the historicity of the events 
described.  Immanuel Kant is representative of the second sub-group, who loosed the 
allegorical subject matter from the author’s intention, and argued that “historiographical 
considerations are strictly irrelevant to the interpretation of the subject matter, which is 
the foundation and advancement of a pure moral disposition in the inner man and its 
connection with the ideal realm of ends.”58  These believed one reached the meaning of 
the biblical narratives by understanding the ideas they represent in story form.59  These 
ideas are universally true, and, thus, not dependent upon Scripture for their authority.  In 
fact, one might find these ideals anywhere outside of Scripture, as well as outside of 
Christian communities.  Despite their differences, both sub-groups commonly held that 
biblical narratives referred not to bona fide historical events, but to ideas. 
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 Those Frei calls “mythophiles” promoted the third, or the mythic, hermeneutical 
option.  Mythophiles rejected both the ostensive and allegorical meanings of biblical 
narratives because the former virtually dishonored the authors, while the latter ignored 
them and infused meaning into the Bible from outside.60  They found the meaning of the 
subject matter “in the consciousness they represented.”61  Myth, in this sense, “is a 
genetic-psychological category employed in the process of critical-historical 
understanding.”62  So the subject matter consists of what could be described as the plight 
or condition of the biblical authors’ minds.  Schleiermacher approached this hermeneutic 
from the perspective of “understanding discourse by understanding the author as it were 
immediately and from the inside.”63  That is, the consciousness of the author is to be 
examined and understood.  “It is his spirit that must be grasped”64 in order to reconstruct 
the “process of discourse by that of understanding.”65  Hegel pursued a different slant.  
He believed the realistic narrative shape occurs not in the interaction of character and 
incident, but in “the integration of the consciousness-event into the history of 
consciousness, or the stages by which Spirit becomes himself.”66  The subject matter 
means “the common framework into which the interaction of incident and character is 
taken up, so that the interaction may be seen to be more than a contingent external 
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64 Ibid., 310. 
65 Ibid., 301. 
66 This brings to mind the conclusion of David Steinmetz’s article, “The Superiority of Pre-Critical 
Exegesis,” in Theology Today 37 (1980):  “Until the historical-critical method becomes critical of its own 
theoretical foundations and develops a hermeneutical theory adequate to the nature of the text which it is 
interpreting, it will remain restricted—as it deserves to be—to the guild and the academy, where the 
question of truth can endlessly be deferred” 38. 
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relation.”67  Frei offers the example of Hegel’s interpretation of Christ’s death and 
resurrection as a watershed moment, by which the stage of individual consciousness 
transitions to that of general consciousness.68  Both Schleiermacher and Hegel reject that 
a narrative’s progression may contain its own meaning.  The mythic option involves 
transcending the actual narrative in order to glean its intended meaning from some place 
outside the text.  Biblical narratives must “mean something other than what they say.”69 
 Frei argued compellingly that the latter three prevalent hermeneutical options 
severely lacked the ability to provide the church with bountiful resources for ever-
deepening friendship with God and neighbor in the ways pre-modern interpretation had.  
This is because pre-modern interpretation held that “the world truly rendered by 
combining biblical narratives into one was indeed the one and only real world.”70  Frei 
agreed with pre-modern readers in their perception of the entire biblical narrative as 
unified.  Furthermore, their literalism was “at the level of the whole biblical story and 
thus of the depiction of the whole of reality,” which led to figurative readings that 
enabled interpretations of “stories and their meanings by weaving them together into a 
common narrative referring to a single history and its patterns of meaning.”71  Modern 
criticism inverted this correspondence between the text and the world.  This approach 
separated biblical events into a factual realm, where they could stand on their own apart 
from their biblically narrative presentation.  “Instead of rendering them accessible, the 
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narratives, heretofore indispensable as means of access to the events, now simply verify 
them, thus affirming their autonomy and the fact that they are in principle accessible 
through any kind of description.”72  Yet, pre-modern interpreters pursued a world as 
created by Scripture.  In the latter case, the reader’s duty is as follows: 
to fit himself into that world in which he was in any case a member, and he too 
did so in part by figural interpretation and in part of course by his mode of life.  
He was to see his disposition, his actions and passions, the shape of his own life 
as well as that of his era’s events as figures of that storied world.73 
   
 
2. 3  TOWARD A RECONCILING LITERAL SENSE 
Frei’s title, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, refers to the loss of this hermeneutic 
worldview in terms of biblical narrative’s “eclipse,” because of the shadow modern 
criticism cast upon it.  Nevertheless, eclipses are temporary.  Thus, on the slowly 
brightening crescent that only an appreciation for the pre-modern literal sense perceives, 
Frei offers his own definition of the sensus literalis.  Christian tradition derives meaning 
“directly from [...] its sacred story, the life, teachings, death, and resurrection of Jesus the 
Messiah.  This narrative thus has a unifying force and prescriptive character in both the 
New Testament and the Christian community” that is unique to that Testament and 
community.74  The literal sense for Frei, then, is a “sacred story” with the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus as its “unifying force.”   
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 Frei proceeds to remind us of three minimal agreements among Christians 
inhabiting the pre-modern interpretive worldview, which he offers in the context of an 
appeal for their retrieval.  First,  
Christian reading of Christian Scriptures must not deny the literal ascription to 
Jesus, and not to any other person, event, time, or idea, of those occurrences, 
teachings, personal qualities and religious attributes associated with him in the 
stories in which he plays a part, as well as in the other New Testament writings in 
which his name is invoked.75 
  
Second, “no Christian reading may deny either the unity of Old and New 
Testaments or the congruence [...] of that unity with the ascriptive literalism of the 
Gospel narratives.”76  And third, “any readings not in principle in contradiction with 
these two rules are permissible, and two of the obvious candidates would be the various 
sorts of historical-critical and literary readings.”77  
So for Frei, Jesus is the absolute center, the crosshairs of the focal lens through 
which Christian communities have traditionally interpreted Scripture.  This also 
corresponds with Frei’s intense dedication to the priority of the narrative forms of the 
gospels, and his understanding of the literal sense.  What Frei seeks with these principles 
is a recovery of a pre-modern hermeneutic guided by a literal sense that edifies, inspires, 
orients, and guides believing Christian communities as they seek “to love God and enjoy 
him forever.”  This is good news for a church that has not been well-served by academic 
preoccupation with the Bible’s historical and empirical verifiability.  Frei’s literal sense 
does offer hope for a reconciling hermeneutic.   
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 Yet, we should pause to question whether Stephen Fowl has not offered a more 
compelling version of the literal sense than Frei.78  After all, it may be that Frei has set 
himself up to do precisely what he seeks to avoid.  By saying the literal sense is 
essentially the narrative arc of the gospel, he may be in danger of limiting the literal sense 
in ways that are similar to the sporadic constructions of meaning presented by scholars 
beholden to the historical-critical method.  Certainly, Frei advocates for the use of many 
forms of interpretation, as well as using historical-criticism as a tool subordinated to his 
narrative theological approach.  The Trinity also serves as a boundary for his interpretive 
method.  But, for example, what does Frei mean by the second principle he delineates 
(above) about the unity of the Old Testament with the New Testament, and “the 
congruence of that unity with the ascriptive literalism of the Gospel narratives”?  Is it not 
the case that limiting his literal sense to the gospel narrative precludes, or at least 
disturbs, this unification, and falls short of fully managing the diversity of Scripture?   
 Perhaps Frei could have strengthened his case by stretching the “sacred story” of 
Jesus’ life, teachings, death, and resurrection into something more like Irenaeus’ Rule of 
Faith, so that the latter narrative shape does not constitute the sole content of his literal 
sense.  Irenaeus placed the “sacred story” not as the one unifying story of Scripture, but 
as the climactic moment of the apostolic faith, formally represented in the Apostles’ 
Creed.79  It is “Scripture itself that supplies the categories in which the [Rule of Faith] is 
expressed.  Text and interpretation are like twin brothers; one can scarcely tell the one 
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from the other.”80  It is the kerygmatic arc of the Rule of Faith that the apostles use in 
their sermons and speeches throughout Acts.  The consistent framework of the apostolic 
gospel across the New Testament begins with the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy 
and its inauguration of the new age in the coming of Jesus Christ, proceeds through his 
life, death, and resurrection, continues in his exaltation to God’s right hand, and 
culminates in his imminent return as judge and savior of all people.81 
 What Fowl does with the literal sense is more hospitable to interpreting Scripture 
with the Rule of Faith as a practical guide.  It certainly complements and extends 
Aquinas’ approach to the literal sense as having eschatologically infinite possibilities82 
for faith formation in the life of the church.  Fowl defines the literal sense of a passage as 
follows:  
Let us take the ‘literal sense’ of a passage to be the meanings conventionally 
ascribed to a passage by Christian communities.  Thus, the literal sense will be 
those meanings Christians regularly ascribe to a passage in their ongoing 
struggles to live and worship faithfully before the triune God.  This means that 
the literal sense of Scripture will be those interpretations Christians take to be 
primary, the basis and norm for all subsequent ways of interpreting the text. 
 
This definition of the literal sense allows for figural readings that are more 
beneficial for the church today.  Especially in the light of the glut of divisions throughout 
the contemporary church, Fowl’s approach encourages a reclamation of the various pre-
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modern approaches to Scriptural interpretation that most fully enable the making of 
disciples capable of performing the Scriptures, and of being drawn into the communion 
of saints across time and space.   
The saints are those who have masterfully performed the Scriptures, those who 
have allowed their engagements with Scripture to draw them into an ever deeper 
communion with God and neighbor.  If these are also the ends of theological 
interpretation in the present, then it is unclear why one would seek to engage 
Scripture with these same ends in mind without also attending to the lives and 
interpretations of such successful practitioners.83 
 
By deftly appropriating Irenaeus’ Rule of Faith in a way that builds on Frei’s 
work and repositions church communities as Scripture’s most authoritative interpreters, 
Fowl’s literal sense creates an opening for a hermeneutic that emphasizes the reconciling 
orientation and nature of biblical language.  Reading Scripture for reconciliation requires 
a literal sense that includes reading with the saints, since the saints remind us of 
Scripture’s richness and complexity.  His proposal that “those interpretations Christians 
take to be primary” should be “the basis and norm for all subsequent” interpretations not 
only prioritizes theological concerns, but encourages the literal reconciliation of modern 
interpretations with one another and with past Christian interpreters.  Fowl’s literal sense 
“seeks the peace of the city” by including present readers within the communion of saints 
for all time, especially those interpreters whose voices were—in a kind of metaphorical 
fratricide—relegated to the past.  Fowl shows that the practice of reading Scripture for 
reconciliation necessitates participation in the community of the great cloud of witnesses, 
whom God has gathered to seek the mind of Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit.   
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Churches should, therefore, seek to enact what Rowan Williams called a 
“diachronic” style of reading Scripture.  This approach asks, “How—without gross 
distortion and selectivity, ‘synchronic’ reconciliations—are we to follow the history of 
Scripture so that the authoritative centrality of the narratives presupposed in baptism and 
eucharist appears?”84  The diachronic reading of Scripture reads Scripture as a pattern of 
changes, a sequence of changes in a single time continuum, rather than as a field of 
linguistic material that is worked out in something more like the surface of a picture, that 
is, worked out in space.85  Williams’ advocates grounding the literal sense in dramatic 
modes of reading, so that we are “invited to identify ourselves in the story being 
contemplated, to reappropriate who we are now, and who we shall or can be, in terms of 
the story.  Its movements, transactions, transformations, become ours; we take 
responsibility” for the positions in the narrative.86  A diachronic reading recognizes that 
particular Christian communities in the present participate simultaneously as heirs and 
forebears within the cosmic scope God’s salvation history.  A diachronic reading also 
recognizes that the time and movements within a text are analogous to our own lives in 
ways that are recognizable and given to duplication.  As we diachronically follow a text, 
there is room for a wide variety of interpretations and imitations, while there are also 
sacred limits provided by the text, itself.  “Scripture, with all its discord and polyphony, 
is the canonical text of a community in which there are limits to pluralism.  The history of 
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Scripture, internal and contextual, for all its stresses and cross-currents, is read as the 
production of the meaning of a corporate symbolic life” with unity and integrity.87 
 A diachronic reading of Scripture in the terms Williams describes provides a 
literal sense that is most nimble especially for churches in pluralistic cultures, where there 
will be an unruly number of different interpretations of Scripture within even one local 
church body.  So, this literal sense could also be understood as an “eschatological sense.”  
For,  
to read diachronically the history that we call a history of salvation is to ‘read’ 
our own time in the believing community (and so too the time of our world) as 
capable of being integrated into such a history, in a future we cannot but call 
God’s because we have no secure human way of planning it or thematising it.88 
 
This will frustrate the “iron theologies”89 of fundamentalists, but it enables 
solutions to more pressing problems than the ones that seem always to pre-occupy those 
who believe there can only be one meaning of a text, those for whom the interpretation of 
Scripture becomes a game of “finders keepers.”  There may be no more pressing need in 
the church than a way of faithfully reading Scripture with the kind of diachronic method 
Williams describes, where disciples across the ecclesial spectrum may be both 
figuratively and dramatically drawn into ever deeper communion with God and neighbor 
in ways that burn off even our self-perceived virtues.90 
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 In this sense, Scripture is humanity’s enemy.  For a diachronic reading demands 
from the interpreter a capacity for imagination readers are often unwilling to nurture.  For 
Christians, such imagination involves directing the faculties of fascination and curiosity 
toward the joyful building up of the church.  To read the Bible for reconciliation, 
interpreters should prepare to have their hostility toward Scripture outmatched by 
Scripture’s hostility towards the readers’ agenda.  Scripture’s hostility towards us is 
really grace, since its hostility aims to soften our hardness of heart.   
 
 2.4  ELLUL, BRUEGGEMANN, AND PROPAGANDA 
In the parable of the Weeds and the Wheat, Jesus compares the kingdom of 
heaven to “someone who sowed good seed in his field; but while everybody was asleep, 
an enemy came and sowed weeds among the wheat, and then went away” (Matthew 
13:24-25).  This clandestine operation by “the evil one” (13:38) is not unlike the role 
modern propaganda plays in frustrating a diachronic reading of Scripture.  Because 
modern propagandists value speed, efficiency, and scientific technique in their 
interpretations of history, they are innately opposed to the patience and submissiveness so 
constitutive of the diachronic interpreter’s methods of interpretation.  Reading Scripture 
diachronically will mean preachers must also read as anti-propagandists, proclaiming the 
kingdom of heaven in stark contrast to the kingdoms of this world. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Her skepticism about human works complements my view that even those works we would acknowledge as 
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We assume at our own peril that propaganda was merely a tool of 20th Century 
totalitarian regimes, and that its threat extends no further than the faded images the 
nightly newscasts dramatically burned into the collective memory of the masses for more 
than half a century:  locals pulling down a statue of a dictator; a poster filled with 
nationalistic rhetoric hanging from an overpass; grainy videos of soldiers marching 
lockstep in the capital square; or Hitler gesturing furiously from a podium.  Reading 
Scripture diachronically requires heightened sensitivity to modern propaganda as a 
technique critical to the function of the modern nation-state and the preservation of its 
sovereignty.  Propaganda is a primary means by which nation-states contrive enemies and 
domesticate Jesus’ lordship over history. 
In his enduring treatise on the subject, Jacques Ellul defines propaganda as   
a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the 
active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, 
psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in 
an organization.91 
  
More recent scholars have criticized Ellul’s depiction of the vastness and 
pervasiveness of propaganda as too indefinite for the kinds of precise investigations 
needed to unmask it.92  But what one finds in Ellul’s work that is largely missing in these 
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more recent analyses is a careful respect for propaganda’s sheer size, its unremitting 
proliferation, and its spiritual dimensions.  In a later work, he describes propaganda in 
biblical and apocalyptic terms, unapologetically identifying it as the contemporary form 
of the “beast that rose out of the earth” in Revelation 13.  This second beast, which 
follows the beast from the sea, “makes speeches which induce people to obey the state, to 
worship it.  It gives them the mark that enables them to live in society.”93 
By this association, Ellul expands our capacity to recognize propaganda’s ability 
to overwhelm.  Recognition is not a vaccine against its effects, but an exposé of 
propaganda as a kind of leviathan.  Readers familiar with Ellul will hear echoes of his 
analysis of the technological society in his statement that propaganda must utilize all 
media—“the press, radio, TV, movies, posters, meetings, door-to-door canvassing.”94  
Propaganda’s dissemination must be total, rather than sporadic.  “Propaganda tries to 
surround man by all possible routes, in the realm of feelings as well as ideas, by playing 
on his will or on his needs, through his conscious and his unconscious, assailing him in 
both his private and his public life.”95  Additionally, contemporary technology (television, 
internet, mobile devices) and scientific understanding have combined to produce forms of 
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propaganda previous societies could not have imagined.  For example, propaganda is now 
so omnipresent and pervasive that countries like the United States—where the common 
citizen sees propaganda as something negative—is nevertheless steeped in it, and even 
happily dependent upon it.  Propaganda surrounds Americans so completely one might 
say it has an unassuming quality.  Left unchecked, it suffuses citizens’ consciousness 
with its own brand of imagination, and stamps everyone with its unique trademark.96   
 Ellul’s analysis of propaganda complements Walter Brueggemann’s description 
of the “royal consciousness,” for which the central criteria are the maintenance of 
affluence, the politics of oppression, and the subordination of the sovereignty of God to 
the sovereignty of the king.  There are three corresponding elements of the royal 
consciousness that serve as the distinguishing marks of what Brueggemann calls “the 
royal program of achievable satiation.”  This program has to do with a saturation of the 
governed with a particular kind of imagination.  In particular, the royal program:  
• Is fed by a management mentality that believes there are no mysteries to honor, 
only problems to be solved […]    
• Is legitimated by an ‘official religion of optimism,’ which believes God has no 
business other than to maintain our standard of living, ensuring his own place in 
his palace.   
• Requires the annulment of the neighbor as life-giver in our history; it imagines 
that we can live outside history as self-made men and women.97 
 
First, the “management mentality” to which Brueggemann refers is precisely what 
sustains modern bureaucracies.  Modern propaganda could not exist without bureaucratic 
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managers.  There must be an institutional, administrative organization, with a defined 
hierarchy of leadership.  The higher one traces the hierarchical pyramid, the more 
concealed the administrators are from the general public.  An intentional result of this 
organization is that “[t]he propagandist is always separated from the propagandee, he 
remains a stranger to him.”98  Propagandees are, by definition, “underneath” the 
propagandist: 
Classic propaganda, as one usually thinks of it, is a vertical propaganda—in the 
sense that it is made by a leader, a technician, a political or religious head who 
acts from the superior position of his authority and seeks to influence the crowd 
below.  Such propaganda comes from above.  It is conceived in the secret 
recesses of political enclaves; it uses all technical methods of centralized mass 
communication; it envelops a mass of individuals; but those who practice it are 
on the outside.99 
  
Such separation between propagandist and propagandee mirrors the atomization 
of the public mass into individuals that appear to the propagandist to be little more than 
commodities.100  This corresponds with Ellul’s contention that modern propaganda can 
flourish only in certain sociological conditions.  For propaganda to succeed, the society 
must be both an individualist and a mass society.101  These may sound like contradictory 
terms, but Ellul insists they are not.  In truth, “an individualist society must be a mass 
society, because the first move toward liberation of the individual is to break up the small 
groups that are an organic fact of the entire society.”102  The consequence is an epidemic 
of loneliness and isolation that makes individuals even more susceptible to propaganda.  
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“Precisely because the individual claims to be equal to all other individuals, he becomes 
an abstraction and is in effect reduced to a cipher.”103 
Thus, there will be “no mysteries to honor” within the bureaucratic royal 
consciousness, since one of the intended results of achievable satiation is the people’s 
disenchantment with the legends that once constituted and animated their communal life.  
Propagandists derive much of their power in a parasitical way from the fact/value 
dichotomy.  “Modern man worships ‘facts’—that is, he accepts ‘facts’ as the ultimate 
reality.  He is convinced that what is, is good.  He believes that facts in themselves 
provide evidence and proof, and he willingly subordinates values to them.”104  In this 
context of a simultaneously individualist and mass society, everything is carefully 
weighed and measured, and reality can only be that which the technicians, politicians, 
and managers seem to empirically and objectively construct or verify.  These are the 
conditions in which the royal consciousness redefines our notions of humanness, and 
denies “the legitimacy of tradition that requires us to remember, of authority that expects 
us to answer, and of community that calls us to care.”105  
A second principle of the royal program is its “official religion of optimism.”  
This element functions to maintain the status quo of affluence, especially for the ruling 
classes.  The official narrative also domesticates religion by handing what is really God’s 
jurisdiction over to the king.  It perpetuates myths that hijack God’s sovereignty and 
gives the king “a monopoly so that no marginal person may approach this God except on 
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the king’s terms.”106  Those who challenge authorized accounts of reality are ignored as 
traitors and fools.  Lamentations are mocked.  The official religion of optimism suffers no 
interruptions.  “There will be no disturbing cry against the king here.”107 
Likewise, propagandists must advance an etiological myth, one that enables the 
organization to offer a foundational, all-embracing system of belief and explanation for 
the way things are.  The myth must be a complete answer to all questions occurring in the 
citizens’ conscience.108  In this sense, democratic states are required to become religious.  
“The content of this religion is of little importance; what matters is to satisfy the religious 
feelings of the masses; these feelings are used to integrate the masses into the national 
collective.”109  In the United States, the etiological myth is synonymous with “the 
American Way of Life.”  A democracy needs its citizens to believe in this myth (“of 
tolerance, respect, degree, choice, diversity, and so on” 110) in order to preserve itself.  If 
the state ceased to promulgate its reason for being, its effectiveness in nourishing 
citizenry’s need for religious content would diminish.  The state  
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would become the laughing stock of the citizenry, and its information would lose 
its effect, together with its propaganda.  For the information it dispenses is 
believed only to the extent that its propaganda is believed.111   
 
The third distinguishing characteristic of the royal program is “the annulment of 
the neighbor as life-giver in our history.”  The king or ruling class tries to preserve the 
idea that their citizens are not really dependent upon or accountable to one another, but 
ultimately dependent upon and accountable to the royal program.  The ruling classes 
establish “barriers and pecking orders that secure us at each other’s expense,” convince 
us we have denied no one their basic needs by hoarding wealth for ourselves, and expect 
us to remain blind to the human cost in terms of poverty and exploitation.112  In this 
imagination, the king becomes the agent of God’s providential care.  As this imagination 
gains momentum, and as the king increasingly becomes an historical agent with enduring, 
ontological significance, the primary vision eventually becomes the well-being of the 
king rather than the marginalized.113 
Here again the etiological myth arises to displace any idea that the individual is 
not utterly dependent on the state.  The propagandist employs the myth to isolate the 
individual from his neighbor, to convince him he does not really need anyone else but the 
state.  One of the effects of propaganda is that it diminishes a person, usurping his 
capacity for imagination until “he can no longer decide for himself, or alone assume the 
burden of his life; he needs a guardian, a director of conscience, and feels ill when he 
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does not have them.”114  By positioning it as the sole benefactor and provider of comfort 
and security, propaganda enables the state to become the people’s true shepherd and 
neighbor.  The state  
neutralizes the masses, forces them into passivity, throws them back on their 
private life and personal happiness (actually according them some necessary 
satisfactions on this level), in order to leave a free hand to those who are in 
power, to the active, to the militant.115 
  
With this free hand, the state creates enemies for itself, and quite easily mobilizes 
the citizenry against them.  “Man always has a certain need to hate, just as he hides in his 
heart the urge to kill.  Propaganda offers him an object of hatred, for all propaganda is 
aimed at an enemy.”116  There is no possibility for considering enemies as potential 
neighbors.  In democratic states this would confuse the etiological myth—i.e., the 
“American Way of Life”—as being merely one among other valid options.  In other 
words, the state’s pursuit of enemies involves the perpetuation of the illusion that it alone 
determines the truth.  The state uses covert propaganda to establish the public’s 
expectations for who their enemies are and utilizes overt propaganda to agitate the public 
by attacking those enemies directly.   
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It is extremely easy to launch a revolutionary movement based on hatred of a 
particular enemy.  Hatred is probably the most spontaneous and common 
sentiment; it consists of attributing one’s misfortunes and sins to ‘another,’ who 
must be killed in order to assure the disappearance of those misfortunes and 
sins.117 
 
With its management mentality, status quo optimism, and manufactured enemies, 
the royal consciousness clearly corresponds with key components of modern propaganda.  
But a fuller understanding of propaganda will enable preachers to read Scripture against 
the royal consciousness, in order to embolden the church as it becomes increasingly 
“surrounded” by the secular order.  Brueggemann’s own definition of preaching shows 
what is at stake in preachers’ interpretive practices.  He describes preaching as the 
“summoning and nurturing of an alternative community with an alternative identity, 
vision, and vocation, preoccupied with praise and obedience toward the God we 
Christians know fully in Jesus of Nazareth.”118  Such preaching has wisdom enough to 
counter the royal consciousness, to expose propaganda, and to discern when “an enemy 
has done this” (Mt. 13:28).  It has the power to “summon and nurture” an alternative 
community capable of living by truth, lament, and reconciliation.   
 
2.5  A JOURNALISTIC HERMENEUTIC 
A reconciling hermeneutic employs diachronic reading as an alternative to the 
propagandist’s interpretation of time and history.  Diachronic reading—where the church 
recognizes its potential to integrate its present situation within that of the larger story of 
                                                
117 Ellul, Propaganda, 73. 
118 Brueggemann, Testimony to Otherwise: The Witness of Elijah and Elisha (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 
2001) 5. 
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salvation history—is also the means by which preachers summon and nurture the 
congregation from disenchantment to enchantment, from cynicism to trust, and from 
hostility towards the text to friendship with it.  This means reconciliation has to do not 
only with restoring relationships between God and humanity, and between human beings, 
but also between human beings and Scripture over time.  A reconciling hermeneutic 
begins with the interpreter’s imaginative submission to the lordship of the Word of God 
revealed in Scripture.  Consequently, such a hermeneutic will be “journalistic,” so that it 
not only imaginatively pairs Scriptural narratives with contemporary lives and events, but 
does so with a particular concern for those being abused by the powers.  That is, a 
“journalistic hermeneutic” adds to the diachronic reading a predisposition of concern for 
those on the margins.  It exercises a “preferential option” for those being sacrificed. 
There is a danger in advocating a journalistic hermeneutic to the extent that 
modern, corporate journalism119 in the West is not only thoroughly secular, but also 
saturated with propaganda, violent motivations, and dubious claims of objectivity and 
neutrality.  Ellul’s study suggests much that passes for modern news is merely the 
systematic transmission of “facts,” presented so that their a priori objectivity is assumed.  
Modern news is perceived to be legitimate only when its biases are carefully masked, and 
                                                
119  By “corporate journalism” I mean to highlight contemporary journalism’s increasing susceptibility to 
the concerns of only a handful of large corporations in the United States, including The Walt Disney 
Company, Comcast, Time Warner, News Corporation, Viacom, Liberty Media, and CBS.  For a discussion 
of this dynamic as “the business of propaganda,” see Hedges, Death of the Liberal Class, 83ff. 
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when readers ignore or do not discern ulterior motives in the content a particular medium 
presents.  In modern journalism, the news cannot be good unless it is impartial.120 
One of the cardinal propagandistic qualities of corporate journalists is their 
general predisposition to offer “both sides of the story,” even when one side is clearly 
harming the other.  One New York Times reporter described his approach to a story about 
a proposed telephone rate hike in New York State as “a kind of arrogance: 
I was painting by numbers, I had written the story by calling up legislators who 
were sponsoring the proposal, and then calling up citizens’ groups who were 
raising hell about it, and then getting back to the legislators for their reaction.  I 
then stitched all the quotes together under a grand-sounding theme, and voilà! I’d 
been dutifully ‘objective’ and gathered both sides of the story and made a ‘fair 
and balanced’ front-page story for the New York Times…If anything unfair or 
truly nefarious was being done by the legislators, lobbyists, or citizens’ groups in 
the process of getting this rate hike passed, I would have been blithely unaware 
of it.  The principal actors in this story could have driven a bribe or a lie or a 
loophole or a simple unfairness right under my nose, and I wouldn’t have 
suspected a thing.  The he-said-she-said formula was all I needed to get on page 
one.121 
  
Journalism, especially journalism disseminated to the public from large, corporate 
institutions, often harms not only certain powerless demographics and poor, marginalized 
people, but also the reporters themselves.  As a Pulitzer Prize-winning foreign war 
correspondent for The New York Times, Chris Hedges covered wars in Central America, 
the Middle East, and the Balkans.  He suffers from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
                                                
120 Some of the most popular forms of mass media in the West attempt to distinguish themselves from other 
news sources as objective, fair, and balanced, even when they consistently promote very particular 
ideologies.  Whatever the political allegiances, and no matter the source or medium, news cannot be and 
has never been impartial.  One effect of the Internet on news media has been to partition people and ideas, 
with the effect of efficiently ghettoizing and calcifying divisions across a broad spectrum of political, 
economic, and social categories.  More easily than ever, people may consume prodigious amounts of media 
content without ever encountering perspectives other than those with which they already agree.  The 
proliferation of such a dynamic in modern, technological societies makes the masses increasingly 
susceptible to propaganda. 
121 Doug McGill, quoted in Chris Hedges, Death of the Liberal Class (New York: Nation Books, 2010) 134. 
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(PTSD) from living in war zones continuously for decades.  He also laments his own 
participation in the emotional detachment that war correspondence demands from its 
storytellers.   
It is difficult to witness human suffering and not to feel.  But to express these 
emotions in the newsroom, to express outrage at the atrocities committed by 
Salvadoran death squads, the killings by Bosnian Serbs, or especially the 
brutality of Israeli soldiers in Gaza, was to risk being reassigned or pushed aside 
by editors who demanded emotional disengagement.  Those who feel in 
newsrooms are viewed as lacking impartiality and objectivity.  They cannot be 
trusted.  And the game I and others played was to mask our emotions and pretend 
that, no matter how horrible the crime, we were only clinical observers.122 
  
After returning to the United States, Hedges was eventually fired for continuously 
denouncing, in journalistic reports, opinion editorials, and public speeches, the lead up to 
the second Iraq War.  After criticizing the war in a commencement address to graduates 
at Rockford College, a Times assistant managing editor gave him “a written reprimand 
for ‘public remarks that could undermine public trust in the paper’s impartiality.”123   
 In stark contrast to some of the destructive aspects of corporate journalism, a 
journalistic hermeneutic will not seek formulaic, objective, or detached interpretations of 
Scripture or of the life of a worshipping community.  Nor will it serve to satiate the 
modern appetite for “facts” in the sense Ellul describes.  Rather, in service to the finality 
of God’s reconciliation in Christ, the journalistic hermeneutic has Scripture in mind when 
it is interpreting the community and has the community in mind when it is interpreting 
Scripture.  Scripture’s whole purpose is to reveal Christ.  And, as Martin Luther said, 
                                                
122 Hedges, Death of the Liberal Class, 126. 
123 Ibid., 130. 
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“Nihil nisi Christus praedicantur” (nothing except Christ is preached).124  Where Luther 
would say the hermeneutical key to Scripture is finding the proclamation of the gospel in 
the biblical book being interpreted,125 a journalistic hermeneutic applies this principle to 
the interpretation of the present context as well.   
This requires faith on the preacher’s part that the Kingdom of God is in fact 
present in the world in discernible ways for the baptized.  Therefore, those who read 
Scripture for reconciliation will unapologetically approach the text with a bias.  With the 
preconceived notion that God has already so conclusively and irrevocably reconciled 
humanity to himself in Christ that the consequences of this reconciliation still reverberate 
today, biblical interpreters concerned with preaching the Scriptures will expect to find 
evidence “outside” the text that God “has broken down the dividing wall, that is, the 
hostility between us” (Eph. 2:14).   
The journalistic hermeneutic really asks two questions: 1) “Where is the gospel in 
this text?” and 2) “Where is the gospel happening in our midst?”  The second question 
follows the first, and its answer is subordinate to the answer of the first.  Nevertheless, 
every reconciling sermon should be so dependent on the gospel conveyed both in the text 
and also in the church’s life together that proclamation would fall apart if either were 
missing.  Peter Storey sums up the tragic consequences of preaching that fails to do this.  
Remarking on the flat and lifeless sermons of many of his colleagues in the context of 
Apartheid in South Africa, he recalls, “Every Sunday, their sermons said everything, and 
                                                
124 Fred W. Meuser, Luther the Preacher (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1983) 16. 
125 O. C. Edwards, A History of Preaching, Vol. 1 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2004) 285. 
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nothing; they could have been preaching anywhere in the world, or nowhere in the world.  
They told the old, old story of Jesus and his love as if it happened on another planet.”126 
In addition to the dialectic between Scripture and communal life, a second key 
component of a journalistic hermeneutic runs counter to corporate journalism:  lament.  
To read Scripture with a journalistic hermeneutic is to read with the conviction that 
reconciliation and lament are inextricably related.  That is, a journalistic hermeneutic will 
embrace lament as a crucial part of the journey of reconciliation, and therefore will not 
shy away from the most difficult realities of the preacher’s context.  This adds a 
supplementary third question, which is, “Who is being sacrificed?”  With the tenacity of a 
zealous reporter, Scriptural interpreters sift through the text and their own context to 
determine what is happening to human bodies.  Here we focus our attention on what is 
concretely at stake for our bodies in light of the cross (literally, the stake) of Christ, so 
that through its Scriptural interpretation, the church may learn to lament in ways that 
offer alternatives to the numbness of corporate journalism. 
Introducing his theological response to the Rwandan genocide, Emmanuel 
Katongole names three particular ways to think about bodies on any journey toward 
reconciliation.  The first sense calls our attention to the bodies of those who have been 
victimized or physically harmed.  “Anyone who watched the news reports from Rwanda 
in 1994 will remember the images of bodies.  Bodies stacked in open graves.  Bodies 
floating down rivers.  Bodies hacked to pieces by machetes.  We cannot remember 
                                                
126 Peter Storey, With God in the Crucible: Preaching Costly Discipleship (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 
2002) 16. 
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Rwanda in 1994 without talking about bodies.”127  The second sense invites a closer 
inspection of the body politic. 
The genocide of 1994 did not erupt out of nowhere.  It has a political 
history…Rwanda’s genocide is not just a story about the bodies of some who 
were victims and others who were killers.  It is about the ultimate manifestation 
of a body politic that was sick from the time it was conceived.128 
 
The third sense focuses on the broken body of Christ.  Christians killed other Christians 
in Rwanda, “often in the same churches where they had worshiped together.   
Accordingly, this is not a story about something that happened to a strange people in a 
faraway place.  It happened among the body of Christ, of which we are members.”129 
 Having enumerated these three senses of the word body, Katongole asks Western 
Christians to consider how their numbness is reflected back to the church in Rwanda’s 
broken bodies.130  The bodies of Western Christians are just as susceptible to the ways in 
which bodies in Rwanda were dominated and mutilated by violence.  A journalistic 
hermeneutic, therefore, presupposes the reader’s sensitivity to the text’s consequences for 
the body, in each of the three senses outlined above.  Such a hermeneutic will aim to 
counteract the cool objectivity and scientific rationalism that plagues corporate 
journalism.  With the passion of the Psalmist, of Job, of Jeremiah, and of Jesus on the 
cross, the journalistic hermeneutic subjects the church to questions so intense they could 
have only risen organically from the text.  Since so many biblical texts are concerned 
with what is at stake for bodies, any proclamation born from a journalistic reading will 
                                                
127 Emmanuel Katongole, Mirror to the Church:  Resurrecting Faith after Genocide in Rwanda, with 
Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2009) 10.  
128 Ibid., 11-12. 
129 Ibid., 12. 
130 Ibid., 13. 
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contend with the interplay between Scripture’s intentions for human bodies, the body 
politic, and the body of Christ. 
 
 2.6  PRACTICING A RECONCILING HERMENEUTIC 
From the discussion thus far we may identify three distinctives of a reconciling 
hermeneutic.  First, a reconciling hermeneutic discerns in Scripture’s inexhaustible 
potential for figural interpretations a correlative to God’s peaceably drawing the world to 
himself in Christ.  There is, then, a characteristically non-violent, reconciling dynamic to 
the language of Scripture which all preaching must seek to imitate if it would enable the 
deepening of communion between God and humanity.  Second, reading the Bible for 
reconciliation requires prioritizing theological concerns over all others.  Reconciling 
interpreters will be inclined to expand the plain sense of a Scripture passage with a 
“suspension of disbelief” or enchantment, so that curiosity and a capacity for 
astonishment constitute the interpreter’s fundamental posture towards the text.  Third, a 
reconciling hermeneutic reads journalistically, in that its diachronic vision prioritizes 
attention to suffering people.  Counter to the detached and “objective” methodologies of 
corporate journalism and its concern to report “facts,” a journalistic literal sense reads 
Scripture and contemporary events together, in order that the biblical texts may impose 
themselves to reanimate and reform their hearers’ perceptions of reality.   
What does a sermon developed with these distinctions look like?  Ellen Davis, a 
North American Old Testament scholar, regularly employs a reconciling hermeneutic in 
her preaching.  She eloquently combines both modern and pre-modern hermeneutics in 
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her sermons, and is consistently concerned with the theological interpretation of 
Scripture.  Throughout her sermons, she incorporates her own proposal that, 
 the preacher’s first and most important responsibility is to educate the 
imaginations of her hearers so that they have the linguistic skills to enter into the 
world which Scripture discloses, and may thus make a genuine choice about 
whether to live there.131 
 
 In her sermon, “Psalm 1,” preached from the lectionary text for the Sixth Sunday 
of Epiphany (Year C), Davis concentrates on the first two verses of the Psalm in order to 
encourage her congregation of seminarians toward a prayerful disposition in preparation 
for Lent.132  Her introduction leads to an exegetical analysis of the Psalm’s first word, 
אשרי (ashrê), moving from the typical translation of “happy” to “fortunate,” and finally to 
“privileged.”  “Privileged is the one who meditates on Torah day and night.”  The 
privileged are not those gathered “in the sitting place of the scornful,” but the “few who 
find pure delight in studying the Torah of YHWH.”  Her detailed analysis of this one 
word primarily depicts not her immediate congregation, but the original author, the 
Psalmist, communicating to the reader one simple point: “you’re not going to get 
anywhere in the life of prayer unless you’re reading Scripture, God’s Torah, all the time.” 
 Were the sermon to continue in this vein, the congregation might feel as though 
they had been subjected to an introductory Hebrew class, with an added “point” or 
maxim for inspiration.  But within moments, Davis places the congregation beside 
biblical characters as living prayer partners.  People we have come to know through 
                                                
131 Ellen Davis, Imagination Shaped: Old Testament Preaching in the Anglican Tradition (Valley Forge, 
PA: Trinity Press International, 1995) 250. 
132 Sermon preached in York Chapel, Duke Divinity School, February 18, 2004; subsequent quotations 
from Davis, Wondrous Depth: Preaching the Old Testament (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005) 
146-151.   
  102 
Scripture—David, Jeremiah, Jesus—“attend us as we pray, and their stories shape our 
prayers.”  When we pray the Psalms, we do so “in the company of Jesus and all these 
saints.”  Davis has transitioned imaginatively from Hebrew instructor to journalist, 
directly chronicling the good news that these biblical characters pray with us as surely 
and as presently as the next person in the pew.  She has interpreted the text “literally,” 
that is, with attention to exegesis and application, and even with a view toward the 
author’s original intent.  But now the literal sense has expanded dramatically, so that the 
focus is not on the author’s “original intent,” but on the hearer as the psalmist, praying in 
communion with all the saints who have made these words their own.  In this way, she 
not only reconciles the text and congregation so that the text may dovetail with their life 
together, she “overlaps” the sermonic event with the presence of saints past and present. 
 Davis is also aware of the time.  She attempts to reconcile the Psalm with the 
present moment, unleashing Scripture’s ambition to absorb the congregation into its own 
world.  “The church as a whole is about to enter the great season of holy discipline, Lent, 
and so this is a good time to take up the psalmist’s challenge to make a difficult decision 
about the company we keep.”  Focusing on “the sitting-place of the scornful” in verse 1, 
she transcends more direct, literal connections to “racy company” or folks who “wouldn’t 
want to hang out with us” godly people.  She unapologetically moves further from a 
literal to a figurative sense, explaining to the congregation, “Christians have long 
recognized that if the literal interpretation of a psalm doesn’t touch us closely, then we 
should try a less literal one.” 
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Now, the scornful become “whoever would hurt us by filling our thoughts and 
imagination with things that have no substance.”  The “sitting-place” becomes the couch 
in front of the television.  She thus invites the congregation not only to abstain from 
television during Lent, but to continuously ask when watching it, “What is it costing me 
to sit here?”  She provides two immediate answers: 1) sleep, and 2) time in spent in 
stillness before God, “sitting quietly with the Word of God in your hand or your heart.”  
With this interpretive move, Davis spares the congregation from an analysis of what the 
seat of scoffers might have looked like in the fifth century B. C., avoiding as well any 
tired depictions of the scornful as unbelievers or nominal Christians.  Instead, the 
congregation sees the sitting-place of the scornful in sharp relief, and it is likely waiting 
for them when they return to their living rooms.  Commenting on her sermon, Davis 
notes when she offered an alternative resting place to overworked students, where they 
might receive the “the greatest gift, the quiet presence of God,” there was “an audible 
sigh of longing in the chapel.”133   
 With a final metaphor, she likens someone inhabiting a “full-grown life of prayer” 
to the tree in verse 3, “planted by water channels, which gives its fruit in its season, and 
its leaf does not whither; and everything she does will prosper.”  She leaves the 
congregation with a sharper vision not only for a divinely ordained escape from the 
exhausted and meaningless life of a couch potato, but for the recognition of a psalm-
shaped life when they see one.  Christians shaped by deep prayer are “like that tree:  not 
ostentatious, yet hardly unnoticeable.  People who are on a journey and in need will 
                                                
133 Davis, Wondrous Depth, 151. 
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notice—people looking for shelter from the heat, people who are desperate for water.”  
This raises the stakes for the congregation, revealing a way for them to navigate the 
world upon their departure from worship with a heightened awareness of the holiness 
prayer imbues in themselves and in others.  To the watchful eye, the world into which the 
sermon invites them is full of signs and wonders, an enchanted grove where one just 
might encounter a living source of God’s peace.  
 
 2.7  CONCLUSION 
 The ultimate aim of this chapter has been to illuminate Scriptural interpretation as 
an inherently peacemaking practice.  That the threefold word of God corresponds to the 
unity within the inner life of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, means no one form of 
divine linguistic expression can exist apart from the other two.  If God’s peace is fully 
present in the incarnate word, Jesus, it follows that this same peace constitutes the word 
of God in its written and spoken forms.  It is not that this same peace should constitute 
these two latter forms, but that we cannot fully describe or identify any of these forms as 
the word of God apart from the fundamentally peaceable character God has revealed to us 
in the person and work of Jesus Christ.  This is both an affirmation of the unity of the 
Trinity, and a challenge to preachers to heed the intricate complexion and disposition of 
Scriptural language as divinely inspired by the God, “who reconciled us to himself 
through Christ, and has given us the ministry of reconciliation” (2 Cor. 5:18).  Sustained 
by these claims, the reconciling hermeneutic functions to usher the congregation into the 
“strange new world of the Bible,” where we may be continually astonished to discover 
  105 
that the God it describes is determined not to count our trespasses against us, but rather 
entrusts to us the message of reconciliation. 
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CHAPTER 3:  RECONCILING RHETORIC 
Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am 
become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. 
I CORINTHIANS 13.1 
 
Nothing true can be said about God from a posture of defense. 
THE REVEREND JOHN AMES, GILEAD1 
 
 Theologian Elizabeth Newman describes the indelible moment she first 
encountered the mummified heart of Teresa of Avila, preserved in an ornate glass case in 
Teresa’s hometown of Avila, Spain.   
A faint line could be traced across the heart, where, I was told, the Holy Spirit 
had pierced her.  Teresa writes about this divine ‘arrow’ in Interior Castle, as 
well as in her autobiography, The Book of Her Life.  Such a mark on Teresa’s 
heart could well be understood as a sign of Teresa’s own reception of the Holy 
Spirit as ultimately a gift to the church.2 
 
The image of a preserved human heart literally engraved by God’s Spirit should 
strike the baptized not as a tourist gimmick, but as a sign and seal of the LORD’s promise:  
“I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts; and I will be their God, 
and they shall be my people” (Jeremiah 31:33).  We should be disappointed if any 
preacher’s autopsy did not reveal similar marks.  For the preacher’s call begins not in her 
own imagination, but in the deep impact of God’s revelation, which Barth says is like “an 
arrow from the other side of a shore on which we will never set foot, yet it hits us.”3  To 
amend his analogy, we should describe this arrow more like a harpoon, since God does 
not pierce us and leave us alone, but draws all people to himself as he is “lifted up from 
                                                
1 Marilynne Robinson, Gilead (New York:  Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2004) 177. 
2 Elizabeth Newman, Attending the Wounds on Christ’s Body:  Teresa’s Scriptural Vision (Eugene, OR:  
Cascade Books, 2012) 9. 
3 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (Oxford University Press, 1933) 238. 
  107 
the earth” (John 12:32).  That is, God inaugurates his mission of reconciliation by cutting 
us to the heart with the Word (Acts 2:37), and persists in this mission in order to dwell in 
our hearts through faith, as we are being rooted and grounded in love (Ephesians 3:17). 
 There is a uniqueness to Christian rhetoric that originates in the deeper recesses of 
God’s own heart and comes to us only as God wills it.  To put this another way, the 
rhetoric of preaching really begins in the heart of God, where the preacher can never 
exercise ultimate control, but only hope that God uses her message to build up the 
church.  This does not mean preachers can eschew rhetoric.  Preachers are automatically 
rhetoricians, and their attempts to persuade the congregation constitute a crucial part of 
what makes preaching an art.  But is persuasion necessarily the all-encompassing 
firmament of the language of preaching?  Or has God’s reconciling mission 
fundamentally altered the nature of gospel proclamation, effectively subordinating 
rhetoric to the Word of God?  Through the power of the Holy Spirit, God the Father has 
shown preachers the way to shape their language by revealing his divine “form” in Jesus 
Christ the Son, who is for us the reconciling Word.  This means that, together with 
reading Scripture for reconciliation, preachers must also shape the language of their 
proclamation in reconciling ways.  The challenge of this chapter will be to demonstrate a 
unique homiletical rhetoric that serves the purposes of reconciliation.  
It will not be my sole task to re-catalogue the inner workings and mechanics of 
classical rhetoric, nor to delineate and rank certain existing definitions of rhetoric as more 
compatible with my argument than others.  Instead, I will seek to build on the historical 
and complementary relationship between rhetoric and homiletics in order to offer an 
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account of reconciling rhetoric for preaching.  I will first draw from the works of 
Aristotle in order to demonstrate rhetoric’s original emphasis on persuasion.  Then I will 
examine the works of Augustine and Kenneth Burke to show how more recent 
understandings of rhetoric have built on classical definitions.  From there I will consider 
how Richard Lischer’s caveat against persuasion as preaching’s fundamental rhetorical 
orientation compares with Lucy Lind Hogan and Robert Reid’s emphasis on rhetorical 
“effectiveness.”  Finally, after offering my own definition of “kenotic rhetoric,” as the 
preferential option for reconciling sermons, I will present the character of John Ames in 
Marilynn Robinson’s novel, Gilead, as an exemplary practitioner of reconciling rhetoric.  
Overall, I will be concerned to show that attention to reconciliation is a more 
fundamental prerequisite for preaching than the mastery of persuasion.  Preaching’s 
acceptance of persuasion as the essence of rhetoric denies the complexity of the divine 
Word, and often derails gospel proclamation from its original function, purpose, and 
infrastructure, to the detriment of deeper theological reflection on and proclamation of 
the finality of God’s reconciling action in Jesus Christ. 
 
3.1  CLASSICAL PERSUASIONS 
 Noting that it is “a feature of all human communication” even in nonliterate 
societies, George Kennedy defines rhetoric in its most primordial function as “a form of 
mental or emotional energy imparted to a communication to affect a situation in the 
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interest of the speaker.”4  In this sense, rhetoric is a phenomenon of communication that 
spans all human cultures and even certain species of animals.  Yet, rhetoric as an art form 
and subject of study traces its roots to Greece, several centuries before the birth of Christ.  
Rhetoric as a specific discipline arose in the Athenian law courts, where adult male 
citizens assembled to argue decisions over public policy, and to prosecute others or 
defend themselves before large juries in both criminal and civil trials.  Because there 
were no professional lawyers, both prosecutors and defendants were expected to address 
the jury with at least one set speech.5  Many lacked the necessary skills with which to 
persuade juries consisting of over a thousand randomly chosen male citizens, and often 
relied on helpful pamphlets on rhetoric circulating at the time.  The atmosphere was one 
of argumentation, competition, and rivalry, as cases were decided on the rhetor’s ability 
to convince a majority of jurors.  The art of rhetoric was refined in circumstances where 
the speaker’s future well being depended on his ability to persuade his audience.   
 Due to its practical flourishing in the law courts, the Greeks were also the first to 
develop a methodical vocabulary and complex tradition of rhetorical scholarship.  
Aristotle inherited a rich rhetorical tradition from Plato, as well as from the works of 
Homer and other poets.  His unique contribution, if one can briefly encapsulate it, was a 
decisive turn toward an understanding of rhetoric as having both practical and theoretical 
dimensions.  Introducing what perhaps remains the prevailing, authoritative definition, he 
describes rhetoric as “an ability, in each [particular] case to see the available means of 
                                                
4 Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, 2nd ed., trans. George A. Kennedy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2007) 7. 
5 Ibid, 9. 
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persuasion.”6  The rhetorician, then, will speak persuasively only after having achieved a 
level of sophisticated knowledge enabling one to grasp the full potential of persuasive 
speech in particular situations.  Before its application through speech, rhetoric first 
describes an agent’s particular capacity for rhetorical applicability.  By defining rhetoric 
as an ability, a faculty of vision, which precedes the actual utterance, Aristotle posits 
rhetorical intellect as a prerequisite for rhetorical speech. 
There were essentially three public occasions that warranted such an ability.  In 
addition to the law courts, two other circumstances requiring Athenians to demonstrate 
rhetorical skill were the legislative assembly and certain ceremonial events.  All three 
occasions necessitated the use of one of the following three rhetorical species: 
deliberative, judicial (forensic), or epideictic (demonstrative).  Each of the three species 
evokes its own “time” and purpose, or telos.  The deliberative rhetoric of the legislative 
assemblies is concerned with what might happen in the future, and so aims to designate 
what is advantageous or harmful.  The judicial rhetoric of the law courts, which is 
concerned with past actions and events, seeks to determine what is just and unjust.  
Epideictic rhetoric, which relates to the more immediate concerns of celebratory 
gatherings or funerals, aims to evoke what is honorable or dishonorable.  Kennedy notes 
that Aristotle’s assigning of “times” to each species of discourse is strained due to the 
obvious tendency for these species to overlap within their respective domains.7  
Nevertheless, Aristotle’s categories are consistent with his contention that rhetoric is an 
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ability of vision regarding the available means of persuasion.  In its classical orientation, 
persuasion’s effectiveness requires an initial discernment of the type of occasion and its 
corresponding time.   
Aristotle’s categorization of species is clearly not intended to culminate in the 
mutual exclusion of their respective aims.  He intends for them to serve not as rhetorical 
straightjackets, but as guides.  Considering the rhetorical demands of a specific occasion 
during his preparation, the classical rhetorician would not approach a jury as though he 
would a funeral gathering or a legislative assembly.  Yet, he may combine the respective 
aims of each species to constitute his speech for any occasion.  In addressing a funeral 
gathering the speaker may supplement his epideictic rhetoric with both deliberative and 
judicial aims, thereby blending the “times” associated with each species.  For example, in 
his funeral address to Athens during the first year of the Peloponnesian War (431 B.C.), 
Pericles combines epideictic rhetoric with the deliberative and judicial species.8  While 
he approaches the podium primarily to praise the dead who lie just behind him in a mass 
grave, he also takes the opportunity to laud the abiding strength and character of the 
citizenry:   
We have no need of a Homer to sing our praises, or of any encomiast whose 
poetic version may have immediate appeal but then fall foul of actual truth.  The 
fact is that we have forced every sea and every land to be open to our enterprise, 
and everywhere we have established permanent memorials of both failure and 
success.9 
 
                                                
8 Ibid.  Kennedy briefly mentions Pericles’ “Funeral Oration” in Thucydides and Abraham Lincoln’s 
“Gettysburg Address” as rhetorical examples that resist Aristotle’s “strained attempt to assign a time to 
each species.”  I am more directly considering the content of Pericles’ speech in order to demonstrate the 
fluid nature of Aristotle’s rhetorical species.   
9 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Martin Hammond (Oxford University Press, 2009) 93, (2.41).  
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As well, he commends what would be advantageous for the city’s future welfare.  
Those young enough to bear children again should do so, for “both maintenance of the 
population and also a safeguard, since those without children at stake do not face the 
same risks as the others and cannot make a balanced or judicious contribution to 
debate.”10  These two excerpts show how Pericles’ rhetorical approach serves as an 
interruption and confirmation of Aristotle’s classifications.  Though he combines all three 
species, Pericles puts deliberative and judicial rhetoric in service to the central, epideictic 
thrust of praise for the war dead.  By supplementing other species as he deems 
appropriate, he demonstrates a refined capacity to see the available means of persuasion.   
 Just as crucial for the classical orator as the ends of these rhetorical species are the 
means of persuasion, or “kinds of proof” (pisteis), Aristotle presents:  ethos, pathos, and 
logos.  Descriptions of these terms intensify Aristotle’s focus on persuasion, since they 
function to enrich the three rhetorical species with specific modes of convincing the 
audience.  Ethos, pathos, and logos constitute what classical rhetoricians call invention—
the first stage of speech—by which the orator exercises the entechnic form of pisteis, or 
the embodied art of rhetoric.11  Entechnic is “whatever can be prepared by method and by 
‘us’” through artistic invention.12  The first of these, ethos, signifies the character of the 
speaker and her speaking in such a way as to attract the audience by her (perceived) fair-
                                                
10 Ibid., 95 (2.44). 
11 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, 38 (1.2). 
12 Ibid.  Aristotle contrasts entechnic with “atechnic,” which he defines as “not provided by ‘us’ [i. e. 
potential speaker] but are preexisting: for example, witnesses, testimony from torture, contracts, and such 
like.” 
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mindedness.13  The second is pathos, the means by which the speaker induces emotion in 
her hearers. The third mode, logos, names the means of persuasion by logical argument 
through deductive and inductive reasoning.  The classical rhetor carefully combines these 
modes in order to achieve the aims associated with particular rhetorical species.  
Centuries later, Cicero would redevelop these widely accepted “proofs” into “duties” that 
correspond with levels of style.  An orator should prove (provare) in the plain style, 
delight (delectare) in the middle style, and stir emotionally, move, or “bend” (flectere) in 
the grand style.  Even so, the ultimate aim remained the persuasion of an audience. 
  
3.2  RHETORIC’S AUGUSTINIAN SHIFT 
Augustine further reorients rhetorical aims for teaching and preaching in On 
Christian Teaching, Book 4, effectively introducing a decisive shift in rhetorical theory in 
service to the church.  Harnessing persuasion for the encouragement of loving God and 
neighbor, Augustine apparently adopts Quintilian’s adjustments of Cicero’s duties, 
replacing provare with docere (to instruct), and leaving delectare unchanged.  He also 
intentionally alters the third mode, from flectare to movere, in order to emphasize the 
importance of affecting obedience.  Augustine systematically combs the Scriptures for 
these rhetorical effects.  What made his contribution truly original was the fact that 
Christian communities had heretofore equated eloquence and flowery language with 
paganism.  Augustine’s rhetorical recalibrations commenced the church’s unapologetic 
                                                
13 The orator’s appearing to have good character was essential to Aristotle.  He regarded the actual 
character or personal integrity of the speaker apart from the rhetorical event as superfluous since, in the 
most typical contexts, the one speaking would have often enough been a stranger to the audience.  
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use of classical rhetoric, and enabled preachers from Augustine’s own time to the present 
to see the available means of persuading people towards faith.  Nevertheless, though he 
draws the practices of classical rhetoric close to his lips, he does not swallow them 
whole. 
Augustine reflects on passages from several of Paul’s epistles, illuminating the 
apostle’s skillful use of rhetoric, and commending these ways to Christian interpreters.  
He points to Paul’s use of the restrained style in Galatians 4:21-26, where the apostle 
describes the narrative of Abraham’s two sons as allegorical:  “These are in fact the two 
covenants:  one, from Mount Sinai, by which people are born into slavery—this is 
Hagar…But the heavenly Jerusalem is the free woman, and she is our mother.”14  Here, 
Paul provides clarity through instruction and probing analysis, fulfilling the purpose of 
the plain or restrained style.  He not only reveals what is hidden, resolving “knotty 
problems” in the process, but also anticipates other potential questions that might refute 
his initial case.  This restrained style is suitable for syllogisms and logical proofs, 
introducing ideas, addressing single subjects over longer periods, and for contributing to 
the rhetorical ebb and flow whereby the other two styles may also find their proper place.  
Because of its more subdued nature, this style is “easier to tolerate over a long period” 
than the other two, especially the grand style. 
 Augustine is particularly drawn to Romans to highlight employments of the 
mixed style.  As a philologian, he delights in the text’s artistry, finding again and again “a 
                                                
14 The biblical translation is at it appears in Augustine’s analysis in On Christian Doctrine, trans by R. P. H. 
Green (Oxford University Press, 1997 [2008]) 126. 
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graceful flow of phrases each duly balanced by other phrases.”15  In Rom. 12:6-16, there 
is an attractive “outpouring of words,” artfully separated by cola in a way that evinces a 
“stylistic embellishment that derives from rhythmical clausulae” (which Augustine 
laments has been lost in the Latin translation’s adherence to original word order).16  For 
Rom. 13:14, he would replace the strict translation, “Put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and do 
not give thought to the flesh by indulging in its passionate desires,” with the following, 
more rhythmic construction:  “Do not, by indulging passionate desires, give thought for 
the flesh.”17  The danger with the mixed style lies in the temptation to reduce “the weight 
of the impressive divine writings while enhancing the rhythm.”18  Augustine notes his 
preference for applying moderation in clausular rhythm.  Yet, what distinguishes the 
mixed from the grand style is that “it is not so much embellished with verbal ornament as 
inflamed by heartfelt emotion.”19 The mixed style gives delight through eloquence 
itself.20  Carried by its own momentum in this regard, the mixed style is most 
appropriately used epideictically, “when there is something to be praised or censured.”21   
 The grand style evokes the most intensity, since, “as a rule the grand style silences 
people’s voices with its weight, but elicits tears.”22  By the audience’s tears the speaker 
will know the people have been moved.  Paul uses the grand style in I Corinthians 5:7-8, 
“Purge out the old leaven, so that you may be a fresh mixture, unleavened just as you are.  
                                                
15 Ibid., 128. 
16 Ibid., 128-29. 
17 Ibid., 128. 
18 Ibid. 129 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 140. 
21 Ibid., 138. 
22 Ibid., 139. 
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For Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us.”  By the grand style the hard heart is 
softened, the people groan and weep, and lives are changed.  “Many people are 
transformed by the restrained style of speaking too, but in the sense of knowing what they 
did not know before.”23  That is, the change that occurs by the restrained style more 
directly affects the mind, achieving a more cognitive persuasion.  But when the people 
are persuaded by the grand style, they act in obedience.  They make a decision towards a 
more praiseworthy life. 
One rightly suspects at this point that Augustine has adjusted Cicero’s pairing of 
modes with styles.  Whereas Cicero claims, “The eloquent speaker will be one who can 
treat small matters in a restrained style, intermediate matters in a mixed style, and 
important matters in a grand style,”24 Augustine has suggested a more hybridized 
approach, advising that each aim does not necessarily correspond to or fit within one of 
the three styles.  The aim of instructing is not limited to the restrained style; delight may 
occur outside of the mixed style; the speaker may move the people without using the 
grand style.  In matters of faith, there should be “the sense that a speaker should always 
have these three aims and pursue them to the best of his ability even when operating 
within one particular style.”25  If the preacher integrates the three aims skillfully enough, 
he might arouse the congregation to applause even with the restrained style.  
                                                
23 Ibid. 
24 Augustine, 123.  See also, Cicero, On the Ideal Orator, trans. by James M. May and Jakob Wisse 
(Oxford University Press, 2001) 144 [2.80]. 
25 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, 141. 
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That Augustine claims the smallest matters have eternal significance marks the 
beginning of a decisive divergence with classical rhetorical thinking. 
In our [Christian] situation, since we must relate everything, especially what we 
say to congregations from our position of authority, to the well-being of human 
beings not in this temporary life but in eternity, where there is added danger of 
eternal perdition, all matters that we speak of are important…26 
 
Augustine’s remark signals a reestablishment of rhetoric’s underpinnings in service to 
something more groundbreaking and profound than persuasion.  While the church must 
not ignore rhetoric due to its pagan associations, neither should it unquestionably adopt 
rhetoric on the basis of its classical presuppositions.  Augustine shows us the art of 
persuasion is a virtuous practice, but only as teachers and preachers use it toward 
charitable ends.27 
Where Cicero and others too readily equate eloquence and wisdom, Augustine 
initially separates the two.  Eloquence, according to him, does not necessarily indicate 
wisdom.  This becomes apparent at the beginning of Book 4, where he speaks of 
eloquence as a neutral tool available to those who would use it to do harm or good, “to 
give conviction to both truth and falsehood.”28  In this sense, eloquence follows “relevant 
observations and rules, which, together with a skilful manner of speaking” use an 
                                                
26 Ibid., 124. 
27 Athenagoras anticipates Augustine’s concern in Chapter 11 of A Plea Regarding Christians.  Addressing 
Roman emperors, Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Aurelius Commodus, whom Athenagoras calls “philosophic 
princes,” he says, “Who of those who analyze syllogisms, resolve ambiguities, explain etymologies, or 
[teach] homonyms, synonyms, predicates, axioms, and what the subject is and what the predicate—who of 
them do not promise to make their disciples happy through these and similar disciplines?  And yet who of 
them have so purified their own hearts as to love their enemies instead of hating them; instead of 
upbraiding those who first insult them (which is certainly more usual), to bless them; and to pray for those 
who plot against them?”  Passage excerpted from Christian Peace and Nonviolence:  A Documentary 
History, Michael G. Long, ed. (Maryknoll, NY:  Orbis Books, 2011) 17. 
28 Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, 101. 
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abundance of words and verbal ornament.29  Knowing evil and good people alike can 
craft beautiful language to serve their own ends, Augustine makes wisdom the 
cornerstone upon which eloquence stands or falls.  Eloquence then ceases to pursue 
persuasion for its own sake, but becomes the means by which listeners may understand, 
delight in, and be moved to obey Christian teaching.  Making the love of God and 
neighbor eloquence’s ultimate aim has a seismic impact on the development of rhetorical 
theory and practice.  Augustine re-synthesizes rhetoric with wisdom, and more 
particularly with the wisdom of God embodied in Jesus Christ, thereby inaugurating a 
new age for preaching.   In this new paradigm, rhetoric and wisdom inhabit a more 
formal, complementary relationship in service to the church. 
  
3.3  BURKEAN PERSUASION:  COOPERATION AND IDENTIFICATION 
Kenneth Burke discloses the consequences of Augustine’s strategy by describing 
the ways in which he effectively widens the scope of rhetoric beyond persuasion.30  In 
Augustine’s scheme, “wisdom (philosophy, ‘dialectic’) is a ‘source of eloquence.’ not 
because it is one with eloquence (since the ‘truth’ of Christian doctrine can be stated 
without eloquence), but because it is the ground of eloquence.”31  This wisdom is “the 
heavenly wisdom that comes down from the Father of lights” (James 1:17), and is gained 
in direct proportion to one’s progress in learning the holy Scriptures.32  The Scriptural 
authors who have achieved such wisdom, in fact, acquire a “kind of eloquence 
                                                
29 Ibid., 102. 
30 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969 [1950]) 77.  
All succeeding references including italics are original to his work. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Augustine, Doctrine, 104-05. 
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appropriate to writers who enjoy the highest authority and a full measure of divine 
inspiration.”33  Their “saturation” in Scripture, so to speak, has the real effect of drawing 
the speaker deeper into the inner life of the Logos, the logic, of God. 
Thus, whereas Aristotle grouped rhetoric with dialectic by reason of the fact that 
both were purely verbal instruments, in Augustine (as with the Stoics) dialectic is 
more than words:  for when it is correct, it deals with the ultimate nature of 
things, hence has a kind of extraverbal reference to guide the use of ornament 
(eloquence, rhetoric).  The end of rhetoric was ‘to persuade with words’ 
(persuadere dicendo); but the principle of Logos behind such purely human 
language was ‘the Word’ in another sense, a kind of Word that was identical with 
reality. 
 
 Burke’s own philosophy of rhetoric turns on notions of persuasion, identification, 
and cooperation.  Initially through literary critique, but also in the wake of general and 
philosophical analyses of human behavior, he concludes that earlier definitions and 
theories of rhetoric restrain its fundamental essence.  With considerable influence from 
Augustine, Burke defines rhetoric as a continually renewing “use of language as a 
symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols.”34  
Consequently, persuasion is not an expansive enough category for rhetoric unless it 
“involves communication by the signs of consubstantiality, the appeal of 
identification.”35  “Consubstantiality” names a kind of communion between human 
beings among whom there are admittedly also varying degrees of division.  “If men were 
not apart from one another, there would be no need for the rhetorician to proclaim their 
unity.  If men were wholly and truly of one substance, absolute communion would be of 
                                                
33 Ibid., 106. 
34 Burke, Motives, 43. 
35 Ibid., 62. 
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man’s very essence.”36  Rhetoric names the means by which symbol-using animals 
(human beings) exchange symbols in the service of bridging divisions between them.  In 
this light, persuasion is actually relegated to a co-subsidiary status within the genus of 
rhetoric itself, joining “identification” as its symbiotic counterpart.   
Burke reframes classical articulations of rhetoric by revealing its ubiquitous and 
even “pure” nature.  Rhetoric is “everywhere,” ranging from the “bluntest quest of 
advantage, as in sales promotion or propaganda, through courtship, social etiquette, 
education, and the sermon, to a ‘pure’ form that delights in the process of appeal for itself 
alone, without ulterior purpose.”37  Pure persuasion contrasts with rhetoric’s more 
agonistic expressions.  Rhetoricians have generally concerned themselves with “proving 
opposites,” exhortation, invective, argument, winning over an audience.  The orator 
stands in something like an adversarial relationship with the listeners.  With his speech he 
must redirect them in some way, so that they will know or do what they otherwise would 
not have known or done had they never been addressed.  But the rhetoric of pure 
persuasion involves 
the saying of something, not for an extra-verbal advantage to be got by the 
saying, but because of a satisfaction intrinsic to the saying.  [Rhetoric] summons 
because it likes the feel of a summons.  It would be nonplused if the summons 
were answered…It intuitively says, ‘This is so,’ purely and simply because this is 
so.38 
 
Burke suggests the actor’s relationship to the audience, or a devout person’s 
relationship to God, as scenarios for pure persuasion’s flourishing.  In each case there are 
                                                
36 Ibid., 22. 
37 Ibid., xiv. 
38 Ibid., 269. 
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three elements—speaker, speech, and spoken-to—which serve as the form in which we 
find the ultimate rhetorical motive.39  This motive is “grounded not in the search for 
‘advantage,’ and in the mere ‘sublimating’ of that search by ‘rationalizations’ and 
‘moralizations,’” but rather in the “persuasiveness of the hierarchic order itself.”40  In 
other words, pure persuasion is the continuation of rhetoric after the uttered plea is 
answered, the joy of communication for its own sake, the verbal and non-verbal 
communion between symbol-bearing animals (humans) that is continuously present and 
acting.  The tripartite form of speaker, speech, spoken-to has an eternal quality that 
persuasion toward an advantage does not.  “For a persuasion that succeeds, dies.”41   
 Persuasion, for Burke, most fundamentally describes a threefold “form” of 
relations with an “eternal” quality, rather than a means of winsomely gaining advantage 
over those addressed.  Rhetoric, in this new sense, actually invites the frustration of 
persuasion’s final declarations.  The art of persuasion in its purest form is not a technique 
for inviting adherence to terminal decrees, but an interference of linguistic finality.  The 
purpose of language is to engage human difference in order to affect cooperation.  The 
speaker so shapes his speech as to “commune with” the spoken-to.42  It cannot be 
coincidental that Burke constructs his rhetorical theories in the wake of two disastrous 
world wars, during which maneuvers of classical rhetoric reached scientific levels of 
precision with murderous consequences.  By advancing a form of persuasion that “never 
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40 Ibid. 
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42 Ibid., 271. 
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ends,” Burke seeks to unveil an essential, liminal quality in language that interrupts 
totalitarian aims, and more fully reveals language’s authentic purposes, namely, for the 
sake of cooperation. 
 
3.4  ARE WE PERSUADED? 
 We have now arrived at a point where, from a Christian position, we must begin 
proceeding from Augustine’s practical applications and Burke’s aesthetic perspective 
toward what particular difference the gospel makes for rhetoric, itself.  Augustine 
certainly employs rhetoric in service to the gospel, conscripting modes of persuasion and 
appropriating them for use in the church’s pulpits.  Burke elegantly rehabilitates classical 
rhetoric, expanding our notions of its jurisdiction and intrinsic function.  His emphases on 
identification and cooperation are consistent with the reconciling rhetoric I will attempt to 
illumine.  But there is nothing in particular about Burke’s philosophy that makes it 
binding for a community that confesses Jesus Christ as Lord.  Should confessing 
Christians uncritically adopt the notion that the sum and substance of God’s speech to 
them is “persuasion,” whether or not it might be pure?  Is the fullness of the biblical 
witness about God that humanity has been “persuaded”?  Both Augustine and Burke 
leave rhetoric to inhabit the same “world,” or paradigm, of persuasive language.  The 
question is whether theology has any sublimating consequence for rhetoric.  Can there be 
a uniquely Christian rhetoric that transcends persuasion as its primary substance?      
 Two preaching scholars, Richard Lischer and Lucy Lind Hogan, have wrestled 
with the question of persuasion’s relationship to preaching.  Lischer approaches the issue 
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from a theological perspective.  He asks, “Why would anyone wish not to be persuasive, 
especially a preacher, of all people, whose success depends on his or her ability to win an 
audience?”43  His question highlights the firm grip classical rhetoric holds on preachers 
and their assumptions about the purposes of preaching.  Is it not the preacher’s job to 
move the congregation from one place to another through whatever rhetorical maneuvers 
are necessary?  If persuasion is not the preacher’s quintessential aim, then what is 
preaching for?  Lischer counters that insistence upon “‘persuasion’ as a paradigm, for the 
sowing and germination of the word of God simply does not do justice to the 
environment in which we live and minister.  It does not do justice to the richness of our 
theological calling.”44  Because its language is eternally rich, versatile, and complex, the 
gospel cannot be reduced to a technique.  Rather than “crushing the gospel into a 
persuasion,” preachers should understand their speech as “redeemed—crucified and 
risen—and located at the heart of a new community of the baptized.”45  A preacher’s first 
questions during sermon preparation should not be, “Is this persuasive enough?” but, 
“How does the speech adhere to God’s revelation on which it is based?  Does it respect 
the richness of the Bible’s many voices?  And secondly, how shall we join this speech to 
the other practices of the church?”46 
 Lischer draws upon Amos Wilder’s assertion that the basic character of the 
Gospel is revelation, not persuasion.  “If you reread the gospels and epistles through the 
                                                
43 Richard Lischer, “Why I Am Not Persuasive,” Homiletic 24, no. 2 (1999) 13. 
44 Ibid., 14-15. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 16. 
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lens of his insight, you cannot miss the necessary continuity between God’s method of 
communication and our habits of speaking.”47  Wilder illuminates the ways in which 
Christian speech, from its birth onward, infuses existing forms of speech with the 
revelatory newness of the gospel. 
[Christian speech] beginning with Jesus himself, represented an identification 
with and a renewal of existing idioms.  In one sense, as language the Gospel met 
each man and each people where they were—was ‘all things to all men’—in 
another sense it spoke a new word to all.48 
 
 The first four evangelists of the New Testament canon departed so conspicuously 
from the rhetorical tools at their disposal that they needed a new name for their genre—
gospel.  The author of the Gospel of John 
could have written instead a meditation on the incarnation of the Word, or the 
visit to this lower world of the heavenly Revealer.  Thus we might have had from 
him not a gospel but a homily like the Coptic Gospel of Truth.  But the narrative 
pattern established by Mark or otherwise known to him imposed itself upon him 
so that his unique heavenly discourse is presented in gospel-form.49   
 
 Wilder shows how the gospel’s peculiar rhetoric is akin to what the poet Rilke 
called “the uninterrupted news that grows out of silence.”50  This news proceeds from 
Pentecost, the gospel’s rhetorical wellspring, which is a “sound like the rush of a violent 
wind” (Acts 2:2).  Lischer follows Wilder’s logic in advocating for a specifically 
Christian rhetoric that remembers the birth of the church’s odd speech, and attempts to 
bring it into the present through human speech.  This rhetoric gushes forth in a way that,  
                                                
47 Lischer, “Why I Am Not Persuasive,” 14. 
48 Amos N. Wilder, Early Christian Rhetoric: The Language of the Gospel (Peabody, Massachusetts: 
Hendrickson Publishers, 1999 [Harper & Row, 1964]) 39. 
49 Ibid., 30. 
50 Quoted in Wilder, Early Christian Rhetoric, 16. 
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brings out on the one hand the miraculous unedited newness of the word, 
breaking forth out of silence, out of ignorance, out of nescience.  And it also 
brings out the flowing character of that word as ‘uninterrupted news’—the 
speech of the Gospel that renews itself and conveys life from generation to 
generation from inexhaustible fountains.51 
 
 According to Lischer, preaching devolves into moralism when it “presupposes a 
vaguely democratic atmosphere” where the congregation is in conflict with the preacher.  
We should not transpose the rhetorical version of Hobbes’s “war of all against all” onto 
the church and “accept it as the normative environment for worship and preaching.”52  To 
preach with a rhetoric whose purpose is always to convince is to deny that the 
congregation to which one preaches is not already convinced.  “Despite the increasingly 
conflicted nature of church life, preaching still occurs in an ecology of shared hope and 
humanity in which the listeners are no less persuaded than their preacher.”53   
 Hogan and co-author Robert Reid embrace the former questions over the latter.  
Their approach to rhetoric in preaching is first to determine not whether the preacher’s 
speech inhabits the gospel’s own modes of communication, but whether the preacher’s 
speech “connects with the congregation.”  Their primary concern is not reconciliation 
with the gospel’s language, but “effectiveness.”  Hogan and Reid believe that learning 
rhetorical theory “is not enough to make one an effective preacher.”54  Implicit in this 
statement is that, though rhetorical theory is not enough, the preacher’s goal is still to 
learn how to be effective, to get the sermon to “work.”  And what works is determined or 
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54 Lucy Lind Hogan and Robert Reid, Connecting With the Congregation:  Rhetoric and the Art of 
Preaching (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1999) 13. 
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measured less by how much the preacher’s rhetoric is shaped by the various patterns of 
the gospel, and more by the congregation’s response.  “We need to be willing to follow 
the ‘rules,’” they say, but we must also “deviate from them when we feel that it is 
necessary.  If, for example, you have come to know that your congregation responds well 
to something your preaching professor told you NEVER to do, as long as it is ethical, do 
it.”55  The preacher must do “what works,” as long as it is ethical.  Hogan and Reid do not 
seem to consider the ethical consequences of a preacher’s deviation from the gospel’s 
own parlance.  
 Their approach to rhetoric is to search for the formula or rubric that works best to 
keep the congregation’s attention, and persuade them to accept and act on the preacher’s 
ideas.  It is basically an argumentative approach.  The congregation is in one place, while 
the preacher (who seems perpetually to be standing on higher ground) provokes and 
cajoles the people to step closer toward the preacher’s conclusions about the text.  
Whether the sermon is semantically reconciled to the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus 
is of secondary importance in relation to whether the sermon effectively attends to the 
maintenance of a preacher’s persona (ethos), appropriately balances reason and emotion 
(pathos), and maintains a rhetorical stance (logos) based on arguments and examples that 
best fit the needs of a particular congregation.   
 Ironically, Hogan and Reid’s application of a rhetoric of novelty and effectiveness 
is a derivative of Charles Finney’s “New Measures,” which are now entering their third 
weary century.  As Ted Smith has elegantly shown, new measures preachers use 
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rhetorical techniques that arose in the overlapping arenas of the Second Great Awakening 
and the early years of America’s thriving democratic republic.  New measures adapt 
almost seamlessly between ecclesial and secular realms.  Preachers of these measures 
employ methods that set goals and seek immediate fulfillment—they use whatever 
“works.”  They are, by definition, anxious to achieve a hearing “NOW.”  For the revivalist 
Finney, preaching was not preaching unless it sought immediate conversion.  “God 
commanded [the sinner] to repent now, to believe now, to make him a new heart now.”56   
 Smith’s book does not provide an exhaustive list of the practices called “the new 
measures.”  He does enumerate the six specific measures, showing how they influenced, 
and were influenced by, democratic culture in America.  The six measures are: 1) 
organizing worship so that it achieves measurable results; 2) using novelty to compete in 
an economy of attention; 3) demanding that people make free decisions; 4) proclaiming 
the formal equality of all people; 5) representing private selves in public spaces, and so 
speaking with the authority of celebrity; and 6) telling stories to illustrate points.57  Smith 
believes these measures continue to dominate preaching today, and have “shaped the 
rhetoric of preachers as diverse as William Sloane Coffin, Michael Lerner, T. D. Jakes, 
Joyce Meyer, Daniel Berrigan, Rick Warren, and Barbara Brown Taylor.”58  One can find 
new measures preachers in the largest churches of America’s most populous cities, as 
well as in the smallest congregations in the most rural hamlets.   
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 The new measures’ omnipresence reveals their nearly inescapable influence.  
They have so ingrained themselves in the practice of preaching in America that most 
preachers, even if their dependency on the new measures were exposed, would have to 
struggle mightily to avoid using them.  These practices “seem so obvious that they rarely 
merit explicit discussion except in the most rarefied homiletical circles.”59  Since their 
establishment in the nineteenth century, the rhetoric of the new measures has remained 
essentially unchanged.  “A new measures sermon sought, above all else, to work effects 
in this world.  It sought to move people to make decisions to change their hearts and 
minds and actions.”60  And it still does.  New measures rhetoric was and is intentional in 
its desire to compel people toward immediate change.  However, as Smith reveals, what 
once “worked” so well that it shocked the senses now passes nearly unnoticed.   
 The crucial difference between Lischer and Hogan/Reid turns on their respective 
perceptions of new measures like the ones Smith describes.  The kind of rhetoric Hogan 
advocates is, like the new measures, theoretically “at home” in the halls of secular power, 
while the rhetorical approach Lischer encourages is one that could not exist apart from 
the language of a crucified God.  While Hogan pursues the exhausting goal of achieving 
agreement between preacher and congregation, Lischer is primarily concerned with 
whether the sermon lifts the weight of the gospel.  He promotes a rhetoric reconciled with 
“the new utterance” of the gospel that ruptures existing idioms.  His basic claim is that 
the word of God redeems even our most “cherished homiletical rules,” and flourishes 
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only as it is grounded in the church’s mission.61  Analogously, apart from the life, death, 
and resurrection of Jesus, there would be no such thing as Christian preaching.  If the 
preacher’s rhetoric “makes sense” whether or not Jesus is risen from the dead, it cannot 
be gospel preaching. We are not persuaded to God; we are reconciled to God.  Hogan and 
Reid’s rhetorical strategy, on the other hand, does not live or die by the language of the 
gospel; it appeals across a wide spectrum of rhetorical strategies.  For them, the 
effectiveness of a sermon depends on whether the congregation agrees with the message.  
For Lischer, a sermon’s effectiveness is subservient to its weight.  “Let two or three 
prophets speak,” he might say, “and let the others weigh what is said” (1 Cor. 14:29).  
Lischer encourages a kind of rhetoric that shapes a sermon in such a way that if it were 
placed on a scale, its natural weight would “lift up” the gospel.   
 
3.5  PREACHING ‘DOWNHILL’  
 In constructing a “reconciling rhetoric” we are not doing something “new,” but 
recovering something “old,” something that is truly from the beginning.  At the same 
time, it is also eschatological, for it is something that is truly from the end.  That is, we 
are expecting to find by this excavation, to borrow a phrase from Lischer, “the end of 
words.”  For a reconciling rhetoric attempts to proclaim the gospel by crafting language 
theologically understood as proceeding from a distinct beginning and ending.  Christian 
language begins and ends in a person, the alpha and omega, Jesus Christ, in all of his 
power and weakness.  Reconciling sermons will therefore not compete for a microphone 
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with the great orators of the age.  Rather, preachers committed to living peaceably as 
followers of Jesus Christ will attempt to craft their language in such a way that it simply 
“rings true.”  Their language will sound patient, kind, not envious or boastful or arrogant 
or rude.  It will not insist on its own way; it will not be irritable or resentful; it will not 
keep a record of wrongs, but will rejoice in the truth.  It will bear all things, believe all 
things, hope all things, and endure all things.  
 Reconciling rhetoric evokes Karl Barth’s theological description of Wolfgang 
Amadeus Mozart’s work:   
Why is it that this man is so incomparable?  Why is it that for the receptive, he 
has produced in almost every bar he conceived and composed a type of music for 
which ‘beautiful’ is not a fitting epithet:  music which for the true Christian is not 
mere entertainment, enjoyment or edification but food and drink; music full of 
comfort and counsel for his needs; music which is never a slave to its technique 
nor sentimental but always ‘moving,’ free and liberating because wise, strong 
and sovereign?62 
 
Mozart’s genius lay in his miraculous ability to capture reality from a theological 
point of view—a view which confessing the Lordship of Jesus Christ makes available.  
He was able to convey through music the truth of creation’s final redemption in God, and 
the harmony of God’s ultimate providence, while simultaneously leaving himself out of 
his productions.  “He was remarkably free from the mania for ‘self-expression.’  He 
simply offered himself as the agent by which little bits of horn, metal and catgut could 
serve as the voices of creation, sometimes leading, sometimes accompanying and 
sometimes in harmony.”63  Mozart used every instrument at his disposal, including the 
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human voice, but gave the latter no special place in terms of a hierarchical ranking.  
Human emotions served the music, and not vice versa.64 
Analogously, reconciling rhetoric arises from the truth of what God has already 
done by revealing himself in the person and work of Jesus Christ.  For Barth, preaching 
must conform to this revelation.65  The Word of God is revealed in Jesus, in Scripture, 
and in preaching.  Both the Bible and preaching are not the Word of God in themselves.  
The Word of God in Scripture and in preaching become the Word of God whenever God 
so chooses to make it God’s Word.  “Whenever it becomes God’s Word, it is God’s 
Word.”66  The revelation of God’s Word is “a closed circuit in which God is both Subject 
and Object and the link between the two.”67  Preaching is an  “event” into which the 
preacher and the congregation are drawn in “listening to the self-revealing will of God.”68 
They are called by this event.  The event becomes a constituent part of their own 
existence.  Because God has revealed himself and wills to reveal himself, and 
because preachers are confronted by this event, their preaching—if they are 
commissioned to preach—is necessarily governed by it in both content and form, 
in the logical content of what is said and in their relation to the fact that God has 
revealed himself and will reveal himself.69 
 
 Consequently for Barth, “the thrust of the sermon is always downhill, not uphill to 
a goal.  Everything has already taken place.”70  “Downhill” movement characterizes 
preaching as an event that owes its existence to the truth that, in Christ, God has already 
confirmed his final decision about humanity.  In other words, proclamation’s movement 
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has a gravitational momentum that disembarks from the conviction that God has finished 
reconciling us to himself on Christ’s cross.  Golgotha has reoriented history in such a way 
that the friction of its contingencies cannot impede God’s reconciling Word.  “All 
preaching must have the total assurance of ‘It has happened, it is done, and also the 
forward thrust.’”71  The focus for Barth is on the way the content of preaching conforms 
to the content and form of God’s revelation.  He is not, then, developing the sermon so 
that its function is beholden to a rhetorical form.  Rather, the sermon functions in 
obedience to the content of God’s revelation.  “From first to last Scripture says the same 
thing, but it constantly says the one thing in different ways.”72  It is the purpose of 
preaching to preach “the one thing,” the gospel, which is not in our thoughts or hearts; it 
is in Scripture.”73   
 Barth’s theology of preaching leads him to declare that sermons should eschew 
rhetorical “gymnastics.”  Rhetorical moves like the use of central themes, illustrations, 
repetition, and even introductions are distractions and impediments to the Word, and 
reflect the preacher’s distrust in complete reliance on Scripture for sermonic content.74  
Barth even discourages allegories, which for him are occasions for practicing our own 
arts with the Word.75  We rightly disagree with Barth’s stringent (in his theory, though 
not in his later practice76) refusal to recruit rhetorical tools in service to proclamation of 
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the Word.  In his reaction against the Protestant liberalism of his day and its attempts to 
make the Bible relevant, he ignores the fact that Scripture itself uses a host of rhetorical 
devices.  One would think that in order to follow Barth’s logic, one would have to 
employ rhetoric to some extent if “the text itself must always be master.”77  As we 
learned earlier from John Milbank, these stringent limitations may even serve death in 
terms of their constrictive effects on the life-giving Word, and the polyvalent nature of 
Scripture.   
Yet we must view Barth’s warnings against allegory with an eye toward his 
historical context.  Barth is battling against the rise of Nazism, and countering his 
contemporaries’ proclivity to wrap the text in the political pathos of the day.78  Otherwise, 
we would mistakenly assume Barth not only contradicts himself, but also discounts 
centuries of great Christian homiletics.  Where Barth implores us to “repress” the 
“concerns that burn in on our souls, no matter how pressing,” we must remember he is 
attempting to preserve pathos “for the question of the theological reality underneath, 
behind, and beyond any particular political position.”79  By ignoring the historical context 
of Barth’s Homiletics, we put him in the position of contradicting his admonitions to 
preachers to live among and love their congregations.  Barth would not encourage 
preachers to conform their messages to every Mother’s Day and homecoming event, or 
every page of the newspaper.  But neither would he encourage preachers to ignore the 
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places and events happening in and around the congregation into which the gospel may 
offer hope, or engender resistance to the principalities and powers.  An appropriate 
solution to the complexities of preaching allegorically in a particular context is to allow 
the lectionaries of the church to determine the texts for the day.  Where the texts coincide 
with local, regional, and national events, the preacher does well not to ignore the world 
into which the people walk when the gathering disperses. 
 A significant strength of Barth’s homiletical theology is its reclamation of the 
sacraments as necessary for truly hearing and understanding the sermon.  The sermon 
will have its meaningful place between the sacraments of baptism at the beginning of the 
service and communion at the end.  “Life begins with baptism, not with birth,”80 and 
communion interprets the sermon as communal gift.  Only by having the sacraments and 
preaching together do they become legitimate in their relation to one another.81  Then the 
sermon, which Barth says is a liturgical act, becomes part of the creation of a liturgical 
and linguistic world in which the “already finished” good news of God takes shape in 
visible ways.  Baptism, preaching, and communion together form “rhetorical” 
manifestations of Christ’s victory on the cross.  In the midst of worship the reconciled 
people of God receive the Word of God as gift, one that is meant to give shape and 
direction to our life, and especially our language. 
 Having made “downhill,” a central, theological descriptor of reconciling rhetoric, 
we must contend with one of Barth’s critics on the matter.  In As One Without Authority, 
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Fred Craddock takes issue with Barth’s “condescending” language.  At the same time, 
Craddock does make critical contributions to preaching in this book, including his 
preliminary theological, philosophical, and scientific discussion on the oral nature of 
language.  His insights here intersect in key places with conclusions one might infer from 
my overall project.  For example, Craddock claims that the spoken word grounds our 
very being, and that it “presupposes that which it also creates: community.”82  
Additionally, few can claim to have more authority than Craddock in matters of 
imagination, vernacular, speaking from an imbedded position within the congregation, 
and reintroducing Scripture as the church’s living, breathing resource for preaching as a 
communication of the Word.  Yet a component of Craddock’s theology falters at this 
latter point.  Craddock believes the Word of God is strictly contingent, modified by the 
situation of the congregation.   
To say the scripture is the Word of God or that scripture contains the Word of 
God is to identify the Word of God too completely with only one partner in the 
dialogue.  Word, whether it be of God or of humanity is properly understood as 
communication, and it is rather meaningless to discuss word in terms of one 
person.83 
 
 The Word of God for Craddock is located neither at the “pole” of Scripture nor 
the “pole” of the congregation, but “in movement, in conversation, in communication 
between Scripture and church.”84  Apart from such communication, claims of locating the 
Word of God in a particular place have more to do with potentiality than actuality.85  
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“And this is affirmed in full awareness that there is a strong tradition of preaching that 
consistently refuses to embrace any position that implies that the Word of God...moves in 
any direction other than downward.”86  Craddock’s theology of the relationship between 
the Word of God, Scripture, and the congregation reveals a disdain for theologies of 
preaching based on God’s Word as only moving downward to God’s people.   
The fundamental error in this whole approach is the artificiality of the objective-
subjective way of thinking.  If the biblical text or the Word of God is objective 
and the human hearer is subjective, obviously the human is secondary, for the 
Word is the Word even if spoken into an empty room or into the wind.87   
 
 The insinuation in this case is that Barth’s theology of preaching is too limited to 
God’s action alone, to the exclusion of any participatory human role.  But whether the 
Word of God is on its way down or up, or found in the conversation “between” Scripture 
and congregation, is beside the crucial point Craddock does not make.  The weakness of 
his argument lies in its lack of emphasis on the initial downward movement of God to 
God’s people as the measure of all of God’s movements toward humankind, and which 
all movements of the Word of God make thereafter.  This is another way of stating that 
the Word of God, wherever one may or may not witness its location, is pure gift.  Not 
only is the Word of God pure gift, but also pure gift to God’s enemies.  “He came to what 
was his own, and his own people did not accept him” (John 1:11).  And, “The Word 
became flesh and lived among us” (1:14). 
 The agenda underlying Craddock’s theology of the Word of God is his 
determination to prevent preachers from “moving downward” from themselves to the 
                                                
86 Ibid.  Craddock provides a footnote here to Karl Barth, Prayer and Preaching (London:  SCM Press, 
1964) 71. 
87 Craddock, As One Without Authority, 58. 
  137 
congregation as authoritarian, theological experts who must now impart the wisdom they 
gleaned during preparation.  Preachers must include the congregation throughout the 
process of preparation and delivery.  “Those who hear are not just an audience; they are 
participants in the story.  The pure gospel has fingerprints all over it.”88  Yet, where 
Craddock displays the way one imagines the hearers, he tends to view the congregation 
not as a unified (or even a broken) body, but as a collection of individuals.  The purpose 
of preaching devolves into creating an “experience” of the gospel for the hearer 
(singular).  The preaching of the church addresses the needs of “the whole person.”89  
“When a pastor preaches, she doesn’t sell patent medicine; she writes prescriptions.”90  
But, as Charles Campbell has rejoined,  
When preaching focuses on individual experience in this way, the Christian faith 
all too easily gets relegated to the private realm.  The gospel becomes divorced 
from serious, radical, public claims and from a concrete, public community of 
faith.  By succumbing to this private-public split and focusing preaching on 
‘private’ experience, contemporary homiletics runs the danger of selling out to 
the presuppositions of modern, liberal, American culture.91 
 
 Craddock finally does not practice his own theology of preaching in As One 
Without Authority, especially in terms of his admonition to imitate the Bible’s own 
rhetorical modes of speech:   
If the speech-forms of the Bible were adopted, sermons would be strengthened 
by the fact that the text would not be forced to fit a new frame.  In other words, 
narrative texts would be shared in narrative sermons, parables in parabolic form, 
biography in biographical sermons, and similarly in other speech models.92  
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 But the normative divine speech-forms in the Bible constitute God’s address to a 
people, a gathering.  It comes particularly to a forgiven “y’all.”  Especially in matters of 
preaching, the sermon is not for consumption by one mind, but an address to a gathering 
of those who are to be “of one mind” about God’s having reconciled them in Christ.  
When preaching becomes an attempt to communicate the gospel in a way that moves 
“from the present experience of the hearers to the point at which the sermon will leave 
them to their own decisions and conclusion,”93 it not only usurps the communal nature of 
a congregation’s hearing the gospel, but also creates a habitat for the perpetuation of 
listening habits ingrained into us by “the rulers of this age”—politicians, television 
producers, marketers, and so on.  Stuck in this veritable quicksand, the preacher is 
hampered by the constant tug of anthropological concerns alone, and continually plagued 
by a perceived need to persuade. 
 
3.6  KENOTIC RHETORIC 
Preaching downhill is not condescension in a haughty sense.  It dives beneath 
Craddock’s superficial description of the objective-subjective relationship between God 
and humanity.  It is a metaphorical attempt to juxtapose the rhetoric of preaching with the 
image of love flowing down from Golgotha.  Since many preachers, regrettably, are too 
concerned with offering individualistic or therapeutic salvation, most sermons never scale 
this summit.    
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Most sermons...do not make the final ascent. The preacher turns around at [the 
point of inviting acceptance of the good news at the level of a personal 
relationship with God], satisfied with the view, and heads down the mountain.  
Too many gospel sermons do not make the ultimate gospel gesture by celebrating 
God’s reconciliation of enemies in the church and the world.  Which means that 
such sermons have no basis on which to encourage their hearers to seek the 
appropriate level of reconciliation in their lives.  They come very near the true 
end of words, but fall short of its glory.94 
 
 The problem that many homiletical discussions on rhetoric seem to ignore is that 
churches around the world, from the United States to Sub-Saharan Africa, continue to 
send out missionaries of violence, disciples not of Christ but of whatever tribe they 
happen to be part of.95  Whether one preaches a narrative sermon in Atlanta, Georgia, an 
expository sermon in Kigali, Rwanda, or a three-point sermon in the Czech Republic, the 
sermon form, itself, does not engender resistance to the wielding of machetes, the 
operation of drones, or the dumping of bullet-riddled bodies in mass graves.  Preaching 
forms must conform to God’s enemy-embracing reconciliation.  Barth was right to blame 
the world’s wars on the kind of preaching that bypasses “the objective reality of 
salvation.”96  God has given the church the language that creates enclaves of Christ’s 
peace, whereby the world may be reminded that its violence is atheistic.  When the 
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church’s language does not serve as such a reminder, neither the church nor the world can 
see its violence as a result of agonistic rhetoric.   
God’s message of reconciliation introduces the possibility of what we may call 
“kenotic rhetoric.”  With kenotic rhetoric, preachers pursue not their own techniques or 
rhetorical interests, but present the gospel on its own terms—as gift poured out for us—in 
ways consistent with Christ’s emptying himself on the cross.  Kenotic rhetoric seeks first 
not to teach, delight, and persuade, but to be taught, delighted, and persuaded by the 
forgiving Word, Jesus.  It is an invitation for the language of preaching to theologically 
imitate the divine pattern of Christ’s humiliation and exaltation.  We might more 
appropriately say in classical rhetorical terms that kenosis is the “genus” of the church’s 
rhetoric.  Kenotic rhetoric does not move downward from God to humankind like a 
judge’s gavel, but like blood poured out for us from the heart of God on the cross.  The 
Word streams down to us with all of its terrible beauty to become incarnate in human 
preaching.  It is from God’s having given himself to us in Jesus in precisely this way that 
preaching as an address to former enemies takes its rhetorical shape.   
The theological pattern follows that of the Christ hymn in Philippians 2:5-11.  Jesus 
Christ, the form (µορφή) of God, empties himself (κένωσις), “taking the form of a slave, 
being born in human likeness, 
And being found in human form,  
he humbled himself  
and became obedient to the  
point of death— 
even death on a cross. 
 
Therefore God also highly  
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exalted him  
and gave him the name  
that is above every name,  
so that at the name of Jesus  
every knee should bend,  
in heaven and on earth and  
under the earth,  
and every tongue should confess  
that Jesus Christ is Lord,  
to the glory of God the Father.  
 
 The rhetorical shape of this text has both condescending and ascending 
movements.  Perhaps the church’s earliest hymn, it poetically describes the divine 
reconciling activity that makes salvation possible. By his condescension and ascension, 
Jesus Christ, the Word of God, has demonstrated in his very body the reconciling purpose 
and destiny of all language, beginning with the language of the church.  The Word 
proceeds to us from God’s own mind.  The Word’s condescension is a “pouring out” of 
God’s self for us—God’s complete self-denial.  The Word’s exaltation enables us to 
share in the doxological praise of God.  The linguistic corollary of the Philippian Christ-
hymn is what God’s redemptive action in Jesus does to human language.  This is not 
simply about Jesus in a historical sense, but about Jesus as logos, as the church’s logic.  
Paul in Philippians passes down to the church a rhetorical mold with its own intrinsic 
logic—the wisdom of God that is foolishness to the world.  It is “foolishness” not to 
retaliate with violence in order to protect oneself from suffering.  Nevertheless, this is the 
way of Jesus, the way of the cross, and, therefore, the way our words should run.  To 
implement the logos of reconciling rhetoric the preacher speaks as one who has 
relinquished control of her message to God.   The crucified God is her logical “proof.”  
Thus, she gives up, or gives herself over to God, that she may be caught in the undertow 
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of his humiliation and exaltation.  She speaks “unassumingly,” convinced that the 
regeneration and conversion of humanity has already taken place in the cross, 
because it is finally and supremely in His cross that He acted as the Lord and 
King of all men, that He maintained and exercised His sovereignty, that He 
proved His likeness to the God who is so unassuming in the world but so 
revolutionary in relation to it.97 
 
Following upon the rhetorical means of logos, kenotic rhetoric also reorients the 
means of pathos, by which Aristotle meant the effect of persuasion on the listeners’ 
emotions.  The preacher, however, is concerned not with her own ability to see the 
“available means of persuasion.”  Instead, she is an ambassador of a message not her 
own.  As a herald of God’s message of reconciliation, she knows “there can be no 
question of our doing the revealing in any way.”98  She has emptied herself of the “mania 
for self-expression,” so that the aim of her pathos is not sentimental appeal, but the 
genuine emotion that corresponds with Christ’s own self-denial.  Her aim is more akin to 
a hope in the message’s unique power to elicit the congregation’s tears, that they might 
be of the same species as the tears of the sinful woman that wet Jesus’ feet with her hair 
(Luke 7:38); of Jesus’ tears that fall like drops of blood in Gethsemane (Lk. 22:44); or 
precursors of those tears that shine on the faces of saints assembled before the throne in 
Revelation (Rev. 7:17; Isaiah 25:8).   
 The kenotic ethos is Christ-centered as well:  “Let the same mind be in you that 
was in Christ Jesus.”  Aristotle claimed, “character is almost, so to speak, the most 
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authoritative form of persuasion.”99  Augustine echoes him:  “More important than any 
amount of grandeur of style to those of us who seek to be listened to with obedience is 
the life of the speaker.”100  But the redeemed aim of ethos belongs to the Christian 
category of vocation.  It remembers Lischer’s claim that, “A vocation puts an end to you 
in order to disclose your true end.”101  It also recalls Bonhoeffer’s declaration:  “When 
Christ calls a man, he bids him come and die.”  The vocation of the preacher inhabits the 
pattern of humiliation and exaltation by her pilgrimage “through faith for faith” (Rom. 
1:17).  The literal Greek translation more closely follows the semantics of kenosis, “into 
faith, out of faith.”  The preacher’s character is constituted not in the moment she rises to 
speak, but in relinquishing her life to the Holy Spirit’s promise to abide with her and her 
people (John 14:17).  She is not “taking over” language in order to control it, as much as 
she is taken over by the Word.  The preacher achieves this level of character only insofar 
as she “looks to the interests of others” (Phil. 2:4).  Her self-denial is reckoned to her as 
righteousness.  Her vocation calls her away from what she thought was best in her, 
purifies it, and promises to make her something or someone she is not yet.102   
 In addition to the three means of persuasion, Aristotle also speaks of rhetorical 
“times.”  Rhetoric’s judicial, epideictic, and deliberative species have their own 
corresponding times of (respectively) past, present, and future.  But in the realm of 
kenotic rhetoric, past, present, and future inhabit the more determinative dimension of 
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eschatological time.  By “eschatological” I do not mean to elicit the ominous or the 
foreboding images characteristic of literalist interpretations of The Apocalypse of John.  
Rather, I share John Howard Yoder’s contention that eschatology summons, “a hope 
which, defying present frustration, defines a present position in terms of the yet unseen 
goal which gives it meaning.”103  Kenotic rhetoric assumes that Christ established the 
meaning of history once and for all on the cross, from which God also exalted him, so 
that “at the name of Jesus every knee should bend, in heaven and on earth and under the 
earth.”  Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection constitute God’s definitive apocalypse, by 
which all of creation, including all of human history, has been ushered into a new time.   
 Yoder interprets history in terms of John the Revelator’s claim that, “The Lamb 
that was slain is worthy to receive power!” (Rev. 5:12).  In this new time, “the cross and 
not the sword, suffering and not brute power determines the meaning of history.”104  The 
preacher acknowledges a new “species” of time by addressing those gathered with the 
conviction Yoder articulates, that “the ultimate meaning of history is to be found in the 
work of the church.”105  In this new time, past, present, and future are absorbed into the 
person and work of Jesus Christ, whose “very obedience unto death is in itself not only 
the sign but also the first fruits of an authentic restored humanity.”106  Eschatological 
time therefore introduces something new to rhetoric that transcends the art of persuasion.  
For Christian preaching, the primary definitions of classical rhetoric are subordinate to 
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the shape and aims of divine language in Scripture.  When rhetoric subordinates the force 
of persuasion to the contours of the life, death, and resurrection of the incarnate Word, 
the preacher intentionally risks “losing control” of the Word.  Here the image of the 
preacher as “peacemaker” is fitting.  Those “will be children of God” who speak not only 
with the rhetorical forms God has given us in Scripture, but also, and more importantly, 
in the manner of the One who forgave his enemies on the cross.  In this new time, 
effectiveness—the animating principle of persuasion—is supplanted by patience.  As 
Yoder contends, 
The triumph of the right is assured not by the might that comes to the aid of the 
right, which is of course the justification of the use of violence and other kinds of 
power in every human conflict.  The triumph of the right, although it is assured, 
is sure because the power of the resurrection and not because of any calculation 
of causes and effects, nor because of the inherently greater strength of the good 
guys.  The relationship between the obedience of God’s people and the triumph 
of God’s cause is not a relationship of cause and effect but one of cross and 
resurrection.107 
  
 As Nathan Kerr observes, Yoder understands Jesus’ resurrection and Lordship 
from the perspective of its having been “‘finished’ in its culmination on the cross.”108  
The resurrection of Jesus “drives us back into the cross, and even into the life of Jesus of 
Nazareth’s own cruciform journeying, as the key to the risen Jesus’ relationship to history 
as its sovereign Lord.”109  This means preaching inhabits a cruciform dimension of time, 
where the language of preaching lies “with the grain of the universe” provided that the 
preacher takes seriously the way of the cross.   
                                                
107 Ibid., 232. 
108 Nathan R. Kerr, Christ, History and Apocalyptic: The Politics of Christian Mission (Eugene, OR: 
Cascade Books, 2009) 151. 
109 Ibid. 
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This Gospel concept of the cross of the Christian does not mean that suffering is 
thought of as in itself redemptive or that martyrdom is a value to be sought after.  
Nor does it refer uniquely to being persecuted for ‘religious’ reasons by an 
outspokenly pagan government.  What Jesus refers to in his call to cross-bearing 
is rather the seeming defeat of that strategy of obedience which is no strategy, the 
inevitable suffering of those whose only goal is to be faithful to that love which 
puts one at the mercy of one’s neighbor, which abandons claims to justice for 
oneself and for one’s own in an overriding concern for the reconciling of the 
adversary and the estranged.110 
  
 Though there is a latent quality to kenotic rhetoric due to the fact that it may often 
have a persuasive effect on congregations, this effect will be ancillary to the more 
primordial kenotic dynamic.  God has not persuaded us to himself.  God has reconciled 
us, and those who know this are the beneficiaries of a new species of human speech—a 
language of peace that wells up from places so deep in God’s heart that they surpass all 
understanding.  Kenotic rhetoric manifests itself in the peculiar, christocentric language 
of peacemaking.  Both its means and ends seek to emulate and echo the Word Jesus and 
his concern to reconcile the adversary and the estranged.  Kenotic rhetoric’s 
distinguishing marks include these respective expressions of logos, pathos, and ethos as 
they are redeemed in Christ’s humiliation and exaltation, as well as the full and patient 
awareness of eschatological time in which history is determined by cruciform suffering.   
This new language, which is also as old as the Ancient of Days, transcends the worldly 
wisdom of classical rhetoric through the patience borne of confidence in eschatological 
time.  Those entrusted with the message of reconciliation will speak in this time of God’s 
patience to those “in heaven and on earth and under the earth”—all three congregations, 
which are really one congregation—as if they are all listening at the same time.   
                                                
110 Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 236. 
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3.7  THERE IS A BALM IN GILEAD 
 Rather than analyzing one particular sermon as with the previous two chapters, 
the thesis of this chapter requires an alternative route through a work of fiction.  One 
might suggest that so many sermons attempt to be persuasive that there are few examples 
from which to choose and apply my theory.  But the advantage of considering the person 
and work of a fictional preacher in this case is important due to the fact that reconciling 
rhetoric has so much to do with a preacher’s ethos.  Fiction has a way of expanding our 
vision and grasp of reality in ways that other kinds of literature do not.  In this case, the 
fictional preacher, John Ames, in Marilynne Robinson’s novel Gilead, presents us with 
the opportunity for considering how reconciling rhetoric encompasses the whole life of a 
person called to preach the gospel.111  Robinson provides the reader with glimpses of a 
preacher whose logic, passion, and character are beautifully integrated in his belief and 
practice, and whose humility in preaching originates in his untamed awe of creation and 
its graceful God.  His constant insistence that truth evades our attempts to harness it for 
our advantage constitutes his wisdom, and makes Ames the epitome of a reconciling 
preacher.  The brief excerpts he provides of his exegetical imagination and sermonic 
content provide compelling instances of reconciling rhetoric. 
 Ames, a pastor in the fictional town of Gilead, Iowa, is an aging, third generation 
preacher addressing his memoirs in letters to his son.  Having lost his first wife and infant 
daughter decades before, he marries again in old age, and is compelled to share the 
                                                
111 Subsequent quotes from this work will be cited parenthetically in the text. 
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wisdom he will not live to share in person with his young son.  We also learn that Ames 
deeply dislikes his namesake, John Ames (Jack) Boughton, the troubled son of his best 
friend and fellow preacher in town.  Despite Jack’s untrustworthiness, and the ambiguous 
nature of his relationship with Ames’s young wife, Lila, he is also like a son to Ames.  
Jack is finally the recipient of John’s blessing, in a scene strikingly similar to the return 
of the prodigal son.  The latter scene confirms for the reader that John Ames is a type of 
the forgiving father in the parable.  He is the wise father who does not chase after the 
wayward son in his anger, but waits for him, welcomes him upon his return, and blesses 
him, “to the limit of my powers, whatever they are,” with the benediction from Numbers 
6:24-26 (241). 
This moment illumines the nature of Ames’s ethos.  His character takes on the 
“mind” of Christ as he extends mercy to a man he distrusts, and who has finally returned 
to a town he once left in disgrace.  Upon seeing Jack’s head remain bowed and his eyes 
shut at the end of the blessing from Numbers, Ames continues, “Lord, bless John Ames 
Boughton, this beloved son and brother and husband and father” (241).  Ames then tells 
Jack it was an honor to bless him, and later writes that he would have gone “through 
seminary and ordination and all the years intervening for that one moment” (242).  Such 
is the substance of a preacher who revels in the joy of participating in an act of love made 
possible only by a God who has loved us first.  This moment of blessing is the 
culmination of a life of preaching the love of enemies.  His is a reconciling ethos because 
his forgiveness is a consequence of his calling, the consummation of his gradual struggle 
to faithfully inhabit the consciousness of God for his enemy’s sake.  God’s having 
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reconciled John Ames makes it possible for John Ames to initiate reconciliation with 
Jack Boughton.  In an earlier passage, as Ames reflects on Jack not merely as a “son,” but 
as “another self, a more cherished self,” he says, 
I fell to thinking about the passage in [Calvin’s] Institutes where it says the image 
of the Lord in anyone is much more than reason enough to love him, and that the 
Lord stands waiting to take our enemies’ sins upon Himself.  So it is a rejection 
of the reality of grace to hold our enemy at fault.  Those things can only be true.  
It seems to me people tend to forget that we are to love our enemies, not to 
satisfy some standard of righteousness, but because God their Father loves them.  
I have probably preached on that a hundred times (189). 
 
 Ames’s pathos is likewise consistently reconciling, whether he is standing in or 
outside of the pulpit.  Though he would not avoid inducing emotion in his hearers, 
whether it be through inciting joy or delight, he admits he is “much better at weeping 
with those who weep” (134).  It is not that he would prefer to weep more than rejoice.  It 
is rather that he does not set out to stir the congregation to emotion as much as he 
attempts to describe the ways God stirs human beings.  He is so often amazed by the 
traces of God’s grace in his own quotidian existence.  Partly due to his old age, he 
regards existence itself as, “the most remarkable thing that could ever be imagined.  I’m 
about to put on imperishability.  In an instant, in the twinkling of an eye. 
The twinkling of an eye.  That is the most wonderful expression.  I’ve thought 
from time to time it was the best thing in life, that little incandescence you see in 
people when the charm of a thing strikes them, or the humor of it.  ‘The light of 
the eyes rejoiceth the heart.’  That’s a fact (53). 
   
This is not an appeal to the emotions of the listener or reader, but an expression of 
doxological praise we should dare not reduce to something so functional as a persuasion.  
Ames’s rhetoric permeates the boundaries of pathos as a merely persuasive tactic, and 
transforms it into something more like “one kind of vision, as mystical as any,” which 
  150 
knows “there is nothing more astonishing than a human face” (66).  From the perspective 
of the way reconciliation reverses pathos, so that the preacher is its subject rather than its 
agent, a human face’s capacity to astonish is related to its being in the image of God, 
whose face is too powerful for human sight.  When Ames says, “Any human face is a 
claim on you,” it is not the persuasive power of the face, but that “you can’t help but 
understand the singularity of it, the courage and loneliness of it” (66).  Ames’s rhetoric is 
that of an enchanted man, delighted again and again by God’s abrupt transformations, 
which “occur unsought and unawaited, and they beggar your hopes and your deserving” 
(203). 
 Ames’s insistence on the “disjunction between our Father’s love and our 
deserving” (73) is a persistent theme in Gilead.  This theme undergirds the reconciling 
dimension of Ames’s logos.  There is a gap between God and God’s creatures, across 
which only God may traverse according to his prerogative.  This separation between God 
and humanity invites doubt and unbelief on humanity’s side.  Though he calls these 
human responses “possible” (177), Ames calls us not to take unbelief so seriously that we 
would try to defend religion with “proofs.”  Such logical proofs only confirm 
unbelievers’ suspicions.  “In the matter of belief, I have always found that defenses have 
the same irrelevance about them as the criticisms they are meant to answer” (178).  Ames 
is not pursuing an anti-intellectual perch, from which he may sit protected from religion’s 
cultured despisers.  He is more concerned to trump the rationalistic with the rational.112  
                                                
112 Robinson is likely aware that this is a concern of Barth’s as well.  In CD I/1, Barth explains the 
difference between rational and rationalistic as follows:  “All dogmatic formulations are rational, and every 
  151 
We must not look for proofs.  “Don’t bother with them at all.  They are never sufficient to 
the question, and they’re always a little impertinent, I think, because they claim for God a 
place within our conceptual grasp” (179).  Ames’s logic is not beholden to proofs but to 
obedience.  “You can assert the existence of something—Being—without having the 
slightest notion of what it is” (178).  Apart from obedience, one cannot presume to know 
anything about the character of the object of one’s obedience.  We can even “know a 
thing to death and be for all purposes completely ignorant of it” (7).  Here, Ames echoes 
Augustine’s paraphrase of Isaiah 7:9, “Unless you believe, you will not understand.”  The 
authority of the preacher’s logos increases exponentially as it becomes reconciled 
through obedience to the Logos of God. 
 Finally, and perhaps most endearingly, Ames models reconciling rhetoric by 
preaching in the species of eschatological time.  His impending death heightens his 
sensitivity to the way God’s radiant presence surrounds him.  He recalls a Pentecost 
sermon, in which he confesses,  
“It has seemed to me sometimes as though the Lord breathes on this poor gray 
ember of Creation and it turns to radiance—for a moment or a year or the span of 
a life.  And then it sinks back into itself again, and to look at it no one would 
know it had anything to do with fire, or light” (245).   
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
dogmatic procedure is rational to the degree that in it use is made of general concepts, i.e., of the human 
ratio. It can be called rationalistic, however, only when we can show that the use is not controlled by the 
question of dogma, i.e., by subordination to Scripture, but by something else, most probably by the 
principles of some philosophy. If it is clearly understood that dogmatics generally and necessarily involves 
rational formulation, a rational formulation which is, of course, related to a completed proof and which 
takes account of Scripture, then no objection can be taken to logical and grammatical formulae as such, for 
we fail to see why these should be especially suspect any more than certain legal formulae,” 296. 
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Then, having since reconsidered this line of thinking, he corrects himself in the 
narrative, and asserts that the Lord is more constant and far more extravagant than his 
sermon implied.  “Wherever you turn your eyes the world can shine like transfiguration.  
You don’t have to bring a thing to it except a little willingness to see” (245).  Since grace 
is “not so poor a thing that it cannot present itself in any number of ways” (240), the 
preacher Ames appraises the ability to see the available means of grace as a mark of true 
wisdom.   
 Ames’s receptivity to God’s apocalyptic dynamism in this time between Christ’s 
ascension and return exemplifies Yoder’s earlier statement that, “The relationship 
between the obedience of God’s people and the triumph of God’s cause is not a 
relationship of cause and effect but one of cross and resurrection.”113  Despite Ames’s 
claim to be “the good son,” that is, the elder son, “the one who never left his father’s 
house” (238), we could more appropriately place him alongside the forgiving father.  The 
love he shows in his life and in his language, which for him are one and the same, would 
make no sense if Jesus Christ were not raised from the dead.  As soon as he compares 
himself to the elder son, he anticipates that heaven’s rejoicing over him will be 
“comparatively restrained. 
And that’s all right.  There is no justice in love, no proportion in it, and there 
need not be, because in any specific instance it is only a glimpse or parable of an 
embracing, incomprehensible reality.  It makes no sense at all because it is the 
eternal breaking in on the temporal.  So how could it subordinate itself to cause 
or consequence? (238). 
   
                                                
113 Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 232. 
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Here in the nexus of God’s “disproportionate” love lies the quickening power of 
reconciling rhetoric, which is no respecter of cause or consequence.  Ames’s sermonic 
memoirs recall Barth’s description of Mozart, in that they are for the true Christian not 
mere entertainment, enjoyment or edification but food and drink; words full of comfort 
and counsel for our needs; words which are never a slave to technique nor sentimental 
but always ‘moving,’ free and liberating because wise, strong and sovereign.  The 
reconciling preacher is wise to follow Ames’s path in assuming God’s sovereignty over 
all language, such that all time, all existence, all speech “is all an ember now,” waiting its 
turn for the good Lord to breathe it into flame (246). 
 
3.8  CONCLUSION 
John Ames’s name seems designed to evoke the names of John the Evangelist and 
the prophet Amos.  It would not be a waste of time to ruminate on the parallels between 
these three characters.  But perhaps Robinson would permit us to pursue yet another facet 
of the meaning of his name, which is that “Ames” may be a slightly veiled reference to 
rhetorical “aims.”   That is, he aims 1) to love his people, and more specifically, to love 
them as God loves them, and 2) to share this wisdom to the glory of God the Father so 
gently that it is often hard to determine his audience, whether it is his seven year-old son, 
God, his congregation, or himself.  Ames shows that a preacher’s dogged insistence on 
persuading the congregation to think, feel, and obey what they would otherwise not have 
thought, felt, or obeyed apart from the sermon is actually the result of a troubled heart.  
Preachers obsessed with persuading the congregation, cajoling them, winning them, 
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ultimately remain stuck in the dimension of moralism.  Moralistic sermons never quite 
rise above the category of a compelling opinion-editorial.  Such twisting of the Bible’s 
forms of language into a “strategy of influence” is inadequate for “the richness of our 
theological calling.”114 
 But “do not let your hearts be troubled,” Jesus says in the gospel of Ames’s 
namesake (Jn. 14:1).  Jesus leaves us to go and prepare a place for us.  This is so often 
interpreted to mean that Jesus is “somewhere else,” preparing a place for us, perhaps 
building another mansion.  Yet, in verse 2 he explains, “in my Father’s house there are 
many dwelling places.”  Does this not raise an interesting question?  If the mansions are 
already in the Father’s house, why has Jesus told his disciples he is going to prepare 
something he has just said already exists?  It would help us to think of Jesus in this text as 
the Word from chapter 1, rendering it as follows: “If the Word goes and prepares a place 
for you, the Word will come again and will take you to itself, so that where the Word is, 
there you may be also” (14:3).  This means the Word leaves us, but comes back to us 
again and again.  It is in this sense that the risen Jesus prepares a place for us, by piercing 
us repeatedly like an arrow from a distant shore.  Slowly we discover that with every 
strike, he has brought us closer and closer to himself until, finally, where he is, we are 
also.  Having found the way to the Father by the reconciling Word, Ames knew this in 
the end.  He lays down his pen to pray, to sleep, and to “smolder away the time until the 
great and general incandescence” (247). 
 
                                                
114 Lischer, “Why I Am Not Persuasive,” 14-15. 
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CHAPTER 4:  RECONCILED BASTARDS 
My heart is crushed within me, all my bones shake; I have become like a 
drunkard, like one overcome by wine, because of the LORD and because of his 
holy words. 
JEREMIAH 23:9 
 
What you say up there in the pulpit, that’s probably the poorest way to 
communicate with a congregation. 
WILL D. CAMPBELL1 
  
One might argue the sudden transition from the gentle rhetoric of John Ames to 
the irascible preaching of Will Davis Campbell wrenches my argument from its 
moorings.  If, as I have claimed, the proclamation of the reconciling Word must echo the 
patience and kindness of Paul’s description of love in I Corinthians 13, one might object 
that what follows is an outright contradiction of my claims in chapter 3.  As will soon 
become clear, the word “irritable” (I Cor. 13:5) captures one of the more striking aspects 
of Will Campbell’s public persona, so much so that his life and work seem to obfuscate 
or even obliterate any attempt to place him alongside those with more refined approaches 
to reconciliation.  Those without a trained ear might describe his speech as inpatient and 
unkind, sometimes even “boastful or arrogant or rude.”  In what sense could it be 
reconciling to call fellow Christians—as Campbell did—“whited sepulchers” and 
“ecclesiastical bullies”?  Yet, Campbell unapologetically styled himself as a “bootleg 
preacher.”  He was often fiercely at odds with the church, and had, at best, a mercurial 
relationship with it for most of his life.  Yet, though he leaves one of the most 
                                                
1 Will D. Campbell and Richard C. Goode, Crashing the Idols: The Vocation of Will D. Campbell (and any 
other Christian for that matter) (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010) 10. 
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iconoclastic legacies in the history of the American South, Campbell was one of the most 
prophetic of the racial reconcilers throughout the latter half of the twentieth century.  
According to one account, “He was a walking nerve center.  He was enormously 
important but so deft and nimble that the reactionaries never caught on to him.  His 
fingers were everywhere, but when you looked around—there were no fingerprints.  He 
was the Invisible Man.”2 
By turning now to the gifts of his witness, I hope to offer a compelling portrait of 
a historical figure who courageously epitomized the intersection of the practices of 
Christian preaching and reconciliation.  First, I will introduce key themes for 
understanding Campbell by presenting the simultaneously brilliant and “foolish” tensions 
between his theology and ecclesiology as a practicable approach to reconciling 
proclamation.  Second, I will discuss how Campbell’s ability to identify with people gave 
him authority to tell them the most difficult truths, and how such identification evokes the 
Gospel of John’s account of Jesus’ conversation with the Samaritan woman at Jacob’s 
well (4:1-42).  Third, I will present Campbell as a “performer” of certain communicative 
approaches peculiar to the prophet Jeremiah, in order to demonstrate crucial elements of 
the prophetic aspect of preaching reconciliation.  To conclude, I will briefly recount the 
consequences of Campbell’s bearing such a prophetic yoke in the pulpits of a racially 
divided United States.  As often as possible throughout each phase of my argument, I will 
                                                
2 David Halberstam, as quoted by Lawrence Wright, “The First Church of Rednecks, White Socks, and 
Blue Ribbon Beer,” Rolling Stone, December 13-27, 1990. 
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rely on Campbell’s sermons and addresses, in addition to several of his other works, with 
the intention of focusing first and foremost on Campbell as a reconciling preacher. 
 
4.1  UNSYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 
A white Baptist preacher from Mississippi, and a friend of both Martin Luther 
King, Jr. and Ku Klux Klansmen, Campbell falls in the Christian Radical camp of the 
Free Church tradition.3  Few Baptists have been more penetrating in their theological 
critique of the church in the American South than he.  His anti-institutionalism, refusal of 
state-sanctioned violence, and friendship with the downtrodden of every race place him 
on the margins of Southern Baptist tradition.  Nevertheless, Campbell offers a vision of 
reconciliation too compelling to be left on the fringe of Baptist history, much less 
Christian theology.  His insistence that the sovereignty of God—rather than a 
governmental dictum—be the foundation of any Christian response to racial division 
differs substantially from the political epistemologies to which many American 
Christians assent.  If “the only point of reference is God,” Campbell asserts, what 
business does the church have relying on a Supreme Court decision for its authority to 
promote desegregation?4  Campbell’s homiletical application of the politics of Jesus to 
the resistance of racist principalities and powers offers an inspiring witness to the 
                                                
3 It is often noted that Campbell was the only white person present at the founding of the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), even though Campbell himself downplays the significance of his 
invitation.  He was initially refused admittance until Bayard Rustin spoke on his behalf, telling younger 
black organizers, “Let this man in.  We need him.”  Quoted by Emily Langer, “Will D. Campbell, preacher 
and civil rights activist, dies at 88,” The Washington Post (Published 8 June 2013, National Section).  
Retrieved online, 25 April 2014: http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/will-d-campbell-preacher-and-
civil-rights-activist-dies-at-88/2013/06/08/70b67d0a-cee4-11e2-9f1a-1a7cdee20287_story.html. 
4 This is indicative of Campbell’s though after Brown v. Board, and especially after his epiphany during the 
conversation (below) with P. D. East. 
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theology and practice of preaching.  But the theological infrastructure of his reconciling 
homiletic is complex and liminal, “of the times” while also “ahead of its time.”  Who 
were Campbell’s primary theological influences, and how did he synthesize their 
respective ideas in his own life and work? 
Despite his misgivings about systematic theology, Campbell has a theology that 
informs his preaching.5  But we cannot begin to understand it apart from the radical shift 
he underwent after the most defining event of his life, the moment he believed the true 
nature of the gospel was revealed to him.  On August 14, 1965, Campbell received the 
devastating news that his friend, Jonathan Daniels, a young Episcopal seminarian and 
Civil Rights activist, had been killed instantly by a shotgun blast at close range just after 
his release from jail in Lowndes County, Alabama.  Daniels had come south from 
Massachusetts, having been granted permission by his seminary to spend a semester 
living with an African-American family in Alabama, picketing segregated stores with 
other activists, and helping to register voters.  The shooter, an unpaid special deputy and 
prominent local citizen named Thomas Coleman, had cursed and accosted Daniel and 
three other companions at a convenience store near the jail.  As Coleman aimed his 
shotgun at one of the black women standing beside Daniels and began to pull the trigger, 
                                                
5 In his article, “Values and Hazards of Theological Preaching,” Campbell asks, “Theological preaching?  
Never thought about it.  Now that I have I am convinced that it can only be the living of a life in 
community, based on faith, not certitude.”  He is concerned that much of what has been called “theology” 
in the church’s history has often been misappropriated and misunderstood even by original authors.  
Theology as doctrine—in the form of creeds, for example—has also often been used to justify violence, 
which leads Campbell to the conclusion that we are better off pursuing only the simpler things that 
constitute the Way of Jesus as they enable an active faith.  See his discussion in Campbell and Goode, 
Writings, 118-123. 
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Daniels pushed the woman out of the way, and was instantly killed by the bullet intended 
for her. 
Campbell was in Fairhope, Alabama, with his brother Joe and friend P. D. East 
when he received the news of Daniels’s death.  East, who had been exiled from 
Mississippi for publishing an integrationist newspaper, used the opportunity to hold 
Campbell accountable for a definition of the Christian faith Campbell had once given 
him: “We’re all bastards but God loves us anyway.”6  Showing no empathy or sensitivity 
for Campbell’s fresh grief, East faced Campbell closely, put one hand on Campbell’s 
knee, raised the other hand in oath-taking fashion, and asked, “Which one of these two 
bastards does God love the most?  Does he love that little dead bastard Jonathan the 
most?  Or does He love that living bastard Thomas the most?”7  Campbell had no 
immediate response.  He walked across the room and peered out the window into the 
glare of the streetlight.  Intensified by the “glow of the malt which we were well into by 
then,” Campbell began to whimper, cry, and laugh at the same time.  “I remember trying 
to sort out the sadness and the joy.  Just what I was crying for and what was I laughing 
for.  Then this too became clear.”  Campbell called it a revelation. 
I was laughing at myself, at twenty years of a ministry which had become, 
without my realizing it, a ministry of liberal sophistication.  An attempted 
negation of Jesus, of human engineering, of riding the coattails of Caesar, of 
playing on his ballpark, by his rules and with his ball, of looking to government 
to make and verify and authenticate our morality, of worshiping at the shrine of 
enlightenment and academia, of making an idol of the Supreme Court, a theology 
of law and order and of denying not only the Faith I professed to hold but my 
                                                
6 Campbell, Brother to a Dragonfly, 25th anniversary ed. (London:  Bloomsbury, 2000 [1977]) 220. 
7 Ibid., 222.  Inconsistent capitalization of “He” in this quote is in the original text. 
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history and my people—the Thomas Colemans.  Loved.  And if loved, forgiven.  
And if forgiven, reconciled.8 
 
 Campbell would never be the same.  He continued to engage in the Civil Rights 
Movement, but from a radically different perspective.  Though certain neo-orthodox 
themes had already suffused Campbell’s theological training and activism, East’s 
relentless questioning had the ultimate effect of forcing Campbell to clarify his 
presuppositions.  Merrill Hawkins, Jr., relates how the general themes of neo-orthodoxy 
appear in Campbell’s thought in the wake of his watershed moment in Fairhope: 
After his own self-examination in the 1960s, his writings reflect an emphasis on 
human sinfulness or potential evil, the sinfulness of human institutions, a 
criticism of liberal optimism, the otherness of God, and a call for a return to 
scriptural ideas as the starting point for Christian social action.9 
 
The most crucial of these emphases for understanding Campbell’s renewed 
approach to racial reconciliation was the significant attention he began placing on the 
sovereignty of God.  An essay entitled, “The Christian Concern and Starting Point,”10 
directly displays this particular foundation of Campbell’s most counter-cultural 
theological beliefs.  More than any other element of his thinking, it was Campbell’s 
insistence on the Lordship of a reconciling God that compelled him into the kind of 
action and prophesying that angered both sides of the race debate during and after the 
Civil Rights Movement, from the local grand wizard of the Ku Klux Klan to Coretta 
Scott King.  Campbell believed that, for liberals, the Christian concern and starting point 
was (and remains) mistakenly located in humanitarian and egalitarian concerns.  
                                                
8 Ibid. 
9 Hawkins, Jr., Merrill M., Will Campbell:  Radical Prophet of the South (Macon, GA:  Mercer University 
Press, 1997) 89. 
10 See, Campbell and Goode, Crashing the Idols, 114-120. 
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Campbell argued these concerns alone would never convert a segregationist.  They 
“certainly lie within the province of Christian witness but...taken alone, are not enough.  
The segregationist who is honest and who wants to remain loyal to the church has very 
clearly seen this point and has taken clever advantage of its weakness.”11  It does not take 
sin seriously enough, and therefore does not pierce the heart of the matter.  Its 
fundamental flaw is that it makes humans the central subject, and supplants God as the 
almighty and sovereign king.  The truth is,  
Once a man has truly seen this truth he can no longer be racist, nor can he any 
longer grovel in the agonies of self-pity.  From that point on, the racist logic and 
desire for self-justification terrify him.  As for the racist, he is now afraid to call 
any man unclean, to discriminate against any man, to stand in judgment over any 
group or individual or to set himself above any of God’s human creatures.  From 
the moment either the segregationist or the integrationist really accepts the 
absolute sovereignty of God, he is forever thereafter terrified to usurp that 
authority or claim any part of it for himself.12 
   
 Campbell builds his argument for the sovereignty of God on the works of F. O. 
Matthiessen,13 Karl Barth, and, eventually, Jacques Ellul.  Matthiessen argues that a 
theological shift occurred in the nineteenth century that stressed an anthropological point 
of reference to the detriment of traditional understandings of the Incarnation.  There was 
“an alteration in the object of [orthodox belief] from God-Man to Man-God.”14  The 
Jesus long confessed as having descended from the right hand of God, born of a virgin, 
who suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead, buried, but risen and now seated 
at God’s right hand became, instead, a mere “rebel prophet who was murdered by a 
                                                
11 Ibid., 114. 
12 Ibid. 
13 See F. O. Matthiessen, American Renaissance:  Art and Expression in the Age of Emerson and Whitman 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1941). 
14 Ibid., 446. 
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society that was unable to abide the horror of truth.”15  Consequently, the focus of 
theological concern became the deification of the human as reward for a righteous life.  
Christ’s resurrection became the result of human triumph rather than the graceful act of 
the sovereign God in Christ.  “With the diminution of the idea that man might find 
completion in something greater than himself, what could follow more naturally than for 
Protestantism to make man the subject of racial and social justice?”16   
 This slide from the sovereignty of God to the glorification of human action 
catalyzes the theological liberalism that hampers Protestantism from acting according to 
its own core theological claims.  Campbell recalls the emphasis Barth placed on God as 
the subject and humanity as the object and recipient of God’s revelation in Christ.  Barth 
displays the concerns of the biblical writers and their ultimate concern with what God 
thinks about human beings.  He reverses modernity’s anthropological starting point, so 
that the modern person’s question, “Does God exist?” cannot precede the question, “Do I 
exist?”  If “I exist at all, I do so as this subject…For in my natural and ethical life, to the 
extent that I think that I can see and control myself in these respects, I can only consider 
and handle myself as an object of this subject.”17  So influenced by Barth, Campbell says, 
“When one is able and willing to confess that sovereignty belongs to God alone he is no 
longer able to be at ease in the camp of the racist.  He ceases to be excessively 
preoccupied with man or with any particular man or group of men.”18   
                                                
15 Campbell and Goode, Crashing the Idols, 115.   
16 Ibid., 116. 
17 Barth, III/2, 110. 
18 Campbell and Goode, Crashing the Idols, 117.   
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Campbell sees Barth’s work drawing on Calvin, who explains “when we begin 
with ourselves rather than God, we see ourselves in a more powerful, glamorous, and 
impressive light than we actually are.”19  The displacement of God as the subject 
ultimately leads to moralistic arguments for racial integration, which trip over the 
segregationist’s own facts and figures and references to experience, and ultimately 
collapse under the gravity of human disobedience.  The only way to avoid badgering 
people into loving each other is to humble ourselves to God, and reject statistical data—
accurate or not—as being of no account.20  
 In addition to his indebtedness to Matthiesen and Barth, Campbell’s views of 
God’s sovereignty also made him sympathetic with the work of Jacques Ellul, 
particularly in relation to the nature of state politics.  Ellul regarded himself as a Christian 
anarchist, not because he was anti-government, but because he was convinced that the 
state’s power was simply illusory.  Ellul describes Christian anarchy not in the traditional 
sense of “disorder,” but as “an-arche: no authority, no domination.”21  More concretely, 
he defines anarchy as the way of love that absolutely rejects violence.22  These 
convictions complement his most famous work, The Technological Society, in which 
Ellul levels a devastating philosophical critique of modernity’s characteristic insistence 
on the fragmentation of human life for the sake of efficiency.  By “technique,” Ellul does 
not mean technology (or machinery), itself, since “technique” actually precedes 
                                                
19 Ibid., 118. 
20 Ibid., 116. 
21 Ellul, Anarchy and Christianity, trans. by Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Eugene, OR:  Wipf and Stock, 1991) 
45. 
22 Ibid., 11-13. 
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technology.  Rather, Ellul is describing humanity’s habitual enslavement to technology, 
and the subordination of the human to a systematized existence.  He defines technique as 
the “totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given 
state of development) in every field of human activity.”23  Summarizing Ellul, Campbell 
states that “because our new environment is now technique, not nature, the political 
implications are that technique and bureaucracy, not an exchange of ideas in political 
debates and elections, are the stuff of politics today.”24  Politics in the traditional sense is, 
therefore, an “illusion.”25  
 While Campbell did not use the expression “Christian anarchy,” his theological 
convictions led him to unilaterally reject any attempt by the church to engage “in politics 
with utopian pretensions.”26 This is a crucial point for understanding Campbell’s posture 
toward the state vis-à-vis his faith in God’s sovereignty.  Campbell was 
certain that so long as we persist in the belief that there are no limits to what 
politics can do for us because all that is critical about man is politics, it is 
inevitable that we shall try to tear each other asunder, shear off into disillusioned 
and hateful factions, each with our own political nostrums which we shall 
brutally inflict upon those who do not share our nostrums because they have ones 
of their own.27 
 
For Campbell, what the church calls social action “recrucifies” God by attempting 
to build up the kingdom of God with human hands through the state, its laws, and its 
sprawling, bureaucratic structures.  “The church has, in a word, tried to effect 
                                                
23 Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (New York: Random House, 1964), xxv. 
24 Campbell, “Up to Our Steeples in Politics,”  Writings on Reconciliation and Resistance, edited by 
Richard C. Goode (Eugene, OR:  Cascade Books, 2010) 184. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Hawkins, Jr., Radical Prophet of the South, 80. 
27 Campbell, “Up to Our Steeples in Politics,” Reconciliation and Resistance, 185. 
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reconciliation where there already is reconciliation, while the only thing God ever asked 
from the church was to live thanksgiving for others and so express thanksgiving for what 
he has done for us!”28  That God has reconciled humanity to himself “is already a fact.”29  
The permanency of God’s reconciliation is the Good News.  Yet, the church’s 
participation in and reliance upon “programs, strategies, imperatives, laws, and acts of 
obedience” constitute the Bad News of works righteousness.30  Campbell is emphatic:  
because Jesus Christ is truly Lord, reconciliation is neither a rule to be obeyed, nor a goal 
to be accomplished, but is rather a gift to be enjoyed.  “St. Paul’s imperative—‘Be 
reconciled to God’—is the only social action there is for the Christian life.”31   
 The theological influences of Matthiessen, Barth, and Ellul began to coalesce in 
Campbell’s thought beginning with the latter half of the turbulent 1960s.  This was a 
time, Campbell believed, that too many American Christians had placed their ultimate 
hopes and allegiances in the systems of democratic capitalism and its electoral processes. 
The aforementioned theologians became the most authoritative for Campbell as he began 
to proclaim the apocalyptic reality of reconciliation in the wake of his revelation that “we 
are all bastards, but God loves us anyway.”  God’s reconciliation is not merely a future 
promise but a present gift that encompasses all people.  God has reconciled human beings 
to himself and to one another.  Therefore, white American Southerners’ prejudice against 
their black neighbors is a theological problem requiring a theological solution.   
                                                
28 Campbell, Introduction to Up to Our Steeples in Politics, Reconciliation and Resistance, 199.  In the next 
paragraph, Campbell says such a life of lived thanksgiving involves the “giving of food to the hungry, drink 
to the thirsty, shelter to the homeless, and clothes to the naked,” 199. 
29 Ibid., 198. 
30 Ibid., 199. 
31 Ibid. 
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 Campbell scholar Merrill Hawkins, Jr., is not convinced by the alternative 
approach of Campbell’s theological language.  He concludes, “it is very doubtful that a 
religious approach to the segregationist would have been any more effective [than 
appeals to laws or civil rights].”32  He reasons that the segregationists’ racism was “the 
heritage of their culture, which their religion reinforced.”33  Most likely, he continues, 
the segregationist would simply dismiss the interpretation of the social activist.  
In many ways, the behavior of the segregationists was changed by a legal action.  
It was, in hindsight, much easier to convince segregationists that their practices 
violated the law of the land than to tell them they stood in danger of divine 
wrath.34 
 
Hawkins is not incorrect in this assessment.  However, he does not seem to 
recognize that his doubts about Campbell’s claims distract from Campbell’s more 
fundamental suspicions about the fragmentation of theological language, and the seminal 
contributions of such language to the perpetuation of systemic racism in America.  That 
Hawkins concludes with the latter claim betrays his assumption that one’s “heritage” and 
“religion” are distinct entities, such that one entity might “reinforce” the other.  
Campbell’s language, on the other hand, assumes that for the “religiously oriented 
segregationist” (Hawkins’s phrase), cultural heritage and “religion” are indivisible.  By 
concluding with as assumption that Campbell’s overarching goal is to provide yet another 
rubric by which those in positions of power—whether religious or secular—might reason 
with segregationists, he actually overlooks the mournful tone of Campbell’s assessment.  
                                                
32 Hawkins, Jr., Radical Prophet of the South, 100. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 101.  Hawkins’s contention here is reminiscent of a statement Martin Luther King, Jr., made in an 
address to Western Michigan University:  “It may be true that the law cannot make a man love me but it 
can keep him from lynching me and I think that is pretty important, also.”  But Hawkins’s application of 
the legal response to segregation misses the mark of Campbell’s concerns. 
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Campbell’s critique of the theology’s disastrous turn away from the primacy of God’s 
action in Jesus Christ is characterized more by lament than by paternalism.  After his 
revelation in Alabama, the “Bootleg Preacher” never showed any intention in his 
preaching or writing that he believed a better plan of social activism would counteract 
this theological sea change.  As I now hope to show, Campbell addressed the practical 
implications of his theology by advancing renewed ecclesiological understandings.  But 
in both theological and ecclesiological matters, the common thread of Campbell’s 
concern was whether the church’s adoption of the politics of “Caesar” effectively 
disappears the potential witness of the church’s alternative politics of reconciliation.  
“Ours is simply a question derived from the fundamental question we are here raising:  is 
obedience to Christ exhausted by immersing one’s self in Caesar’s definition of 
politics?”35 
 
4.2  CAMPBELL’S SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 
The church’s visible witness in the world was Campbell’s most vexing and 
persistent dilemma.  A brief pastorate, a contentious stint as a university chaplain, and the 
continuously disheartening and even life-threatening encounters with hostile Christians in 
the South finally dissuaded him of the traditional church’s authenticity as a witness to the 
gospel of Jesus Christ.  Campbell was raised in Amite County, Mississippi, by devout 
Baptists.  He was a product of the traditional—or what he called the “institutional”—
church, including Wake Forest College and Yale Divinity School.  But as his thinking 
                                                
35 Campbell, “Up to Our Steeples in Politics,” Reconciliation and Resistance, 188-89. 
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matured, Campbell became increasingly adamant that all institutions—especially those 
claiming to be Christian—were untrustworthy and oppressive.  The dynamics of his own 
education and experience combined to induce Campbell’s perennial struggle to find an 
intelligible answer to the question, “Where is the church?”  What I hope to show in this 
section is that Campbell’s insistence upon reconciliation not only influenced his 
ecclesiological imagination, but also led to his becoming a liminal, transitional figure.  In 
other words, I will claim that, though we should not swallow Campbell’s ecclesiological 
vision whole, Christian hope in the American South would have been significantly 
diminished without his voice. 
For a closer look at Campbell’s ecclesiological beliefs, we will need to consider 
yet another theologian who had a notable impact on his life and thought.  William 
Stringfellow’s influence on Campbell’s understanding of principalities and powers is 
immeasurable.  Campbell conscripted Stringfellow’s interpretation of the principalities 
and powers as the “ideologies, institutions, images and systems” that accost us every 
day.36  Stringfellow believed the principalities and powers were not only countless in 
number, but always found in temporal realities and material structures, including: 
all institutions, all ideologies, all images, all movements, all causes, all 
corporations, all bureaucracies, all traditions, all methods and routines, all 
conglomerates, all races, all nations, all idols.  Thus, the Pentagon or the Ford 
Motor Company or Harvard University or the Hudson Institute or Consolidated 
Edison or the Diners Club or the Olympics or the Methodist Church or the 
Teamsters Union are all principalities.  So are capitalism, Maoism, humanism, 
Mormonism, astrology, the Puritan work ethic, science and scientism, white 
supremacy, patriotism, plus many, many more—sports, sex, and profession or 
                                                
36 William Stringfellow, Free in Obedience (New York: Seabury, 1964) 52. 
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discipline, technology, money, the family—beyond any prospect of full 
enumeration.  The principalities and powers are legion.37 
 
These powers are “creatures having their own existence, personality, and mode of life,” 
and have come to existence just as mysteriously as did the creaturehood of human 
beings.38   
 According to Richard Goode, Campbell agreed with Stringfellow’s emphasis on 
the creatureliness of the principalities and powers.  “All of us are caught up in, with, and 
by these powers,” which seek to wreck the kingdom God in Christ has established.39  
“Principalities can best be understood in modern language as institutions [or 
ideologies].”40  They are beings that exert their power for the purposes of domination, 
enslavement, and alienation—or virtually any other purpose whose means and ends 
pervert the purposes and mock the establishment of God’s kingdom.  “All [powers and 
principalities] are blasphemy for they usurp the authority of the one true God.”41  They 
also include “isms,” such as racism, “an idol with a life and power of its own.”42  That the 
principalities and powers are both real, observable entities, and destructive servants of 
death are the two primary motivators of Campbell’s rejection of what he called the 
“institutional church,” and his concomitant, defiant stance against the power of racism.   
                                                
37 Stringfellow, An Ethic for Christians and Other Aliens in a Strange Land (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 
1973) 78. 
38 Ibid., 79. 
39 Will D. Campbell, And Also With You: Duncan Gray and the American Dilemma (Franklin, TN: 
Providence House Publishers, 1997) 249. 
40 Ibid., 248. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 249. 
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Campbell often spoke equivocally about the church.  He attempted to differentiate 
the “true church” from the “institutional church”—which he knocked as little more than 
“steeples” hosting “altar fires” and “tea parties.”  As institutions, these steeples are also 
principalities.  As principalities, they are inherently evil.  In a speech to the William 
Whitsitt Heritage Society in 1995, he concluded, “All institutions, every last single one of 
them, are evil; self-serving, self-preserving, self-loving; and very early in the life of any 
institution it will exist for its own self.”43  More directly concerning the church, in an 
undated manuscript addressed to a gathering of journalists at an unnamed Southern 
university, Campbell states,  
I do not love my church.  I did for a long time.  I probably worshipped it.  I now 
see it as an idol, as a broken down machine, an ineffective tool, and perhaps the 
greatest barrier to the proclamation of the Gospel of all the institutions in society 
because it is an institutions [sic] and I believe that all institutions are, by nature 
evil.  It stands today where the rich young ruler stood—good, powerful, rich.  Yet 
Jesus told such a one to go and sell it all and get rid of it.  And what would 
happen if the steepled, institutional churches should suddenly follow that 
admonition.  I, of course, don’t know.  But it may be that we might on that day 
learn to sing the Psalms for the first time in our lives.44 
 
On the other hand, in an interview with The Wittenburg Door five years before 
the Heritage Society address, he stated, “I never say the church is bad.  Obviously, it’s 
not a bad outfit; the institutional church—structure—is a good outfit.”45  Nevertheless, 
the wider context of his speaking and writing shows that, though the church may be good, 
                                                
43 Will D. Campbell, edited by Richard C. Goode, Writings on Reconciliation and Resistance (Eugene, OR: 
Cascade Books, 2010) 151.  
44 Campbell, “Redneck Religion,” Undated manuscript, Will Campbell Papers (University of Southern 
Mississippi) Manuscript 341, Box 12, Folder 47. 
45 Campbell, Writings, 73. 
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and may have the potential to do enormous amounts of good, Campbell believes it is 
fundamentally corrupt.   
Don’t trust it.  That doesn’t mean God doesn’t work wherever God chooses, so I 
wouldn’t rule out the stained glass and the mahogany pews and the silver 
chalices.  I don’t rule any of that out.  I am just trying to say that if God is the 
God of the universe, don’t try to put God in this pigeonhole and say, ‘If you want 
to be with God, come to this edifice or this steeple or serve this particular 
cause.’46 
 
 This does not mean the institutional church, as Campbell understood it, is either 
evil or good despite its untrustworthiness.  For Campbell, the true church may distinguish 
itself from the “altar fires and tea parties” presided over in “the steeples.”  “Hell, I don’t 
know what the church is.”47  That is, he does not want to know because he feels 
compelled to resist what he might do if he did know.  “I believe the church is at work in 
the world only because of my faith in this Jesus person.  Trouble is, I don’t know what 
Jesus is up to or where his church is.  That’s good because if I found the church then I’d 
give it a name and start running it.”48   The church for Campbell was wherever people 
happen to be doing the things Jesus commanded.  It is “wherever two or three are 
gathered in my name” (Mt. 18:20).  “In my name,” in this sense, has to do with the power 
and activity revealed by Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection.   
What does it matter what someone believes?  If you are bringing good news to 
the poor and restoring sight to the blind and healing the brokenhearted and 
releasing the captives, but you happen to believe that a whale swallowed Jonah or 
you happen not to believe that a whale swallowed Jonah, what difference does it 
make ‘as long as Christ is preached’?49 
                                                
46 Ibid., 72. 
47 Ibid., 71. 
48 Ibid., 71-72. 
49 Ibid., 74.  In context, Campbell is speaking about the importance of the unity of belief and discipleship.  
In the interview, he clearly expresses strong disagreement with those who care only about “what you 
believe” and not “about how you live” (73 ff.).   
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 This articulation of Campbell’s ecclesiology complements the Anabaptist 
tradition he so deeply appreciated and epitomized, and informs his approach to preaching 
Christ to “the steeples” as a way of resisting racist principalities and powers.  Though he 
eschews temptations to pinpoint where Jesus has decided to be among people, Campbell 
is confident in his ability to detect an institution, and, therefore, the particular location of 
a principality.  “They are real, this-world entities, earthly structures and systems to be 
named and engaged.”50  This is why his aim is so precise when gibing the powers.  
Because they are earthly, they are vulnerable to attack even despite their enormous 
presence and potent dominion.  When a church assumes the status of a principality, when 
it becomes institutionalized and, thus, self-serving, Campbell targets it as an idol to be 
“crashed.”  This does not mean he advocated violence against the institutional church.  
Rather, he believed Christians must speak and act in ways that expose the institutional 
church as a principality that is already fallen, disarmed, and defeated by Christ’s death on 
the cross.  God reigns supreme already.  Christ’s defeat of the powers has been 
accomplished.  God has already reconciled us to himself and to one another.  Because 
one of the seminal verses of Scripture for Campbell was 2 Corinthians 5:16a, “From now 
on, therefore, we regard no one from a human point of view,” human categories and 
points of view no longer mattered to him.  Campbell’s belief that this is true now—
today—lay at the heart of his mission to crash the idol of racism.51  It especially drove his 
                                                
50 Campbell and Goode, Crashing the Idols, 173. 
51 “Well, first of all, it should be understood that I am not a reconciler.  I am a Christian preacher, and I 
believe that all are already reconciled...In 2 Corinthians 5, Paul said that Christ has reconciled us.  Not he’s 
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passion to unleash this Gospel often in the places where it ought to make sense already—
church sanctuaries. 
 In the celebrated PBS documentary about Campbell’s life, “God’s Will,” 
Campbell mentions an unnamed author who had written about him and his ministry.52  
He favorably recounts the writer’s critique as having reduced the essence of Campbell’s 
life and writings to “a search for community.”  This author might have been Hawkins, 
himself, who, in the published version of his dissertation, wrote, “Campbell argues that 
community is the essence of true religion.  He equates community with the true church 
and contrasted community with institutional religion.”53  But is this not a deeply 
problematic dichotomy given what we know of Campbell’s own forceful convictions 
about the present reality of reconciliation?  Is his attempt to distinguish between the “true 
church” and the “institutional church” not a subtle contradiction of Campbell’s own 
terms?  If institutions have a “creaturely” existence, are they still excluded from any 
possibility of redemption?  Furthermore, in what sense do the principalities and powers 
constitute a dimension of existence that is resolutely “beyond” God’s reconciling 
mission? 
 In order to read Campbell with the charity he deserves, we cannot forget that he 
was, as everyone is, a person of his time.  Campbell was so disgusted with the church’s 
                                                                                                                                            
 
going to; or, we can reconcile ourselves by being good boys and loving black folks or Klan folks or 
whoever.  He has reconciled us and enlisted us in this service of reconciliation.  Now that is what the 
church really is,” from a conversation with Norman Bowman, “Prophet, Poet, Preacher-at-large:  A 
Conversation with Will Campbell,” The Student ( December 1970), quoted in Campbell and Goode, 
Crashing, 61. 
52 PBS Documentary, “God’s Will,” Center for Public Television, 57 min. (Quote at 9:50). 
53 Hawkins, Jr., Radical Prophet of the South, 133. 
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deep enculturation with Southern racism he could not bear to say that this grotesquely 
compromised “institutional” rendering of the church might also be the body of Christ.  
Those with a casual acquaintance with Campbell’s work might dismiss him for wanting 
to claim the good without the bad.  But such a critique is too superficial to penetrate the 
depths of Campbell’s ecclesiological imagination.  The discrepancies of his ecclesiology 
notwithstanding, Campbell remains a figure who, even in the wake of this death, remains 
perched at the threshold of a new time in the church’s life.  Not unlike the Reformers 
before him, and like all the saints through the ages who sought to cut through the 
accouterments of ecclesial excess, Campbell was calling the church back to its original, 
radical mission.  “What Campbell wants is an ecclesiological Reformation wherein the 
authentic Church is radically distinguished from institutional religious structures.”54 
 The baseline tension in Campbell’s language manifests itself in a tug-of-war 
between the contrasting legacies of Reinhold Neibuhr and Karl Barth.  Campbell wanted 
to speak of the institutional church in a Niebuhrian fashion, while simultaneously 
speaking of the authentic church in relation to Karl Barth’s theology of the Word of God 
as “event.”  Though Campbell does not seem to have explicitly incorporated anything 
substantial from Niebuhr’s work in his own writings, speeches, and sermons, Niebuhr’s 
influence on theological ethics at that time was, nevertheless, ubiquitous (and arguably 
remains so).  Though it would be futile to offer a thorough account of any aspect of 
Niebuhr’s work here, there is general agreement among scholars about his emphasis on 
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humanity’s sinfulness.  Niebuhr’s steadfast engagement with the Doctrine of Original Sin 
led him to the following, paradoxical conclusion about humanity: 
…on the one hand life in history must be recognized as filled with indeterminate 
possibilities.  There is no individual or interior spiritual situation, no cultural or 
scientific task, and no social or political problem in which men do not face new 
possibilities of the good and the obligation to realize them.  It means on the other 
hand that every effort and pretension to complete life, whether in collective or 
individual terms, that every desire to stand beyond the contradictions of history, 
or to eliminate the final corruptions of history must be disavowed.55 
 
For Neibuhr, history is the story of the consequences of humanity’s sinful nature.  
All institutions, ideologies, movements—all expressions of human communities, 
relationships, cultures—inevitably wreak havoc by their bungling attempts to achieve 
what only God is capable of doing.  Even in spite of the most sincere attempts by 
churches to practice a Kingdom ethic, humanity is ultimately determined by its sin to the 
degree that “the ‘Kingdom of God’ which we achieve in history is never the same as the 
Kingdom for which we pray.”56   
 Ironically, in a passage that sounds as though Campbell had written it himself, 
Niebuhr describes the possibility of the objectively verifiable historicity of God’s grace 
as it might occur outside the boundaries of established churches.   
‘The wind bloweth where it listeth,’ said Jesus to Nicodemus; and that is a 
picturesque description of the freedom of divine grace in history, working 
miracles without any ‘by your leave’ of priest or church.  Since some of the most 
significant developments in the field of social morality have taken place in 
modern life in defiance of a sacramental church…it is understandable that 
modern culture should still be informed by a strong resentment against the 
pretensions of such a church.57 
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Though Campbell could not have improved upon the latter passage, and in fact 
embodied Neibuhr’s point here throughout most of his ministry, Campbell’s theology 
differed from Neibuhr’s in one very crucial way.  According to Stanley Hauerwas, 
America was always the subject of Niebuhr’s ethics.  “[He] paid almost no attention to 
the social significance of the church—for finally, in spite of all the trenchant criticism he 
directed at America, America was his church…from beginning to end [Neibuhr] was 
involved in a stormy love affair with America.”58  Despite his rejection of liberalism, 
Neibuhr’s theology was still grounded in anthropology.  His “compelling portrayal of our 
sinfulness, which seemed to function as a critique of liberal optimism, was in fact a 
continuation of the liberal attempt to demonstrate the intelligibility of theological 
language through its power to illuminate the human condition.”59 
 Because of his convictions about God’s sovereignty, Campbell shared none of 
Neibuhr’s faith in the United States of America to be a force for justice in the world.  For 
him, one of the primary causes of the institutional church’s corruption was due to its 
unholy alliance with America’s domestic and foreign policies.  Yet, Campbell did ascent 
to Neibuhr’s language of realism in relation to the church.  He never relented from 
emphasizing the church’s inherent sinfulness as an institution.  Whenever Campbell 
refers positively to established churches, the spirit of Neibuhr seems always to be 
whispering in his ear, “The church is just like any other human institution, as doomed to 
failure and as intrinsically corrupt as all institutions finally are.” 
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What makes Campbell’s ecclesiology so disorienting was his simultaneous 
endorsement of Neibuhr’s realism together with Barth’s language of the church as an 
“event.”  Unlike Neibuhr, Campbell was captivated by the social significance of the 
church.  As much as he criticized establishment churches, he dedicated himself to 
searching for the church’s most authentic expressions.  In the journal he helped edit, 
Katallagete (Be reconciled!), Campbell’s repeated and often bombastic appeals to 
Scripture and the person and work of Jesus Christ sound distinctively Barthian:   
Jesus’ news is specific, immediate, indifferent to moral codes.  It is an event as 
close to us as brothers, children, neighbors, bedrooms and bars, and the poor and 
black who stand as judgment on our citizenship and our confessions about Jesus 
as Lord.60 
 
In the same article, he invites “each institutional church” to adopt three prisoners 
for visitation, “so that at least once each week every man and woman and child behind 
bars could have one human being with whom he could have community, to whom the 
prisoner could tell his story.”61  This invitation is a telling demonstration of Campbell’s 
ecclesial imagination.  In this particular instance, Campbell implores the institutional 
church to live up to the calling to which it has been called.  He engages the deeply 
acculturated church with the familiar, Scriptural language of Matthew 25:36.  He knows 
that the “wind bloweth where it listeth,” but also that Jesus promises to be with those who 
gather in his name.  Campbell is convinced Jesus makes good on this promise, that 
church “happens,” in the sure and certain community constituted by prison visitation. 
                                                
60 Will D. Campbell and James Y. Holloway, “The Good News from God in Jesus is Freedom to the 
Prisoners,” Katallagete, Winter-Spring 1972, 2. 
61 Ibid., 4. 
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 What makes Campbell such an important transitional figure in the church of the 
American South and beyond is that he passionately articulated what authentic Christian 
community requires, while also disrupting church communities and their services almost 
every chance he got.  One particularly acute disruption occurred at a weekday morning 
chapel service for students at Furman University.  Campbell was the guest preacher for 
the day, but upon realizing the students were obligated by school rules to be in chapel, he 
ascended the pulpit and said, “I was going to preach my sermon until I heard y’all were 
required to be here.  Who ever heard of requiring people to go to church?  That’s 
bullshit.”  And he proceeded to take out a banjo and play country music songs to the 
congregation for the duration of his allotted time.62  Similar stories could fill several 
volumes, from Campbell walking out of his own sermon during worship in Duke Chapel 
in order to aid hurricane victims in Durham, NC, to his famous suggestion during a 
sermon at Riverside Church in New York City that they should sell off their buildings 
and give the proceeds to the poor.  In the latter sermon, Campbell exposes power after 
power, from the United States prison system, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 
even Riverside Church, itself.  “How much is Riverside Church worth? We’ll just auction 
it off.”63  He chides the FBI for working discreetly to support the activities of the Klan.  
He calls for clandestine infiltrations of “the Pentagon, the State Department, maybe even 
the Masonic Lodge, and my son’s college fraternity.”64   
                                                
62 As told to me by William Willimon, personal conversation, 9 October 2013. 
63 Campbell, Writings, 168. 
64 Ibid., 173. 
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 He then proceeds to pillory the idea that we can “do something” about the 
problem of race in America.  Thinking we can alter the course of history by maneuvering 
within the principalities and powers is a lost cause.  “For too long we have concentrated 
our efforts on the assumption that our vocation is to solve all the problems of the world.  
Rather than trying to determine what we are, who we are, already, here and now, in this 
present world.”65  So what do we do?  Nothing.  “That’s what we can do. Nothing.”  This 
“nothing” serves as a rhetorical foil to the “nothing” of singing, “Oh Lamb of God, I 
come, I come.”  Campbell claims the lyrics ought to be, “Lamb of God, I go” with my 
75,000 fellow worshipers to stand outside a real prison made of concrete and steel and 
raze it to the ground, and the prisoners set free.66  The “nothing” Christians ought to 
pursue is what has already been given to us to do.  Campbell calls it doing “nothing” 
because active faith in Christ does not require the creation of new strategies for changing 
the structures of domination, but the practice of the acts of releasing prisoners, visiting 
nursing homes, hospitals, and slums, which have already been given us by Christ, and 
which by their very application subvert and expose the limits of the principalities and 
powers.  We announce Christ’s disarmament of the powers by doing “nothing” except 
living as the people God has already created us to be. 
Campbell is reminiscent of such historical figures as Symeon the Holy Fool, who 
disrupted church services in his day by blowing out candles and throwing nuts at the 
                                                
65 Ibid. 
66 Campbell is apparently referring to Billy Graham, and speculating about number of people attending one 
of his evangelism crusades at Yankee Stadium, Writings, 173.  See also his article with James Y. Holloway, 
“The Good News from God in Jesus is Freedom to the Prisoners,” Katallagete, Winter-Spring, 1972, 2-5, 
in which he argues that Jesus’ announcement of freedom to prisoners was not metaphorical, but intended 
for literal application. 
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priests during their sermons and administration of the sacraments.67  Because of the many 
accounts of such stunts, we may rightly say Campbell falls squarely in the category of 
“preaching fools” that Charles Campbell and Johan Cilliers have described. Will 
Campbell was obviously no fool in the derogatory sense.  But his affinity for church “on 
the margins” led to his being perceived by some as foolishly idealistic at best, or 
dangerously subversive.  Campbell and Cilliers identify the present situation, of which 
Will Campbell was a part, as a “liminal space at the juncture of the ages, the space of 
being and becoming as we inter-face and inter-form with others.”68  Campbell’s 
“foolishness” resulted from there being so little receptivity to his ecclesiological vision 
that he inevitably clashed with existing structures.  As Campbell and Cilliers explain, 
Preaching fools know this new [liminal] reality; they have an odd wisdom that 
takes them ‘outside the gates’ in search of Christ.  Preaching fools, like fools 
generally, do not side with those who are powerful according to the old age.  
Rather, they are more often than not found in the vicinity of those whom the 
world considers powerless.  Preaching fools are fond of the old age’s fringes.  
They face those faces on the fringes that others would rather turn away from.69 
 
Campbell also tended to “float” from one form of church to another.  At any given 
time he might be preaching in Riverside Church in New York City, speaking at a funeral 
for a murdered black college student in a college auditorium another day, or performing a 
marriage ceremony in a roadside honky-tonk bar.  The church as “event” might occur in 
an establishment church on main street, Anytown, USA, or at any prison, or even at 
diners, drive-ins and dives like Gass’s Store in rural Tennessee, Campbell’s regular 
                                                
67 See Derek Krueger, Symeon the Holy Fool:  Leontius’s Life and the Late Antique City (Berkeley, CA:  
University of California Press, 1996). 
68 Charles L. Campbell and Johann H. Cilliers, Preaching Fools: The Gospel as a Rhetoric of Folly (Baylor 
University Press, 2012) 178. 
69 Ibid. 
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hangout.  One never knows where or how the Risen Jesus will appear in the midst of 
people.  In this sense, Campbell should be regarded not as one who offers final 
resolutions to our most pressing ecclesiological questions, but as a man whose witness 
was both a product of his time as well as a harbinger of things to come—a man whose 
vision flourished in the liminal space between different ecclesial forms. 
We may confidently say that Campbell’s ecclesiological vision accords with his 
understanding of God’s reconciling mission:  that church is what happens whenever 
people gather to respond to God’s reconciliation through worship (including the 
sacraments of baptism and communion), and by doing the particular things Jesus 
commanded his followers to do.  From this perspective, we might liken Campbell to 
Cleopas on the road to Emmaus (Luke 24:13-53).  With a fallen countenance, he walks 
away from what was—to his way of thinking—a hopeless scenario of death.  His despair 
lifts only in the revelatory moment of a communal breaking of bread, where his eyes are 
opened for the first time to behold the risen Jesus.  As he testifies about this experience to 
other disciples, Jesus appears to all of them, startling and terrifying them as though they 
had seen a ghost.  It is the nature of Cleopas’ encounter with the risen Jesus that he 
should expect any further revelation of God to be protean, unmanageable, but always 
reconciling.  That is, Cleopas would have counted himself amongst those who abandoned 
Jesus on the cross.  The good news is that Jesus comes back to him and the others, meets 
them face to face, dines with them, and offers his body to them to be touched.  In 
response, “they worshiped him, and returned to Jerusalem with great joy; and they were 
continually in the temple blessing God” (Lk. 24:53).   
  182 
Campbell, unlike Cleopas, was not “continually in the temple blessing God.”  But 
like Cleopas, he came of age in a time of spectacular turbulence, where one could never 
be sure where or how God might appear.  In this liminal space, even establishment white 
churches that sinfully, deplorably abandoned their suffering black brothers and sisters 
could not do worse than the disciples who abandoned Jesus on the cross.  Yet, Jesus 
returns to dine with them all.  By his life, Will Campbell demonstrated this good news, 
again and again:  that beginning with the cross the curtain in the temple has been torn in 
two.  The church that Jesus Christ establishes and sustains cannot control Christ’s power 
to reveal himself.  The risen Jesus can appear at random, in the midst of any gathering he 
chooses.  In Campbell’s imagination, that meant church, which had long been a 
comfortable place for racists, was made dangerous again.  Thus, both characters—
Campbell, like Cleopas—serve as reminders that the church inhabits an unsettled space, 
where, as Flannery O’Connor described, the Word of God is like “a wild ragged figure, 
motioning for you to turn around and come off into the dark where you are not sure of 
your footing, where you might be walking on the water and not know it and then 
suddenly know it and drown.70  
 
4.3  CAMPBELL’S IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHORITY 
 Great preachers do not receive their authority to preach in a vacuum, disconnected 
from their congregations.  They gain the authority to speak by living, in one way or 
another, in relationship with people, whether “from an embedded position,” or at the very 
                                                
70 Flannery O’Connor, “Wise Blood,” Collected Works (New York: Library of America, 1988) 11. 
  183 
least by being perceived as “one of the people.”  Campbell exemplified Kenneth Burke’s 
concept of identification in his life and in his preaching, especially in relation to Burke’s 
description of “consubstantiation.”  Consubstantial identification links two entities, but 
does not necessarily mean the two are identical.  Consubstantiality names a way of life by 
which humans act together, “and in acting together, men have common sensations, 
concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them consubstantial.”71  Identification “is 
compensatory to division.  If men were not apart from one another, there would be no 
need for the rhetorician to proclaim their unity.”72  Campbell sincerely crafted his public 
persona as a Baptist preacher—with his language and his body—in ways that epitomize 
Burke’s contention that “identification is affirmed with earnestness precisely because 
there is division.”73   
It is crucial to note that Campbell’s subject matter—reconciliation as an 
eschatological reality impacting the present—actually presents a paradox in Burkean 
terms.  For, “If men were wholly and truly of one substance, absolute communication 
would be of man’s very essence.”  In other words, if we are all already reconciled (“of 
one substance,” so to speak), what is the purpose of preaching reconciliation?  Does 
asking human beings to be what they already are, as Campbell often does, make any 
sense?  Indeed, it does through the loophole Burke provides, whereby “ideal” or 
“absolute” communication is “as natural, spontaneous, and total as with…the 
                                                
71 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1969 [1950]) 21. 
72 Ibid., 22. 
73 Ibid. 
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theologian’s angels, or ‘messengers.’”74  To say this in a theological way, the content of 
Campbell’s communication is intelligible only if its source is divine.  Campbell’s ability 
to identify with his audience was primarily dependent upon the listeners’ reception of his 
message as an expression of the divine Word.   
Campbell certainly understood himself to be a carrier of a message from God.  
Even more, he understood that he did not carry this message by himself, that he must 
embody his message within a particular community.  Charles Campbell and Johann 
Cilliers name such embodiment as a critical function of preaching fools: 
Taking the incarnation seriously, preaching fools live and preach in solidarity 
with those with whom God identifies.  They trust that God is revealed within the 
realms of our humanity through Christ, including through those embodied 
humans who dare to preach this foolish gospel.  Preaching fools thus view 
congregational life as embodied, fully human life.  They approach their 
congregations theologically—kenotically.  These are people with whom God has 
bodily identified; God has been having a relationship with them for a long time, 
before the preacher appeared on the scene.75 
 
Campbell’s genius for identification was also at times a source of frustration for 
him, and a perennial stumbling block for many others.  In July 1977, Campbell went to 
court to observe the proceedings of a libel suit brought against NBC-TV by one Victoria 
Price, who contended that a recent television show about the Scottsboro Nine had 
depicted her as a racist buffoon.  In 1931, Price and another woman, Ruby Bates, accused 
nine black men of raping them.  Despite the inconsistencies and absurd nature of the 
women’s respective testimonies, a jury sentenced all nine men to death.  They were 
eventually exonerated, but only after their lives had been ruined.  At the trial in 1977, the 
                                                
74 Ibid. 
75 Campbell and Cilliers, Preaching Fools, 161. 
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last survivor of the Scottsboro boys was not present.  Campbell had a dilemma.  Where 
should he sit?  With Victoria Price, the executives of NBC, or with others?  “I recognized 
five different and distinguishable groupings, all small, all with plenty of room around 
them…Each had a right and reason to be there.  Each reason had something to be said for 
it.  I like to take sides.  But I couldn’t decide where to sit.”76  In the heat of the moment, 
Campbell considered how each of the groups represented both victims and perpetrators to 
one degree or another.  Price was the notorious accuser, but also a “pathetic 
countrywoman,” a woman of ill-repute whose circumstances in life were as unenviable as 
those of the Scottsboro Boys.  She “stood no more of a chance in that courtroom in 1977 
against NBC than the Scottsboro Boys had stood in another one nearby against the state 
of Alabama in 1931.”77  Campbell decided to sit alone.  “I felt a little confused.  And a 
little sad for Victory Price, for the Scottsboro Boys, and for us all.”78 
 Campbell’s concern to identify with both victims and perpetrators was a common 
characteristic in his speeches, and a source of much controversy.  In an undated address 
to a university somewhere in the South, Campbell spoke as a resident Southerner who 
could sympathize not only with oppressed blacks, but also with the oppressed whites.  He 
grew up in a poor white family and knew firsthand what it meant to be victimized by 
institutions and systems of economic power over which his community had no control.  
The central theme of this address, however, was not primarily about institutions, but the 
language of racism, which institutions across the country construct and perpetuate.  More 
                                                
76 Campbell and Goode, Writings, 65.  Originally published in Christianity and Crisis, July 1977, 189-91. 
77 Ibid., 70. 
78 Ibid. 
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particularly, Campbell’s speech is an indictment of the common use of the word 
“redneck,” which he calls “a dirty word, same as nigger.”79  “Redneck” is the linguistic 
signification of the ongoing oppression by principalities and powers over “the culturally 
deprived and increasingly alienated caucasian minority.”80  While he honors the gravity 
of the African-American struggle, he details the struggle of poor Southern whites.   
The real tragedy of the redneck is that he has been victimized one step beyond 
the black.  He has had his head taken away.  The black man had his back and his 
blood taken but we never got his head.  Through it all he knew what was 
happening, that he was suffering, why he was suffering, and early in the game he 
set about doing something to correct it.  The job on the redneck was more 
extensive.  He had his head taken away.  He still hasn’t identified the enemy.81   
 
The enemy is the power of racism.  Yet, “there continues to be less true racism in 
redneckism because the reneck [sic] participates in the society from a base of 
considerably less power than the rest of us.”82  Comments like these aroused the anger of 
the program’s chairman, who accused him of “posing as a ‘know-nothing’ because he 
knew that [Campbell] had graduated from an Ivy League school and ‘knows better than 
                                                
79 Campbell, “Redneck Religion,” Campbell Papers, Manuscript 341, Box 12, Folder 47.. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid.  In this same address, Campbell compares a song he heard at a Klan rally to one of the imprecatory 
Psalms:  “Have you heard such spirited psalms as:  ‘You niggers listen now, I’m gonna tell you how to 
keep from being tortured when the Klan is on the prowl.  Stay at home at night, lock your doors up tight.  
Don’t go outside or you will find them crosses a burning bright.  Move them niggers north, move them 
niggers north [the Campbell Papers are indecipherable at this point in the sentence] and then the rousing 
sounds of DIXIE.’   
It is an experience that is sickening and frightening.  If you have not had that experience, then perhaps you 
have heard these words:  ‘If I forget you, O Jerusalem let my right hand wither away; let my tongue cling to 
the roof of my mouth id I do not remember you, if I do not set Jerusalem above my highest joy.  Remember, 
O Lord, against the people of Edom the day of Jerusalem’s fall, when they said, ‘Down with it, down with 
it, down to its very foundations;’ O Babylon, Babylon the destroyer, happy is the man who repays you for 
all you did to us!  Happy is he who shall seize your children and dash them against the rocks.’   
Not a Klan ritual but called a Song of Degree by the commentator, the 137th Psalm. 
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to use that kind of grammar.’”83  But Campbell defended himself as having spoken, like 
the educated black man who had addressed the gathering immediately before him, “in the 
idiom of my people, the rednecks.”84   
Campbell was proud of his people, who he believed were also victimized, and 
who, without “the incessant manipulation by the politics of the privileged,” would have 
made a better life for themselves.85  He expressed shame about his earlier aspirations to 
escape the South’s “ignorance” through the educational opportunities at Wake Forest and 
Yale.  He began to more fully embrace his identity as a Southerner.  In one particularly 
direct introduction to an audience, he said, “I’m a Baptist preacher.  I’m a native of 
Mississippi.  And I’m pro-Klansman because I’m pro-human being.”86  Campbell was 
learning the truth from and about his own people, even from Klansmen, whom his 
colleagues referred to as “the Enemy.”  And of these Klansmen Campbell would go on to 
say, “In a strange sequence of crosscurrents we were of them and they were of us.  Blood 
of our blood.  Our people.  And God’s people.”87  By this deft maneuver, Campbell 
flipped the meaning of “the Enemy” on its head.  If the Ku Klux Klan is not the enemy, 
who is?   
Even with a reputation for identifying with and befriending Klansmen, Campbell 
remained a participant in and close ally with leaders of the Civil Rights Movement.  He 
could do so only because he was just as intentional about identifying with African-
                                                
83 Campbell and Goode, Writings, 42. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid., 43. 
86 Hawkins, Jr., Radical Prophet, 174. 
87 Campbell, Brother to a Dragonfly, 249-50.  Also quoted in Hawkins, Jr., Radical Prophet, 179. 
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Americans as he was with his own people.  He tried to embody their suffering, 
endangering himself and his family by fighting for civil rights.  He received death threats 
and was fired from his chaplaincy position at the University of Mississippi for supporting 
integration.  He helped escort black students into the front doors of the Little Rock, 
Arkansas, public schools, in addition to helping at other events of integration where there 
were credible threats of violence.  He preached constantly against racial discrimination at 
a time when such preaching was rare—and dangerous—in America, and almost unheard 
of from Southern white preachers.   
It was this embodied nature of Campbell’s “consubstantial identification” (Burke) 
that enabled Campbell to preach with authority to people across racial boundaries.  Such 
identification was a performance of the relational dynamics of Jesus’ encounter with the 
woman at the well in Samaria (John 4:1-42). The passage not only exemplifies 
Campbell’s own way of identification, but also provides a framework for all efforts at 
identification in the midst of racial divisions. Jesus “looks in wonder” upon the woman at 
the well (4:35); they share a personal, theological conversation during which Jesus 
demonstrates compassion for her life story (4:18); Jesus helps her understand what God is 
doing in a way that neither condemns nor excludes her (4:21-24); finally, Jesus fully 
reveals his own identity to her (4:26).  Each phase reveals an aspect of how Campbell 
“follows Jesus” in his way of identification. 
Though modern concepts of race as a method of determining and categorizing 
human identity are different today than for biblical authors, there can be no denying that 
then, as now, forms of manmade distinctions were widespread, and applicable to both 
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ancient and modern conceptualizations of the principalities and powers.  For example, the 
historical context of Jewish disdain for Samaritans stems largely from the results of 
political and theological animosity.88  Clearly, there are multiple principalities and 
powers working in the background and foreground of the text—political, theological, 
legal, sexual—all sanctioned by the political and religious institutions of the day, 
constitutive of the status quo, and permeating the surrounding culture.  These powers, 
though not identical to the power of modern understandings of race, still prescribe the 
social context in ways that illicit the same reactivity to scandal in the reader today as they 
did in the Johannine community. 
 Yet, none of these powers determines Jesus’ attempt to identify with the 
Samaritan woman.  None of them deters Jesus from entering Samaria in the first place.  It 
is not as if Jesus “had to go through Samaria” (4:4 NRSV).90  Jesus travels miles out of his 
way on foot to the last place his own people would ever expect him to go.  This has to do 
not only with the formal truth that it is Jesus’ mission as the Word of God sent to enter 
                                                
88 According to Raymond Brown, The Gospel According to John I-XII, The Anchor Bible, Vol. 29 (New 
York: Doubleday, 1966) 170, Samaritans are descendants of two groups: “(a) the remnant of the native 
Israelites who were not deported at the fall of the Northern Kingdom in 722 B.C.; (b) foreign colonists 
brought in from Babylonia and Media by the Assyrian conquerors of Samaria.  There was theological 
opposition between these northerners and the Jews of the South because of the Samaritan refusal to worship 
at Jerusalem.  This was aggravated by the fact that after the Babylonian exile the Samaritans had put 
obstacles in the way of the Jewish restoration of Jerusalem, and that in the 2nd century B.C. the Samaritans 
had helped the Syrian monarchs in their wars against the Jews.  In 128 B.C. the Jewish high priest burned 
the Samaritan temple on Gerizim.” Additionally, by the time of John’s writing, there existed a relatively 
new law, instituted in A.D. 65-66, that warned Jewish men against touching a Samaritan woman due to 
their being “menstruants from their cradle” (Ibid.).  Leviticus’ strict regulatory dictums regarding 
menstruation in 15:19-24 were already deeply ingrained into the customs of Jewish daily life, and served to 
heighten the scandal of Jesus’ sharing a cup of water with the Samaritan woman. 
90 “This is not a geographical necessity; for although the main route from Judea to Galilee was through 
Samaria, if Jesus was in the Jordan valley he could easily have gone north through the Bethshan gap, 
avoiding Samaria,” Ibid., 169. 
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into loving relationship with “the world” that takes him to Samaria.  It has also to do with 
the fact that Jesus reveals the God who simply enjoys being with the “wrong” kind of 
people.  If this Jesus is truly the incarnation of God, then the human categories obliterated 
by his presence and conversation with the Samaritan woman must have always been 
demonic powers in service to death.  Here we receive a glimpse the sovereign God who 
snubs the artificial and bureaucratic directives of human engineering and intentionally 
enters forbidden spaces to seek fellowship with forbidden people.  This is precisely the 
image of God Campbell evokes in his preaching.   
 The theological corollary in John 4 is Jesus’ movement toward Samaria as a sign 
of God’s condescension to humankind.  The Samarian woman did not earn Jesus’ favor, 
but was visited, interrupted even, by the Word of God.  The woman leaves her water jar 
and goes back to her city.  She tells the people, “Come and see a man who told me 
everything I have ever done!  He cannot be the Messiah, can he?” (vv. 28-29).  Jesus 
reveals her true identity in God.  She does not discover this on her own.  Her newfound 
understanding of herself is contingent upon God’s self-giving nature.  It is purely a gift 
that she now sees herself as part of a larger story in which God is revealed as no respecter 
of human difference.  God in Christ “looks in wonder” upon the fields and sees they are 
ripe for harvest (v. 35).  Jesus commends his own perceptive sight as a gift to be shared, 
because it is a kind of sight that deliberately interprets others for the purposes of entering 
into ever-deepening relationship with them.  Because God has looked in wonder upon us, 
we may now look in wonder upon our supposed enemies. 
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 “That is a scandal, and I don’t like it,” Campbell preached in a sermon to the 
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary—an institution under the authority of his original 
denominational community, the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC).91  “I want 
somebody to be left out.  I want somebody to be beyond the pale.”  The sermon makes 
the claim that “the least of these” in the Parable of the Sheep and the Goats (Mt. 25:31-
46) could range from disheveled street beggars to dapper pastors of rich churches.  No 
one is left out of the description “least.” 
Sometimes the least thing I can think of is church bureaucrats, presiding over 
their altar fires and tea parties, in the midst of suffering and death.  Big spires and 
steeples costing millions upon millions upon millions of dollars, casting their 
physical shadow, to say nothing of their spiritual life, upon slums and whores and 
addicts and drunks and thieves and rat-infested tenements, with the fingers and 
toes being gnawed off the young and the elderly.  Investments and holdings in 
agencies whose profits are made from instruments of death.  Could that be ‘the 
least of these?’  Well, if they are, then we have it on good authority that I relate 
to my Lord as I relate to them.92 
 
The scandal is not that we should be reconciled to manufacturers of scud missiles, or 
black civil rights organizers, or poor whites or Kluxers, but that we already are reconciled 
to them.  We are not reconciled to the structures of domination any of the “least of these” 
serve, but we are reconciled “to every last person within them.”93   
 Many visitors to Campbell’s log cabin in Mt. Juliet, Tennessee, report that they 
found him to be unwelcoming at first, or even rude or boorish.  Upon his poor reception 
to Campbell’s home, syndicated cartoonist Jules Feiffer, said, “I’m a proud man like 
anyone else.  I was insulted, and I was offended, and I wanted to get the hell out of 
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there.”94  He could come across to others as “distant,” or as having receded so far into his 
persona as a radical, bootleg Southern Baptist prophet that the “real” Will Campbell was 
said to be in hiding.  Wearing his signature cowboy boots and wide-brimmed, black, 
Amish hat, he was always “in character.”  But as journalist Lawrence Wright concluded 
in his biopic of Campbell,  
I realized I had gone as far as I could go with my guru. I had set out to see who 
he really was and whether I could accept his teachings. I had tried as much as 
possible to pry off his mask of authority and see the person inside - the flawed, 
insecure, fallible, often foolish person who was no better than I. And I had seen 
that person or at least caught a glimpse of him. He seemed to me like a deer I had 
once come upon in the woods, who had given me a brief, direct look, passing 
some piece of obscure intelligence between us, and then had fled into the cover. 
But I had seen him, nonetheless.95 
 
Nevertheless, the most astonishing quality of Will Campbell’s life and preaching 
stems from his ability to identify with everyone—blacks, whites, rich, poor, educated, 
and ignorant.  This includes the black member of the Nation of Islam as well as the red-
faced, cross-burning Kluxer, and even the Brooks Brothers-clad Wall Street executive.  
When someone else’s well-being was at stake, Campbell was not afraid to befriend 
anyone.  He pursued friendships with his enemies.96  Such pursuits mimic Jesus’ 
intentional intrusions into places the bureaucrats of the day had previously thought 
                                                
94 “God’s Will,” PBS Documentary, (quote begins at 50:10 min.).  Campbell called him “Mr. Pfizer,” and 
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impenetrable.  But Campbell cannot avoid embracing Klansmen.  He grew up among 
them.  He preached his first sermon at age 16 from a Bible given to his church by the 
local Grand Dragon of the KKK.  He once shared parts of their bigoted worldview.  He 
knows that though they can be extremely dangerous, they are still “little boys playing 
war—little boys for whom Christ also died—Raymond Crawford and Eldridge Cleaver.  
That’s the scandal of the gospel.”97  Thus, Campbell also mimics the woman in John, 
who comes from a reviled and excluded people, but who does not shy away from relating 
with a likely bigot at her well. 
 Jesus says to her, “Give me a drink.” (His disciples had gone to the city to buy 
food.)  The Samaritan woman replies, “How is it that you, a Jew, ask a drink of me, a 
woman of Samaria?  (For Jews do not share things in common with Samaritans” (vv. 7-
9).  This brief exchange discloses an enormous amount of information about the culture 
and customs to which both characters had been subjected by the principalities and 
powers.  But in this instance, it is the woman who provides the most telling evidence.  
She makes public a previously “hidden transcript.”98  She could have simply obliged 
Jesus with a drink.  But she speaks.  She has her say.  She “smarts off.”  She questions his 
intentions to his face.  As a woman alone with a man, she makes herself vulnerable to 
                                                
97 Campbell, Letter to McGeorge Bundy, then president of the Ford Foundation, requesting that racists be 
appreciated and included in conversation about legislation affecting the racial issues in the South, ibid., 56. 
98 James C. Scott, in Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1990), defines a “hidden transcript” as “a critique of power spoken behind the back of the 
dominant.”  It is the linguistic form of a “third realm of subordinate group politics...of disguise and 
anonymity that takes place in public view but is designed to have a double meaning or to shield the identity 
of the actors” (19).  “An individual who is affronted may develop a personal fantasy of revenge and 
confrontation, but when the insult is but a variant of affronts suffered systematically by a whole race, class, 
or strata, then the fantasy can become a collective cultural product.  Whatever form it assumes—offstage 
parody, dreams of violent revenge, millennial visions of a world turned upside down—this collective 
hidden transcript is essential to any dynamic view of power relations” (9). 
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attack if her words are ill-received.  Most of all, she “publishes” the previously unspoken 
truth about how their interaction is supposed to work, according to the direction of the 
powers.  The question, “How can you, a Jew, ask a drink of me, a woman of Samaria?” is 
loaded with each actor’s respective history, ethnicity, gender, and religious and political 
presuppositions.  She puts a question back to the one in the assumed position of authority, 
and, in so doing, assumes some authority for herself.  In this most explosive realm of 
politics, where one ruptures the “political ‘cordon sanitaire’ between the hidden and the 
public transcript,” the woman “obliterates the distinction by making the hitherto hidden 
transcript public.”99 
 Through identification with both black and white people, but especially with his 
own people, Will Campbell gains access to their respective hidden transcripts.  In his 
possession, they do not remain hidden for long.  In his speech to the Whitsitt Heritage 
Society, he tells stories of his childhood days in the Campbell family.  He wistfully relays 
anecdotes of the different views of race he came to know from his father, uncles, and 
grandparents.  Many of them were not bigots.  One of them, Uncle Jesse, who died later 
of a gunshot wound, never came back to their church after he watched the preacher thank 
the Grand Dragon of the local Klan chapter for presenting the church with a brand new, 
large pulpit Bible.  But he remembers all of them, from his racially hospitable family 
members to the local Klan members, as poor people attempting to do what was right as 
they understood it.  “And these are the people who have been double-crossed, betrayed, 
ignored, trampled on like so much chaff in this demonic fight [over control of the 
                                                
99 Ibid., 19.   
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Southern Baptist Convention in the 1980s].”100  These are the people the Convention 
forgot, as well as African-Americans, not only in the Southern Baptist “struggle for the 
soul of the Convention,” but in the many decades preceding the 1980s.  Where were the 
Southern Baptists (Campbell includes himself as culpable here) during the sixties and 
seventies, “when cities were burning, when black Americans were being gunned down 
for no greater crime than the color of their skin,” when women were not allowed to cast 
ballots in elections, when the United States was annihilating hundreds of thousands of 
Vietnamese, or even today in relation to gay and lesbian Christians and non-
Christians?101  He speaks as one of them, but also as one who comes from a people who 
would have been better off if the Convention had not participated in or acquiesced to 
multiple forms of oppression by principalities and powers.    
 Then he turns his attention to the latest culprits.  He calls out the current 
leadership of the SBC for their rejection of the kind of freedom that made possible his 
and others’ ordination to ministry. 
Are you listening, you who wreck schools of learning, who pass absurd 
resolutions, who place limitations on God Almighty as to what gender he can and 
can’t call to preach His gospel.  You don’t scare me, you ecclesiastical bullies, 
you blind guides who strain at a gnat and swallow a camel, who devour widows’ 
houses, who bind heavy burdens and lay them on the shoulders of the poor and 
lift not a hand, you who for a pretense make long prayers, you who compass sea 
and land to make one convert and when he is made make him twofold more the 
child of hell than yourselves.  Woe unto you!  Whited sepulchers outside; inside 
full of the bones of the dead, and of all uncleanness.  Are you listening to this old 
man?  THERE COMES A TIME!102 
 
                                                
100 Campbell and Goode, Writings, 149.   
101 Ibid., 145-146. 
102 Ibid., 150.   
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Here is a man who speaks for a people who have not been able to speak directly into the 
teeth of the powers.  He makes public the hidden transcript of the Convention’s 
participation in oppressive systems and structures.  The Convention was then, and had 
long been, a comfortable partner with the powers that squash the poor, the outcast, the 
prisoner, the sick, and the stranger, even despite their mission to evangelize the world.   
 But this is not the last word.  Campbell, too, has been caught up in the 
institutional dramas.  Now he can only “leave to the One so mysterious, so elusive and 
evasive, so hidden as to say to Moses from a burning bush, I AM WHO I AM, to be the 
sole judge.  I can only exult that grace abounds.”103  The sermon moves from the 
eviscerating “law” language of the publicized transcript—the bad news—to the gospel 
language of abounding grace.  To be sure, the former consumes more time than the latter, 
but both are present.  The bad news, which only an insider like Campbell could have 
proclaimed, fades in light of the good news.  This is part of Campbell’s preaching 
persona, and another example of what it looks like to engage the principalities and 
powers with “mere” words.  It is a raucous example, but it is nevertheless a peacemaking 
mode of speech.  The gospel Campbell preaches proceeds from his consubstantial 
identity with Southerners—both black and white—thereby scrambling the racial 
categories sanctioned by the principalities and powers.  His proclamation introduces 
previously unthinkable possibilities for fellowship, where people who have long looked 
at each another with hatred and suspicion might finally see one another in a new light. 
 
                                                
103 Ibid., 151. 
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4.4  CAMPBELL AS PROPHETIC PREACHER 
 Campbell’s legacy remains largely “iconoclastic,” to the extent that many pastoral 
preachers keep him at a safe distance.  His fellow Baptists enjoy regaling one another 
with “Will Campbell” stories, and many of them might wish they could just once say to 
their congregations what Campbell was prone to say everywhere he preached.  But 
Campbell’s message is difficult, and his example is hard to follow.  His character may 
often be imitated, but never duplicated.  Preachers interested in long-term employment by 
their congregations might rather leave Campbell’s message alone, even though they 
might occasionally enjoy sharing bits and pieces of Campbell’s wisdom in the pulpit, 
savor his award-winning books, or nostalgically quote his maxims about bastards.  But 
after Campbell’s death on June 3, 2013, is this all we have left of him—enduring 
literature, entertaining stories, and dated journals?  Is the legacy of his witness so directly 
tied to the Civil Rights Movement that he is, for all practical purposes, irrelevant for the 
ongoing practice of Christian preaching? 
 We must answer with a resounding “no.”  The church would be wise to keep his 
books in print, and to remember his name and his contributions to civil rights, but it will 
be even more important for the church to preserve the wisdom of his preaching.  
Campbell’s fundamental understanding of himself was that he was called to be a 
preacher.  That he had “a call but no steeple” should not disqualify his contributions from 
being shared by pastors everywhere who preach to the same congregation week after 
week.  Certainly, Campbell’s style could be abrasive, even scandalous at times.  He could 
visit a church, preach a strident sermon, and leave the resident pastor to deal with the 
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consequences.  His style won him the title of “Radical Prophet.”  But the trouble with that 
description is that it gives preachers permission to disregard him.  If he is a “prophet” in 
the popular sense of the word, it is easier to place him on a pedestal so he can no longer 
reach us.  I hope to show that Campbell performed certain aspects of biblical prophecy in 
ways we should view as being practicable for all preachers.  I will focus specifically on 
Jeremiah to explore three of these aspects:  1) dangerous memory, 2) lament, and 3) love 
of enemies. 
Why focus on Jeremiah?  Because he epitomizes certain characteristics of the 
preaching life that need further exploration and elucidation for the church’s sake in this 
violent and technological age.  He knows what is going on and who is being sacrificed, 
and he tells people the truth.  His language is raw, mercurial, even profligate at times.  
With little regard for half-truths and social graces, he interrupts the carefully measured, 
official accounts of the king’s court.104  His witness to the leaders in Jerusalem cuts to the 
heart.  His critiques invite such swift retribution because they are so devastating to the 
carefully woven, royal narrative.  Also, more than any other prophet, Jeremiah comes as 
close as one can to complete despair without losing all hope.  He is not “speaking truth to 
power” as much as he is punching through the delicately gilded, official account of 
reality with persistent lamentations.  Perhaps most importantly of all, he intentionally 
                                                
104 I use the phrase “king’s court” in relation to Walter Brueggemann’s analysis of the “royal 
consciousness.”  The royal “program,” as he describes it, is “fed by a management mentality that believes 
there are no mysteries to honor, only problems to be solved ”; “legitimated by an ‘official religion of 
optimism,’ which believes God has no business other than to maintain our standard of living, ensuring his 
own place in his palace”; and “requires the annulment of the neighbor as life-giver in our history; it 
imagines that we can live outside history as self-made men and women.”  See Brueggemann, The Prophetic 
Imagination, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001) 37. 
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disrupts all royal conceptions of the enemy.  Jeremiah entrusts his enemies to God’s care.  
Violent human retribution is not an option.   
 The first aspect of Jeremiah’s prophetic mission is his dangerous memory.105  
Such memory informs his chastisement of the leaders of Judah for doing evil.  They have 
turned from God in order to worship false gods.  At the heart of their wickedness is an 
enduring and powerful lie, spoken earlier in ch. 8:11, that there is “peace, peace.”  In 
reality, there is no peace, but impending violence.  Babylon’s war horses are snorting in 
the distance.  Judah’s destruction is imminent.  But the lie lives, and is perpetuated by 
what Jeremiah calls “the false pen of the scribes” (8:8).   The scribes have flipped the 
tradition of their ancestors upside down, rigging language in service to their own power 
and affluence.  By the power of the pen, and the power of persuasive speech, the scribes, 
chief priests, and kings have diluted the word of God, and saturated the people with 
falsehoods.   
 They have convinced the Judeans that it is a blessed thing to build high places 
whereupon they may sacrifice their own flesh and blood.  More specifically, they have 
sanctioned the sacrificing of children.  The word of the LORD in Jeremiah 7:31 (and 19:5) 
says:  they “burn their sons and their daughters in the fire, which I did not command.”  
Not only did the LORD not command it, but, the LORD says, “nor did it come into my 
                                                
105 I borrow this phrase from Sharon D. Welch, A Feminist Ethic of Risk, revised ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2000).  It is the memory the oppressed use to remember that they are a people “of dignity and self-
respect who were violated” (63).  But it is also a memory of victory, or “the sense that they are worth more 
than their [oppressors] realize” (ibid.).  Those with “dangerous memories” are able to see the oppression of 
both past and present.  “They are continuously aware of the horrors of the past and the suffering of the 
present.  They do not forget the soul-and-body-destroying effects of exploitation” (61).  In this case, Welch 
refers to the oppression of black slaves, while Campbell applies it to both blacks and poor whites.   
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mind.”  The inhabitants of Jerusalem, those whom the LORD brought up out of Egypt, 
who were saved from Pharaoh’s iron fist, have not only broken God’s heart but 
continually trampled it.  They manufactured something so horrible that it could only be 
generated outside God’s own imagination, and they turned it into a cornerstone of 
religious observance.  This gruesome aberration could not have come to pass apart from 
the “false pen of the scribes.”  I suggest this “false pen” is a corollary to propaganda,  as 
it represents the means by which those in positions of authority use language, images, and 
symbols to consolidate and perpetuate their power through systematic deception and 
violence.  
 Campbell has a “dangerous memory.”  He uses it to disrupt official versions of 
reality, for example, by dismantling the myth that racism is a problem exclusive to the 
South.  Like a modern-day Jeremiah, Campbell knows what is going on in the history of 
the principalities and powers of racism.  He traces this history in the sermon at Riverside 
Church, noting how many of the more obvious racial problems (lunch counters, voting 
booths, water fountains) now take on subtler, often hidden forms.  He anticipates people’s 
deceptive responses to the problem of race in the North, shrewdly proclaims that the 
gospel is ready and waiting to be practiced by liberal, upper class New Yorkers as much 
as it is Kluxers.  In fact, Campbell more than insinuates the Ku Klux Klan as a 
principality in the South is far less dangerous than the institutions in the North that have 
created the environment for the Klan’s repeated resurgence.   
When we see case after case of what we call resurgence of the Klan going hand 
in hand with the intelligence community.  What’s going on here?  Is what we’re 
doing organizing hate groups so we can watch them and report on them and get 
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award-winning series and prizes?  And if so, for what purpose?  I’ll tell you for 
what purpose.  To keep black people and poor white people hating each other.  
To keep black people as “niggers,” and poor white people as “rednecks.”  And if 
you don’t know it, I’ll tell you; those two words mean the same thing...I’m 
getting about as tired of [‘redneck’] as black people got of that word.  Because I 
know what’s going on.  The two words mean the same thing.106 
 
Campbell fearlessly reintroduces suppressed memories, resurrecting their power to cut 
people to the heart.  When preachers unleash such dangerous memories, they point to 
God’s terrible freedom to know us completely— both our past and our present—and to 
lighten our darkness. 
 The second prophetic aspect Campbell and Jeremiah share is the practice of 
lament.  Jeremiah’s lamenting is inseparable from the truth he tells.  He grieves for 
Jerusalem.  But he also grieves God’s treatment of him.  “Oh LORD, you have enticed me, 
and I was enticed; you have overpowered me, and you have prevailed” (Jer. 20:7).  The 
word rendered “entice” sometimes has sexual connotations, such that one could 
conceivably argue that Jeremiah is accusing God of rape.  It is a visceral lament.  He is 
accusing God of taking advantage of him for no reason.  In a moment of utter despair, he 
curses his own birth.  “Cursed be the day on which I was born!  The day when my mother 
bore me, let it not be blessed!” (20:14).  We can hardly imagine a more anguished lament 
than wishing aloud to God, not that you were dead, but that you had never been born. 
 As Ellen Davis has argued, this kind of lament, which is not foreign to the Psalms, 
has a way of “marking the trail into despair in God’s plain sight, so that God can follow 
                                                
106 Campbell and Goode, Writings, 172-173. 
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‘to the bottom of the night’ the one who is crying out in anguish.”107  She says this in 
light of Wendell Berry’s comment: 
The distinguishing characteristic of absolute despair is silence.  There is a world 
of difference between the person who, believing that there is no use, says so to 
himself or to no one, and the person who says it aloud to someone else.  A person 
who marks his trail into despair remembers hope—and thus has hope, even if 
only a little.108  
 
 To lament in such a way, and especially to do so within earshot of those duped by 
the false pen, has a destructive effect on official narratives.  It creates cracks in their 
façade through which newness of life may sprout and grow to create further, deeper 
cracks, until what was once thought to be impenetrable lies in pieces on the ground.  As 
Brueggemann writes, “The riddle and insight of biblical faith is the awareness that only 
anguish leads to life, only grieving leads to joy, and only embraced endings permit new 
beginnings.”109  
 In Luke 22:25, Jesus says to his disciples, "The kings of the Gentiles lord it over 
them; and those who exercise authority over them call themselves benefactors.  But not 
so with you.”  Principalities and powers insist that they are beneficial to the common 
good.  They are ever the optimists.  But the power of Jeremiah’s lament lies in its 
exposure of the false narratives of optimism, affluence, and beneficence, by which the 
rulers and authorities proclaim their concern for the people’s welfare and prosperity.  
Jeremiah’s tears leave hard evidence that all is not well.  His weeping is what 
                                                
107. Ellen Davis, Wondrous Depth: Preaching the Old Testament (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 
2005) 25. 
108. Wendell Berry, What Are People For? 2nd ed. (Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint, 1990, 2010), quoted in 
Davis, Wondrous Depth, 25. 
109. Brueggemann, Prophetic Imagination, 56. 
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Brueggemann calls “a radical criticism, a fearful dismantling because it means the end of 
all machismo; weeping is something kings rarely do without losing their thrones.  Yet the 
loss of thrones is precisely what is called for in radical criticism.”110 
 In a sermon at a liturgical conference,111 Will Campbell preaches a homily he 
hopes will be a lamentation for those blacks killed in racial violence, as well as a song of 
reconciliation with “our brothers in the Ku Klux Klan.”  It is a most somber reflection on 
racial divisions in the churches and other institutions across the United States.  He quotes 
a poem by Josh White, 
Southern trees bear a strange fruit 
Blood on the leaves and blood at the root 
Black body swinging in the Southern breeze 
Strange fruit hanging from the poplar trees 
 
 Throughout the sermon, Campbell is notably more reserved than usual.  He 
speaks in lamentations and in prayers, as though that is all he can do, but also because he 
knows that such speech is a form of hope.  Campbell seems to depend here on 
lamentations as cries to God that have hope at their core.  That they are complaints 
directed to God is the indication that Campbell’s lamentations are essentially hopeful.  
Despite the sadness he has, he still hopes enough to assume God listens to the word he 
proclaims in the presence of the congregation, which in turn may bring the congregation 
as a lamenting gathering into the presence of God.  Because of the sin of racism, and their 
guilt by association, they are dying. 
                                                
110. Ibid., 57. 
111 “Homily to a Liturgical Conference,” from an undated manuscript of the Will Campbell Papers, 
University of Southern Mississippi, published in Campbell and Goode, Writings, 33-36. 
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Yes, let the homily be a lamentation for the dying, for us the sick and dying.  And 
let it begin right here for these gathered, these of the Holy Mother Church of us 
all.  For it was religion, Christian religion, more than Caesar, that has killed our 
black brother.  Let the homily be the casting out of demons.  The power of 
exorcism is not mine.112 
 
 Campbell depends on the weakness of the word because of his trust in the 
sovereignty of God.113  We submit to the power of God, who has already accomplished 
the revolution of the kingdom of God once and for all.   “And we revolutionists, do we 
think we will win?  No, we will not win.  But that is our sad vocation.  That is our holy 
call.  Not to stage a revolution, but to be a revolution already staged.”114 
The third prophetic aspect Jeremiah and Campbell share is love of enemies.  Part of any 
journey toward reconciliation is the relinquishment of one’s enemies to God’s care.  
Jeremiah gives up control of his enemies to God.  The powers concoct narratives about 
who the enemies are in order to confirm their order as righteous.  There must be an 
enemy, and the enemy must be in the form of flesh and blood.  Once the enemy has been 
                                                
112 Ibid., 35.  
113 In Powers, Weakness, and the Tabernacling of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), Marva Dawn 
proposes that Christians should actually pursue weakness instead of ordinary power.  Following the 
exegetical studies of R. C. H. Lenski, Dawn contends that 2 Corinthians 12:9 should not read, “My grace is 
sufficient for you, for my strength is made perfect in weakness,” but, “for the power is brought to its finish 
in weakness” (37, emphasis added).  Dawn believes our reliance on power negates the possibility of God’s 
presence, and thereby prohibits our participation in God’s work in the church and world.  “Just as powers 
overstep their bounds and become gods, so our power becomes a rival to God.  As the Psalms and Isaiah 
teach us, God’s way is not to take us out of tribulations, but to comfort us in the midst of them and to 
‘exchange’ our strength in the face of them” (47).  Lest we fall into the trap of thinking this is easy, Dawn 
reminds us that the tabernacling God, the God who dwells where we relinquish our power, is a fearful God.  
We cannot be cavalier about God’s presence, because it is the presence of God that transforms us.  It is the 
tabernacling God who subjects us to the pain we associate with God’s delivering us from ourselves.  Dawn 
says one of images of this kind of weakness is subjection to “the sword of the Spirit, the Word of God” as 
characterized by the weakness of Jesus (156).  The Word Jesus is the weak Jesus, who exchanged political 
expediency and effectiveness for the grueling work of the cross. 
114 Campbell and Goode, Writings, 36. 
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identified, the powers may use the threat of violence as a means of manipulation.115  
Without enemies to rely on, the powers have little power to persuade.  In order to rouse 
the masses to action, there must be an orienting adversary, a fear-inducing point of focus 
for the people’s attention.  Jeremiah does not fall into the trap.  He urges cooperation with 
the Babylonians.  But the kings of Judah go their own way.  They are puffed up.  They 
are mad for war.  They believe they can outmaneuver the most powerful empire of their 
day. 
 Jeremiah’s relationship to enemies is all encompassing.  “Give heed to me, O 
LORD, and listen to what my enemies say!” says Jeremiah (18:19).  He proceeds to 
describe the details of Judah’s impending destruction.  However, Jeremiah understands 
the business of dealing with enemies to be God’s business.  In his despair, he asks God 
not to forgive their sin, and implores God to deal with them while God is angry.  
Nevertheless, even in the midst of Jeremiah’s jeremiad, he relinquishes vengeance to 
God.  He compares God to a “dread warrior” who is with him.  He asks God to allow him 
to see God’s retribution upon his adversaries.  Even in Jeremiah’s anger and despair, 
when it would seem fitting to encourage a violent response to a violent system, he instead 
places himself in God’s hands.  By imploring the leaders of Judah to pursue cooperation 
                                                
115 Nazi Reichsmarshall, Hermann Goering, once said to American intelligence officer, Gustave Gilbert, in 
a conversation in Goering’s cell during the Easter break of the Nuremberg Trials, “Naturally the common 
people don't want war:  Neither in Russia, nor in England, nor for that matter in Germany. That is 
understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always 
a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy, or a fascist dictatorship, or a 
parliament, or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to 
the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, 
and denounce the peacemakers for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works 
the same in any country.”  See G. M. Gilbert, Nuremberg Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus, and 
Company, 1947) 278-279. 
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with the Babylonians, he epitomizes in his own person a relationship of exchange and 
embrace with enemies.  Jeremiah knows God is the primary agent of redemption, and that 
human beings may only participate in God’s mission.  Jeremiah anticipates God’s 
reconciling prerogative with the enemies of Judah, and with his adversaries in the house 
of the Lord.  By doing so, he models the way prophetic language may disrupt the false 
pen of the violent, who feverishly work not only to create enemies out of thin air, but to 
convince the people they can defeat their enemies by violent means.   
 By now we have seen the way Campbell’s understanding of reconciliation 
permeates his work, and the broad consequences of this understanding for loving 
enemies.  His ministry to the Klan serves as the most obvious indicator of his refusal to 
abide by cultural norms for the naming of enemies.  Klansmen were not his enemies.  
Neither were the Black Panthers, the Vietcong, Saddam Hussein, or Al-Qaeda.  In year 
two of the second Iraq War, Campbell sermonized in The [Nashville] Tennessean,  
We’ve been lied to and driven into a war of aggression by the leaders of our own 
government, who justify their actions with slogans.  ‘Destroy their weapons of 
mass destruction.’  Not ours, but theirs.  ‘Destroy the regime of this vicious 
dictator.’  Not just any dictator but this particular one…Young men and women 
with serial numbers are doing the bloody deeds their commander-in-chief sent 
them to do, at the risk of their lives and the lives of the invaded, evil and innocent 
alike.  Such a waste!  How in the name of God can this be justified?116 
 
Like Jeremiah, Campbell refused violence as a means of enacting the will of God.  
Campbell did, however, confess, “I am not a pacifist; I am not a non-pacifist.”117  He was 
suspicious of these terms because they were too imprecise to capture the nature of Jesus 
                                                
116 Campbell and Goode, Crashing the Idols, 63.  Originally published as “Nashville Eye,” The Tennessean 
(2 September 2004). 
117 Ibid., 6. 
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Christ’s ministry, particularly with regard to his cleansing of the temple.  He rejected the 
common interpretation of Jesus’ cleansing the temple as a certificate of approval for 
committing violent acts.  “It is a long way for sure from a leather strap to chase chicken 
peddlers out of the church house to dropping forty thousand tons of bombs on a tragic 
little country on His birthday.”118  In an epistemological and practical way, Campbell 
believed human beings could not be enemies of one another.  Here Campbell doubles 
down on the conclusion from chapter 1—that Christians cannot be enemies of one 
another—and extends that thesis to include all people.  For him, God has reconciled 
humanity on the cross.  The enemies are no longer flesh and blood, but principalities and 
powers.  Racism, materialism, and militarism are the enemies, as well as patriotism, 
which “is immoral.  Flying a national flag—any national flag—in a church house is a 
symbol of idolatry.  Singing ‘God Bless America’ in a Christian service is blasphemy…it 
is a violation of the First Commandment.”119   
We can summarize Campbell’s prophetic vision in his preaching and writing, 
indeed in every aspect of his life, by saying he never saw anything more astonishing than 
a human face.  For him, every human being reflected the image of a God who will 
ultimately have the last word about humanity.  “What can be said of us, whatever our 
race or class, except that we and all our fortunes and destinies belong to him?  And this is 
enough to know.”120 
 
                                                
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid., 56. 
120 Ibid., 120. 
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4.5  CONCLUSION 
One of the risks of drawing from Campbell’s theology for homiletical insights 
certainly has to do with the fact that Campbell believes all institutions, including—or 
especially—ecclesial ones, are evil.  More unsettling still is Campbell’s opinion about the 
very act of preaching:  “What you say up there in the pulpit, that’s probably the poorest 
way to communicate with a congregation.”  Yet, Campbell was a preacher who preached 
often, and whose own life was made possible by one of the very institutions against 
which he so piquantly testifies—the church.  His iconoclastic legacy profoundly enriches 
not only the Baptist heritage, and not only the story of an entire nation’s struggle with the 
sin of racism, but also the theological framework for preaching at a time when the 
church’s words seem to have reached the point of exhaustion.  Campbell points us to the 
God of Jesus Christ, who “had to go through Samaria” (4:4), not because it is the quickest 
path between Judea and Galilee, but because it is the only way to get from where we are 
to where God has already called us to be.  “The revolution is accomplished.  It is over.  It 
is finished.  The truce was signed on a jagged tree.  O when will we ever learn?”121 
                                                
121 Campbell and Goode, Writings, 36. 
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CHAPTER 5:  SEEKING THE PEACE OF THE CITY 
It is [Mayor] Jim Melvin!  It is the Councilmen’s class!  And so we declare war 
against them!  War! 
  
NELSON JOHNSON, MOMENTS AFTER 
THE ‘GREENSBORO MASSACRE’ 
NOVEMBER 3, 1979 
 
In my view there can be no quality reconciliation unless it is built on a 
reasonable foundation of truth.  Truth is more than a few facts.  At the deepest level truth 
is love.   
  
REV. NELSON JOHNSON, TESTIFYING BEFORE THE GREENSBORO TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION AUGUST 26, 2005 
  
On November 3, 1979, just after the fog lifted on an unusually warm fall morning 
in the “sleepy little mill-town”1 of Greensboro, North Carolina, a caravan of Ku Klux 
Klansmen (KKK) and American Nazis interrupted the beginning of an anti-Klan rally 
organized by the Communist Workers Party2 (CWP).  As the Klansmen and Nazis cruised 
by those gathering for the parade, the groups exchanged harsh words.3  Seconds later, a 
Klansman from the lead car fired a warning shot, inciting a brawl with fisticuffs and 
picketing sticks.  Some Klansmen near the rear of the caravan exited their vehicles, 
retrieved guns from an arsenal in their trunk, and began firing on the demonstrators.  
                                                
1 Lisa Magarrell and Joya Wesley, quoting Walter Cronkite’s description of Greensboro in his news report 
on the Massacre on the evening of November 3, in Learning from Greensboro:  Truth and Reconciliation 
in the United States (Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008) 3. 
2 The Communist Worker’s Party, originally known as the Workers Viewpoint Organization (WVO), was 
officially founded in 1979 just days after the Greensboro Massacre as a movement to promote the Marxist 
philosophies of Mao Zedong and others.  Its particular emphases were on labor organizing and civil rights 
for African-Americans.  At the height of its activity, the CWP had small branches in major cities across the 
United States.  Its leadership voted to dissolve in 1985 to form what was then called the New Democratic 
Movement. 
3 Klansmen yelled racial epithets, including the phrases, “Show me a nigger with guts and I’ll show you a 
Klansman with a gun!” and “Shoot the niggers!” while CWP rally participants chanted, “Death to the Klan!  
Death to the Klan!”  See Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report:  Final Report, 
Presented to the residents of Greensboro, the City, the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Project and 
other public bodies, 25 May 2006, 280. 
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Eighty-eight horrifying seconds later, five members of the CWP lay dead or dying at the 
intersection of Everitt and Carver4 Streets; ten more were wounded.  By the time the 
Greensboro Police descended on the scene, it was too late.  A storm of hatred, bigotry, 
and violence had torn the roof off of a city where the Civil Rights Movement had gained 
traction at a Woolworth’s department store only nineteen years earlier.5  Tensions 
escalated the following year after an all-white jury acquitted the killers—a stunning 
verdict considering that camera crews from four area television stations captured much of 
the chaos and carnage on film.6  The ghastly events of November 3rd continue to haunt 
this community three and a half decades later, even in the wake of unprecedented 
reconciling efforts by the first Truth and Reconciliation Commission on American soil.    
It would be more than twenty years before a determined group of victims, 
witnesses, and other sympathetic citizens pushed for the development of a local truth and 
reconciliation process concerning the events of that November day.  The Greensboro 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (GTRC) grew from their efforts, formally 
commencing in 2004, and submitting their final report in 2006.  Despite being 
painstakingly constructed over the course of two years, with significant support from 
                                                
4 Carver Street has since been renamed Bingham Street. 
5 Greensboro, twice named an “All-American City” (1966, 1991), has long promoted itself as a comfortable, 
middle-class city with a reputation for forward thinking.  It was once a hub of abolitionist fervor in the 
antebellum South, and an important station along the Underground Railroad.  As well, it was and still 
remains uniquely inclusive of Jewish and Quaker communities.  It is home to over half a dozen schools of 
higher learning, including the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, North Carolina Agricultural and 
Technical State University, Guilford College (Quaker), Bennett College, and Greensboro College. 
6 See North Carolina State v. Jack Fowler et. al. (Superior Court:  Guilford County, NC, 1980). This was 
the first of three trials.  An additional Federal trial (United States v. Virgil Griffin et. al. [United States 
District Court, 1983]) reached the same verdict.  A civil trial (James Waller et. al. v. Bernard Butkovich et. 
al. [United States District Court, 1984]) later awarded meager damages to a spouse of one of the victims, 
but there was no admission of guilt by the original perpetrators, police or other authorities, and local media 
continued to portray the victims as Communist agitators who largely deserved their fate. 
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local citizens and national and international leaders, such as Desmond Tutu, Peter Storey, 
and Bongani Finca, some of the committee’s most crucial—albeit legally non-binding—
recommendations have gone ignored by city leaders.  Nevertheless, the process has made 
reconciliation possible by interrupting and exposing the fabricated, official rhetoric about 
the event, enabling victims and perpetrators to tell their stories without fear of legal 
reprisal, and giving a divided city a foretaste of redemption that had previously been 
unimaginable.  In several instances regarding personal relationships of those directly 
involved in the massacre, former enemies apologized to one another, hard hearts were 
softened, and new friendships emerged.  The past eight years have shown that the seeds 
of peace the GTRC planted are only beginning to sprout. 
 There remains a great deal of interest in the Greensboro Massacre and GTRC.  
Several engaging and academically rigorous books have been written about both events, 
in addition to articles, award-winning documentaries, and artistic responses such as a 
theater production in Princeton, New Jersey.7  Yet, from a forensic perspective, it seems 
as if there is nothing new to say about Greensboro.  Every possible angle of evidence 
concerning the massacre and the Commission’s work has been analyzed down to the nub 
by interested parties, from survivors to trial lawyers, interested citizens, and even more 
objective scholars peering in from the outside.  On the other hand, the contributions of 
faith communities in the aftermath of the Massacre, and to the efforts of the GTRC, have 
largely been overlooked from a theological perspective.  From the massacre’s immediate 
aftermath to the present, preachers have been among the most effective leaders working 
                                                
7 Magarrell and Wesley, 3. 
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underneath a citywide pall of distrust to seek the truth, bridge divides, and encourage 
healing.  It is important to consider how their contributions stimulated these historic 
efforts at reconciliation. 
The unique offering of this chapter will be to discuss Greensboro from a 
theological perspective, and, more specifically, to consider how preachers proclaimed 
reconciliation in sermons and other addresses as they partnered with the GTRC.  I will 
begin by framing Greensboro’s story with the terminologies of theologian Douglas John 
Hall and historian William Chafe in order to present the very complex context in which 
my selected preachers spoke in Greensboro.  Following these preliminary descriptions, I 
will analyze manuscripts, transcripts, and testimonies from some of the most notable 
pastors involved in the massacre and the GTRC’s efforts.  Throughout the chapter, I will 
present the voices of preachers and other local participants in order to guide and enrich 
the discussion.  It will be my overall intention to show not only that pastors fostered 
reconciliation in a city divided by race, class, and lethal violence, but also that they 
continue to serve as models for preaching reconciliation in a variety of contexts where the 
dividing walls of hostility seem thus far to be impenetrable.   
  
5.1  LIGHTEN OUR DARKNESS 
Douglas John Hall might phrase it this way:  “Reconciling preachers lighten our 
darkness.”  His seminal book, Lighten Our Darkness, was published only a few years 
before the Greensboro massacre, and its revised edition was published in 2001, the same 
year the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Community Project (GTRCP) was 
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established.8  The book remains a relevant guide for framing Greensboro’s plight as a 
community where the dialogue between “expectation and experience” had become toxic 
enough to create the ecology for such an explosive confrontation. 
The function of expectation is to deliver us from bondage to the past.  When 
expectation ceases, there occurs what is called, according to the better 
understanding of it, death.  The function of experience is to keep us tied to the 
life of the body, to history.  When experience ceases to make itself heard in the 
dialogue, the consequence is illusion.  Human life is thus a perilous journey 
between death and illusion.  Few are able to reach the end of the journey before 
they capitulate to one or the other peril.  Most people, before their time runs out, 
are acquainted with both.9 
  
Where expectations persistently diverge from experience, communities become 
increasingly vulnerable to a “state of contradiction.”10  In Greensboro’s case, the 
experience of blacks and working poor citizens severely contradicted the white 
establishment’s hypocritical narrative that asserted the sanctity of free-market capitalism, 
and advertised the possibility of a comfortable, middle class lifestyle, while also 
concealing their duplicitous strategies to preserve the legacy of Jim Crow legislation.  To 
be sure, the Communist Workers Party naively and recklessly engaged the Klan—
historically the most violent organization in the South.  Yet, the CWP did not rise ex 
nihilo, but in reaction to the contradiction between the myth of the American Dream and 
their collective American experience.  CWP leaders were not “spies,” as some alleged 
them to be.  They were impassioned young doctors and civil rights activists who 
                                                
8 The GTCRP was the organization that formed a National Advisory Committee (NAC) to study the 
possibility of forming a truth and reconciliation commission.  The NAC then created the Local Task Force, 
which would eventually nominate members of, and organize a broad coalition of support for, the 
Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
9 Douglas John Hall, Lighten Our Darkness:  Towards an Indigenous Theology of the Cross, revised ed. 
(Lima, Ohio:  Academic Renewal Press, 2001) xxv. 
10 Ibid., xxviii ff. 
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idealized communism because it seemed the only alternative to the revolutionary force of 
capitalism.  Among those dead or injured on November 3 were men and women who, as 
Duke University medical students, had rejected the pursuit of wealth to organize health 
clinics and hospitals in some of the most neglected neighborhoods in Durham, NC.  CWP 
leader, Nelson Johnson, who was arrested for “inciting a riot” as he raged at the police as 
his friends lay dead around him—and who was jailed with a bond over twice the amount 
($115,000) of the highest bonded Klansmen charged with murder ($50,000)—had 
worked tirelessly as an advocate for poor blacks in Greensboro for over a decade. 
From a Christian perspective, what the CWP did not grasp was that Marxism’s 
fatal flaw compounded the same problems they fought through their activism.  As Hall 
described in 1976, and again in 2001, Marxism failed in its attempt to eliminate or 
neutralize experience. 
That is, [Marxism] denies that there is in human experience any essential 
predisposition to question great expectations, such as the ideals expressed in 
communist doctrine.  It rejects the contention that exposure to the abyss of 
nothingness belongs to the human condition.11 
  
In other words, Marxism ignored one of Christianity’s most central teachings, the 
doctrine of sin, which declares that humanity is doomed apart from God’s saving mission 
in the person and work of Jesus Christ.  Human beings are so hopelessly mired in sin that  
only the grace of God—not an ideology—can save them. 
Marxism’s mirror ideology, existentialism, indulges only the most immediate 
realities of experience in ways that eliminate expectation.   
                                                
11 Ibid., xxxvii. 
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Existentialism rejects the vision of the individual person as the conscious center 
of a significance that transcends and precedes our existence.  At its most 
influential, existentialism insists that what has been called ‘essential’ being is a 
construct superimposed on the raw stuff of existence in order to make it 
bearable.12 
  
The existentialism Hall describes comes to its fullest expression in the American South in 
the white establishment’s rejection of the truth about its own brutal history, its ruthless 
domination of human beings, its ravenous destruction of the land, and its domestication 
of sin as mere “immorality.”  Such existentialism affects the church by reducing its 
central theological claims to demonstrations of sentimentality.  The gospel is then tamed 
to serve the powers of domination and oppression. 
Hall uses the phrase, “lighten our darkness,” in two ways en route to a theological 
solution to the false optimism of Marxism and existentialism and their approximate roads 
to perdition.  The first is that the light of truth will lead us into our darkness.  “For it is 
known that only as we become accustomed to the night, the deepening gloom, are we 
able to see the light that is specifically light for this darkness.”13  Secondly, “the beautiful 
prayer, ‘Lighten our darkness,’ means, at the same time, ‘show us the darkness that is 
really our habitat’ and ‘give us light enough for moving about in that darkness.’”14  With 
these two perspectives in mind, Hall invites to look not for “meaning beyond our 
suffering, but in it—in the midst of failure, a way; in the midst of darkness, a light; in the 
midst of despair, hope.”15   He implores the church to engage the particular darkness of 
the contemporary context in which it orders its life and work, not to run away from the 
                                                
12 Ibid., xxxvi. 
13 Ibid., 227. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 241. 
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darkness, or pretend it is not a mortal threat.  Only authentic pursuits of the truth will 
disclose the way to a cruciform theology of hope.  As Hall says, 
The only hope that would be pertinent to our condition and responsible, within 
the context of the contemporary world, would be one that was born out of an 
encounter with the despair implicit in and emanating from our own way of life.16 
 
Such an “indigenous theology of the cross” of Christ will give up the profane 
madness that has saturated so much of the contemporary church’s activity in its quest for 
survival.  Hall believes the church’s time for pursuing these self-preserving measures has 
long passed, if it ever was a legitimate concern.  Now is the time for the church of Jesus 
Christ to “perform a service for humankind that is worthy of the power and majesty of its 
Lord.”17  Bourgeois culture lacks the ecology to perform this service.  Rather, putting trust 
in the crucified Jesus at the most personal, concrete level  
means the willingness of the people of the cross to give evidence that, in their 
words as in their deeds, they are people whose faith lives only in company with 
unfaith, whose hope is a dialogue with doubt, whose sense of meaning comes out 
of an ever-renewed confrontation with the data of despair and meaninglessness.18 
  
Hall’s theory parallels the practices of preachers who partnered with the GTRC to 
seek the peace of their city.  Knowing that “the day of the Lord is darkness and not light,” 
they set their minds and hearts on seeking the truth in ways that could prepare the ground 
for reconciliation.  The challenge that lay before them was to lighten the darkness by first 
naming the darkness.  And, as Hall reveals, naming the darkness of racial and economic 
oppression is comparable to witnessing to the light.  “Is it so different if one bears 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 156. 
18 Ibid., 255. 
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witness to the darkness than if one bears witness to the light? …To know the darkness 
and to name it, then, would be the special task of the people of the cross in this society.”19 
 
5.2  DESCENT INTO DARKNESS 
 William Chafe has offered the most perceptive historical analysis of 20th century 
racial and economic relations in Greensboro before November 3, 1979.  He describes the 
city’s story as a complex blend of “civilities and civil rights.”20  “Civilities” describes the 
thin veneer of polite relationships along the spectrum of race and class that masks the 
white structure’s strategic efforts to maintain their hold on power.  “Civil rights” names 
the ongoing struggle toward freedom by blacks and others who place organized pressure 
on the powers of domination and oppression.  From as early as Greensboro’s rise as a 
prosperous industrial and professional “New South” city in the late 19th century, the 
white upper class worked shrewdly to displace and oppress local blacks both 
economically and politically.  Upper class whites made sure Greensboro’s economic 
“ascendancy produced stark economic divisions,”21 even though politically, “a new 
system of paternalism had emerged, with members of the white elite ready to assist those 
                                                
19 Ibid., 255-56, original emphasis. 
20 William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights:  Greensboro, North Carolina, and the Black Struggle for 
Freedom (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1980).  Despite the publication date being after November 
3, 1979, the book was completed before the massacre occurred.  To read it now gives one a haunting sense 
of its relevancy at the time of its publication, and continues to serve as a penetrating source for interpreting 
the inner-workings of Greensboro’s community infrastructure.  Many of those interviewed for this book are 
still living, and several were central participants in the work of the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. 
21 Ibid., 19.   
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blacks willing to accommodate to white interests.”22  This new system of white 
paternalism became increasingly ensconced through new laws that created overt racial 
divisions from downtown white-collar offices all the way to blue-collar neighborhoods 
on the city’s east and south sides.23  From Reconstruction to the end of the Civil Rights 
Movement, whites in Greensboro deftly maneuvered to establish one of the South’s most 
polished versions of Jim Crow segregation.  By 1979, Greensboro’s inveterate 
“system”—known colloquially among blacks as “the Man,” “the White Man,” or “the 
enemy”—was so powerful it ultimately absorbed local black reformers’ most concerted 
efforts and significant victories.24  But, on November 3, Greensboro’s careful harnessing 
of the ambiguous dynamic between civilities and civil rights met its greatest challenge. 
 As the sun dissolved the fog that morning, the Communist Workers Party 
gathered at the Morningside Homes public housing project to hold an anti-Klan rally, 
followed by a march and conference.  This trio of events would serve the dual purpose of 
challenging the Klan and evoking a host of socio-economic and racial issues plaguing 
black and poor residents of Greensboro.  Decades later, as Magarrell and Wesley confirm, 
the GTRC Report would substantiate many of the CWP’s concerns,  
 Among the racial inequities the report cited was the fact that Greensboro city 
council members were elected through an at-large system of voting, which left 
the black community essentially unrepresented.  Significant inequities existed 
                                                
22 Ibid., 21. 
23 For example, a city ordinance in 1914 “barred blacks from purchasing homes on any street where a 
majority of residences belonged to whites” (ibid., 20). 
24 Chafe quotes black reformer, Nelson Johnson, in an epigraph:  “To me the single most important thing 
that came out of the 1960’s is how the superstructure was able to absorb a revolutionary thrust for a long 
period of time [without ever really changing]” (ibid., 336).  
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also in wages, education, housing, and health care during the decade leading to 
1979.25 
 
The WVO (CWP) had already achieved small victories as it attempted to organize 
workers in the local textile mills, and the KKK, as well as other local authorities, had 
taken notice.  Regrettably, the CWP’s advocacy and activism on behalf of Greensboro’s 
more disadvantaged residents spilled over into an organized confrontation with, and 
violent rhetoric about, the Klan.  Flyers promoting the November 3 rally emphasized 
inflammatory slogans such as, “Take a Stand! Smash the Klan! Expose the Misleaders!” 
and “DEATH TO THE KLAN.”  One flyer included a picture of WVO members burning a 
Confederate flag at an earlier confrontation with the Klan in China Grove, NC.26  The 
flyers, in addition to testimonies by Klansmen and Nazis that CWP organizers Nelson 
Johnson and Paul Bermanzohn—among others—had called them “cowards” who would 
be “crushed,”27 played right into the hands of official Greensboro.  From the immediate 
aftermath onward, those concerned to preserve Greensboro’s culture of civility framed 
November 3 as a murderous brawl between incendiaries who got what they asked for.  As 
one local pastor said, 
The big take on what happened was initially, ‘These are a bunch of outside 
agitators, and we don’t know any of these people…Some of them were 
communists, and some of them were Nazis, or Klan, or something.  And they 
                                                
25 Magarrell and Wesley, 7. 
26 A heated confrontation with violent overtones occurred on July 8, 1979, in China Grove, NC, where the 
Klan had announced they would show the film, Birth of a Nation, at the town’s community center.  WVO 
members traveled from Durham and Greensboro to march in protest with China Grove residents.  Many 
marchers were armed, as were Klan members, when they met outside the community center.  Klansmen 
and marchers exchanged bitter words and violent threats with one another.  In this instance, there was a 
strong local police presence, and there was no bloodshed.  However, four of the five people killed on 
November 3 participated in the China Grove march.  Bill Sampson was not present. 
27 Elizabeth Wheaton, Codename GREENKIL:  The 1979 Greensboro Killings (Athens, GA:  The 
University of Georgia Press, 2009) 104. 
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deserved each other, and they deserved what happened, and they’ve besmirched 
our city’s name…A pox on both their houses.’28 
 
What the GTRC found in its investigations of the Massacre exposes this even-
sided interpretation of events as propaganda.  In its final report, the GTRC showed how 
local media employed language that underwrote the status quo of a city “reliant on 
civility as a means to avoid overt conflict and to downplay racial and class undertones of 
the event.”29  Multiple headlines of the mainline daily newspapers described November 3 
as a “shootout,” and the CWP as “radical leftists.”30  The African-American newsweekly 
Carolina Peacemaker offered the only alternative to the approved narratives of official 
Greensboro.  They called the event a “massacre,”31 and focused on the police’s absence as 
a conspiracy.  Their suspicions were not without warrant.  The GTRC’s investigations 
left no doubt that the Greensboro Police Department’s (GPD) own paid informant, Eddie 
Dawson, “acted in a leadership role to bring the two sides into contact.”32   
                                                
28 Frank Dew, personal interview, 16 December 2013.  During the state murder trial (4 August – 17 
November, 1980), questions were raised about which group shot first, in order to determine whether the 
Klan acted in self-defense.  CWP members, united in their conviction that there was a government 
conspiracy against them, refused to testify during the trial.  In a later documentary, Nelson Johnson 
challenges the notion that the CWP came to the rally prepared for a shootout:  “Why would you have all of 
your children and all of your people standing in a big group singing a song if you were planning an 
ambush?  None of that registered on the minds of many of the citizens of this city,” in Greensboro’s Child, 
documentary film, directed by Andy Coon, (All Aces Media, 2004) DVD. 
29 GTRC Final Report, 326. 
30 See the GTRC’s list of noted headlines by the Greensboro Record and the Greensboro Daily News in 
their Final Report, 325. 
31 Most of the pastors with whom I spoke used the term “massacre” without exception.  Still, some pastors 
who remain most sympathetic with the CWP confessed that after 35 years, they still have not come up with 
the proper description for the event.  To call it a “shootout” would be unfair, even though shots were fired 
from both sides.  “Killings” also has its shortcomings.  The term “massacre” can also be misleading.  The 
complexity of November 3 makes those events resistant to encapsulation in a single word. 
32 Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report:  Executive Summary, Presented to the 
residents of Greensboro, the City, the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Project and other public bodies, 
25 May 2006, 8.  Additionally, Dawson “made the initial racist, virulently anti-communist speech at the 
Klan rally designed to incite a confrontation with the WVO; he arranged for the assembly point for Klan 
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The Greensboro Police Department, the majority of [GTRC] commissioners 
found, had knowledge that the Klansmen and Nazis planned to disrupt the march, 
that they might be heavily armed when they did so, and that the white 
supremacists had emerged from a confrontation with the WVO/CWP a few 
months earlier [in China Grove] with a score to settle.33 
   
 Not only was the GPD guilty of “negligence,” at best, the federal government also 
had knowledge of the potential for bloodshed, but did nothing to stop it.  On October 26, 
1979, Dawson asked FBI agent, Len Bogaty, to stop the march, but Bogaty refused.  As 
he exited the agent’s office, Dawson told him, “I tell you what, though, the next time I’ll 
have to bring you a bucket of blood.”34  In addition to Dawson, there was Bernard 
Butkovich, a Nazi informant for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF).  
Butkovich infiltrated the American Nazi Party and testified he knew in advance that the 
Klan and Nazis were preparing to confront CWP demonstrators.  A New York Times 
article from 1985 details the testimony of two members of the Nazi group on trial for 
murder, Raeford Milano Caudle and Roland Wayne Wood,   
Mr. Butkovich told them he would train them in hand-to-hand combat and the 
use of explosives and would help them to convert their guns to automatic 
weapons.  Mr. Wood testified this week that Mr. Butkovich visited him the 
evening before the demonstration and encouraged him to take a gun to the 
confrontation in Greensboro.35 
                                                                                                                                            
 
and Nazi members prior to going to the parade; he was in regular contact with Klan leader Virgil Griffin to 
discuss plans to disrupt the parade; he obtained a copy of the parade permit and route; he drove the route 
with Klansmen the night before the parade; he pointed out the route prior to leaving the Klan assembly 
point; he rushed people into cars at 11 a.m. to get to the parade.  When Klansmen leaving the house asked, 
‘Who’s running this thing?’ Klan leader Virgil Griffin pointed to Dawson and said, ‘I guess he is,’” 9.  
33 Magarrell and Wesley, 7. 
34 Sally Avery Bermanzohn, Through Survivors’ Eyes:  From the Sixties to the Greensboro Massacre 
Nashville:  Vanderbilt University Press, 2003) 199.  See also Wheaton, Codename GREENKIL, 116. 
35 “Agent tells of ’79 threats by Klan and Nazis,” The New York Times (12 May, 1985) section 1, 26.  The 
article continues, “Mr. Butkovich characterized his role as an undercover agent as one that gave people 
with a known propensity for illegal activity the ‘opportunity to violate the law.’ …Mr. Butkovich's superior, 
Robert F. Dukes, testified that Mr. Butkovich ‘was certainly authorized to talk our target into producing 
guns.’  Mr. Butkovich testified that at a planning meeting Nov. 1, 1979, two days before the Greensboro 
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The GTRC analyzed the state murder trial’s failure to scrutinize federal government 
involvement, ultimately concluding that the circumstances “indicate reluctance to 
vigorously investigate the government’s role in the tragedy.”36  Assessing the federal 
criminal trial, the Final Report states “the lack of evidence to support the allegation that 
the FBI failed to rigorously investigate or engaged in other misconduct is largely due to 
the inaccessibility of data controlled by federal authorities.”37   
The Report maintains that widespread racial and economic preconceptions were 
significant reasons why neither the state nor federal trials resulted in guilty verdicts for 
Klan and Nazi members.  All-white juries, fears of government retaliation on CWP 
members, as well as deep-seated prejudices against communists as “America’s enemies” 
coalesced so powerfully that even explicit footage of Klan members shooting people at 
point blank range in the street was not enough to secure guilty verdicts.  As attorney 
Lewis Pitts, who worked on behalf of CWP members in the 1985 civil trial,38 said,  
That was the middle of the Reagan era, and there was major Cold War activity.  
So to be called and labeled ‘communist’ was a real way to undermine and create 
                                                                                                                                            
 
demonstration, he heard a Klansman say that pipe bombs he had made ‘would work good thrown into a 
crowd of niggers.’ 
36 GTRC Final Report, 281. 
37 Ibid., 285. 
38 Waller et. Al. v. Butkovich et. al., 11 March 1985 – 7 June 1985.  After extended and heated deliberations, 
a multiracial jury awarded compensatory damages of $351,500 and $38,358.55 to Martha Nathan and Paul 
Bermanzohn, respectively (Nathan is the widow of Michael Nathan.  Gunshot wounds left Bermanzohn 
permanently paralyzed).  The plaintiffs saw the amount of the award as a disappointment, but were pleased 
that it was the first time in the American South that a jury had held a police department jointly liable with 
Klan and Nazi members for a wrongful death.  In a highly controversial move, without admitting any 
wrongdoing, the City of Greensboro settled the case to avoid further litigation by paying the award on 
behalf of the GDP, Klan and Nazi members.   
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a notion…that you’re less than human.  Therefore, you don’t deserve any rights.  
You don’t deserve any protection.39 
  
The Report leaves little doubt as to whether the voices of CWP victims, their 
family members, and the residents of Morningside Homes were systematically 
marginalized and obstructed.  The U. S. government, the City of Greensboro, including 
Mayor Jim Melvin, as well as city councilmen, the GPD, mainstream media, and 
establishment whites—including many mainline white churches—all promoted the 
message that the CWP received their just deserts, thereby expediting Greensboro’s 
further descent into darkness in the wake of the massacre.  Perhaps no one expressed 
these matters more coarsely and succinctly than Ed Dawson.  Sitting on the passenger 
side of a truck as his Klan-Nazi motorcade arrived at the rally, he coldly peered at CWP 
member Paul Bermanzohn and said, “You communist bastard.  You asked for the Klan 
and you got ‘em.”40 
 
5.3  LIGHTS IN THE DARKNESS 
Greensboro serves as a focal instance of how ideologies and civilities generally 
espoused throughout the United States affect a particular community’s interpretation of 
controversial events.  Despite the city’s openness to certain minorities, and its reputation 
as a center of civil rights activism, “there was also still a great desire to keep the lid on, 
and to keep people in their places.”41  Nearly 26 years would pass after the massacre 
                                                
39Greensboro’s Child documentary, min. 32:10. 
40 GREENKIL, 9. 
41 Dew personal interview. 
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before several Greensboro pastors rose to offer formal statements to the GTRC.  The 
Reverends Cardes Brown, Mazie Ferguson, and Nelson Johnson—all African-
American—were among the first witnesses to name the darkness as the journey of truth 
and reconciliation commenced.  Though these statements were not sermons, they 
functioned as testimonies that helped remove the lid of “civility” as they spoke to the 
Commission within earshot of television cameras, journalists, and hundreds of concerned 
citizens.  Their testimonies provide a window into these preachers’ theological vision as 
they narrated events from Christian perspectives.  They did not attempt to mask their 
identity as Christian pastors with a “third language,” so often prescribed by advocates of 
tolerance.  Rather, Scriptural imagination, prophetic critique, expressions of lament, 
confessions, and appeals to forgiveness constituted their language, which has helped 
cultivate an ecology ripe for reconciliation in Greensboro. 
The Reverend Cardes Brown had been pastor of New Light Baptist Church for 
four years, and president of the Pulpit Forum42 for one year, when the gunfire erupted.  At 
that time, the church was located near the intersection of the massacre.  “I could look out 
the back door of the church and see the bloodstained street, and I wondered, how in the 
world can we allow this to happen?”43  Outlining his own historical perspective of the 
lead up to November 3, he recalled being reprimanded as a boy for drinking from a 
whites-only water fountain.  “I remember my mother coming to get me and I said to her, 
                                                
42 The Pulpit Forum is an organization of prominent African-American pastors devoted to fellowship and 
cooperation on religious and social issues in Greensboro.  It remains a vibrant organization, and a key part 
of ensuring the success of the GTRC’s legacy. 
43 Cardes Brown, Statement to the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Public Hearing, 27 
August 2005.  All subsequent quotes of Rev. Brown are drawn from his statement.  
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‘Mama, there is no difference in the water.’”  He viewed speaking on behalf of others 
who could not “speak as they ought for themselves” as an integral part of his ministry.  
But some of the most striking portions of his testimony are those that evoke lament, 
prayer, and reasons behind his preaching resistance to propaganda and toward hope.   
He begins his prepared statement in the mode of lamentation.  Having just viewed 
with the audience some video footage of the 1979 attack, he says through tears:  “You’ll 
have to excuse me (he stops to wipe tears).  I’ve seen that footage many times, I have it in 
my office, but there is never a time…There is never a time that I view it without being 
emotionally troubled.”  He then pivots to thank God for the opportunity to offer a 
reflection “of a very painful remembrance.”  He pursues such pain “because of a belief 
that in God’s own time, this troubling and disturbing issue will be addressed properly.  
To say that these hearings are a response to that faith in God that this would come about 
is truly, I believe, the reason I am here today.”  Brown repeats questions he pursued and 
continues to pursue in his role as a pastor, “How could this have happened in the city of 
Greensboro?  How could it have happened anywhere?”  He concludes with an apology 
for his emotions “concerning the pain that I will bear, no doubt, until I meet my maker.”  
Finally, Brown confesses, “It’s hard to remove some things from your mind, especially if 
there are instances when they are placed before you and your thoughts and your mind 
cannot remove them without expressing to the God that you have faith in that I still care.” 
He also speaks in the language of prayer.  In a particularly direct passage, he says, 
I pray for the day that true brotherhood and love might exist among all of God’s 
people. I pray that this effort today to seek truth might not be hampered or 
hindered by our failure to recognize that the forces that would speak against 
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knowing the truth are only the forces that intend to keep us bound and enslaved, 
for only the truth will set us free. I could remind you even today of painful 
moments that seem to point to the fact that we who feel at times that the way to 
live without being disturbed is not to get involved, to deny the importance of 
standing for what is right. It was a wise man who said that he who did not stand 
for something would fall for anything.  
  
 One detects a journalistic hermeneutic in his concern to preach hope to a 
congregation struggling to endure suffering.  Midway through his testimony, 
Commissioner Patricia Clark asked about the impact of, and his congregation’s reaction 
to, the not-guilty verdict (of the state trial).  Brown responded that it was one of anger 
and frustration, but that he resolved to make his message to them one of assurance. 
Otherwise, his people would ask, “Why not just give up?”   
So, I said in my statement that the only way to deal with that is to have a faith 
and a hope that in some way, in God’s own time, this matter will come to bear.  
And I think that’s what I’d say, now after 31 years of preaching, 41 years, in all 
that preaching that message of hope, it was what I did continually, up until this 
day, to reassure people that right temporarily defeated is better than evil 
triumphant.  Truth crushed to the ground will rise again. You have to do that 
because otherwise people just become—and this is the part I’ve always said, we 
look at a situation and we wonder why people come to the point where they don’t 
have any feelings, they become numb and a person who is not able to have the 
sense of fear will do anything.  So keeping people from losing their mind became 
an issue. 
  
Brown preached resistance to propaganda about communism.  The massacre, he 
said, “wouldn’t have happened if [the CWP] were not communist.  That was what was 
being fed—media, everybody.  That was the issue.”  And this issue, he believes, 
forestalled reconciling efforts throughout the city.  In his preaching and teaching at New 
Light Church,  
I explained this whole view of communism differently.  I talked about the fact 
that…if we’re not going to understand the importance of tolerance and sharing, 
then we were going to have a problem.  And when we look at it from the 
standpoint and ideology, we’re talking about things being held in common, 
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people recognizing that in order to survive we have to share things in common.  
That’s the way I would always explain it in our congregation that there has to be 
room for all of us.  All of us are not going to see things the same. Does that mean 
that because I don’t see it the way you see it that you can no longer exist? I think 
that the fact that the media and others used that opportunity to justify a hideous 
crime because of a person’s ideology, I think that was one of the things that I 
constantly set right in terms of people’s discussion.  And I do believe that were it 
not for the fact that that was the basis of justification, that things would have 
probably moved to a more reconcilable end earlier than now. 
  
 The Reverend Mazie Ferguson was the only ordained female pastor to give a 
statement to the GTRC.  In addition to being an attorney, at the time of the public hearing 
she was also president of the Pulpit Forum, and founding pastor of Liberation Baptist 
Church in Greensboro.  Ferguson was profoundly affected as a child by the death of 
Emmitt Till, and still grapples with fears she harbors about the Klan.  Her testimony 
emphasizes a biblically informed prophetic critique of the reality of divisions in the city.  
In the years and months leading up to the founding of the GTRC, there had been 
enormous pressure on advocates of truth and reconciliation to stop their work.  From City 
Hall to rank-and-file citizens, one of the prevailing attitudes was that the events of 
November 3 were in the past and should remain there.  Brown countered these claims by 
noting the issues were a “sore” that, if left to fester, would turn “cancerous.”  Ferguson 
contests such public resistance with even more rhetorical potency. 
The wounds are not old, the wounds are still here.  The wounds are quite present.  
The wounds walk up and down our streets.  The wounds go by the names of 
homelessness.  The wounds go by the name of the unemployed.  The wounds are 
still with us.  The wounds are still known by the name of racism, and it is still 
raring its ugly head.44   
 
                                                
44 Mazie Ferguson, Statement to the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1 October 2005.  
All subsequent quotes of Rev. Ferguson are drawn from her statement. 
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Commissioner Mark Sills, also an ordained minister serving in Greensboro, asked 
Ferguson how she would interpret the failures of local religious leaders leading up to 
November 3, and afterward.  She responds by recalling Jesus’ warning, “Woe be unto 
you,” to the religious leaders of his day for “not doing what they should have done.”  Too 
many local preachers, she says, “have become part of the status quo.  Too many of us are 
afraid to speak as we ought to.”  She prefaces her next remarks with language drawn 
from Jesus’ reading from Isaiah in Luke 4:18-19, proceeding to say, 
I subscribe to a cannon [sic] called the Holy Bible where from Genesis to 
Revelations God continues to demand, not suggest, but to demand that God’s 
people fight for justice.  That God’s people look and work to take care of the 
widows and the children and that includes those people right now who do not 
have a living wage and who cannot feed their children.  That includes people 
who sit on councils and have all that they need but do not understand that the 
others also need to be able to pay for doctor bills, have health insurance, be able 
to do the kinds of things they want to do.  And not only is that necessary in the 
political sense, but even more necessary in the religious community.  This is, 
these are our marching orders.  We have no others.  Feed the hungry, clothe the 
naked, take care of the sick, visit the prisoner, take care of the stranger, take in 
the stranger, these are our marching orders… 
 
 Like Brown, Ferguson is also aware of propagandistic motives by those in power, 
and of the historic relationship of abuse toward minorities by police.  But she describes 
these issues in more concrete, biblical terms, giving them a more cosmic, theological 
perspective.  She likens “the culture of the powerful” to “powers and principalities” 
against which people must struggle.  She advocates for a citizens review board that would 
have subpoena power over police.45  Her concluding remarks also name the media as a 
                                                
45 See the GTRC’s formal recommendation of such a review board in Final Report, 386.  As of this writing, 
the recommendation has yet to be implemented despite organized efforts by concerned citizens. 
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“power” in the Scriptural sense, in response to Sills’s request that she provide other 
questions the GTRC should explore.   
I guess I want to say to you, be sure to try to put yourself 25 years into the future.  
And ask the questions that the journalists who are not writing today accurately 
will have for tomorrow.  Because you see, outside of the contemporary context 
more things come.  So right now so many of our, [sic] you wonder why the 
journalists are writing the way they are writing.  They are writing that way 
because who buys the ads for their newspapers?  The people who buy the ads for 
their newspapers are the powers that be, they are not going to fund journals and 
newspapers that write things against them.  But 25 years from now it will be safe 
to do so. 
 
Another way Greensboro authorities manipulated prejudices following November 
3 was to demonize one individual in particular, CWP leader, longtime civil rights activist, 
and the third minister under consideration here, the Reverend Nelson Johnson.  If there 
was one man on whom whites in Greensboro focused their collective hatred and distrust 
before, during, and after 1979, it was Johnson.  The sitting mayor in 1979, Jim Melvin, 
described Johnson as “the most dangerous man in Greensboro.”46  As another local pastor 
and friend of Johnson’s remarked, “It’s one thing to have a black attorney, or physician, 
or dentist.  But Nelson Johnson?  He’s messing up all the equilibrium.”47   
Johnson’s life story reveals a fascinating Christian pilgrimage, from passionate 
advocacy for secular ideologies earlier in his life, to his present Christian ministry at his 
church, based at the Beloved Community Center he co-founded with pastor “Z” Holler.  
He grew up in eastern North Carolina, “two miles from the family who owned my 
                                                
46 Nelson Johnson, Statement to the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Public Hearing, 26 
August 2005.  In this section of the chapter, all subsequent quotes of Rev. Johnson are drawn from his 
statement. 
47 Ibid. 
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ancestors.”48  Before he began studying communism, Johnson saw himself as a follower 
of Martin Luther King, Jr.  As a young man, he and a friend tried to sit near the front of a 
bus heading to Gastonia, NC, on their way to a student council convention.   
When we got to Charlotte, a seat opened up on the second row.  There were two 
seats on the right side of the bus.  And we decided we were going to sit in those 
seats, so we came up and sat down.  And a man stood up, a white man—actually 
people started throwing paper, balls of trash, and saying the ‘n-word’, that people 
don’t know where they belong, that kind of thing.  And a guy had on a London 
Fog coat, and he held it up as he turned and just hit me on the head.  I was sitting 
on the aisle seat.  So I fell over in the lap of my friend…and it was a jarring blow.  
And the people all sat there like nothing had happened.49 
 
Today, even though Johnson is an ordained minister, a graduate of Virginia Union 
School of Theology in Richmond in 1989, and pastor of Faith Community Church, he 
continues to be perceived as a divisive figure by many.  Especially for Greensboro 
citizens most concerned about civilities, Johnson’s rise to infamous prominence as an 
outspoken communist, labor, and civil rights leader during the white heat of the Cold War 
seems to have permanently marked him as a “radical” to be feared or simply ignored.   
His testimony to the GTRC is arguably the most powerful, for in it we hear from 
someone who was in the middle of the fight on November 3.  He was stabbed in the arm 
as he defended himself with a stick against a butcher knife-wielding Nazi.  He witnessed 
the murder of close friends.  He raged against the police before they wrestled him to the 
blood-soaked ground.  But as he spoke to the Commission in August 2005, he epitomized 
                                                
48 Nelson Johnson, Personal interview, 31 January 2014.  Johnson also explained that during his years of 
communist activism, he remained a great admirer of King.  On April 4, 1968, Johnson, who had never 
personally met King, was waiting to meet him at the Greensboro airport.  They had arranged a meeting to 
discuss the ideas of non-violence and loving enemies.  King never made the flight.  He was assassinated 
that morning. 
49 Ibid. 
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central elements of the reconciling Word.  With a broken heart and humble tone, his 
speech exhibits the effects of over two decades of spiritual transformation.  The agonistic 
tenor of earlier days is gone, replaced by the kenotic rhetoric of a pastor determined to 
pursue reconciliation.  “I come today with my scars, my wounds, my regrets and my self-
criticism, to share my story,” and to seek “authentic truth and understanding the killings 
of 1979.”  Of the pastors considered here, Johnson’s testimony is the longest and most 
detailed about November 3.  Its subjects are too broad to consider fully here.  There are, 
however, several stunning moments—most notably, his account of being attacked, and 
his apologies to the community for his own mistakes, as well as his use of Scripture, and 
the broad spectrum of his reconciling vision for Greensboro.   
 Johnson details his being blitzed by a Nazi during the initial skirmish.   
Who I later determined was a Nazi member rushed towards me with a long 
butcher knife.  I was thrown a stick (on which we were attaching signs to be 
carried in the march) by Lacy Russell.  The throwing of that stick by Lacy 
probably saved my life.  The man with the long knife attempted to stab me in an 
upper cut motion into my mid-section.  I used the stick to keep the knife-wielding 
Nazi away from me.  For a period of about 30 seconds we faced off—him with 
the long knife and me with a stick.  I was cut about the hands.  He dropped low 
and attempted to come up under me in this fashion.  I managed to block the knife 
with my arm as the knife went through my arm. 
 
 As the shooting began, Johnson found refuge behind a television truck.  When he 
emerged, “I was bleeding and I saw bleeding people and bodies strewn around.”  He 
turned over friend Jim Waller, who had been fatally shot, and “felt and heard the air go 
out of him as he took his last breath.”  The events of the previous days began to flash in 
his mind, how the police had obstructed the parade permit, the harassing phone calls 
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about the parade posters, and the role police played in preventing a local church from 
hosting the conference.   
I rose from Jim Waller’s dead body and began to speak with all the force my 
emotional state could muster.  I charged that this could not have happened 
without the involvement of the police.  I denounced Mayor Jim Melvin as a “dog” 
and a representative of the capitalist class.  
 
With his next words in the testimony, Johnson apologizes to Melvin. 
I recognize that calling Mayor Melvin a “dog” was wrong.  While it reflected my 
state of mind at the time, it was no less wrong and should not have been done. I 
am sorry that I used such language. Under any circumstances, it demeaned his 
humanity and thereby reduced my own stature as a moral being. 
 
 In addition to this public apology, Johnson offers several regrets as well.  First, he 
confesses regret for using the slogan “Death to the Klan,” as well as for the development 
of the flyer that called Klan members cowards and “demeaned and devalued the potential 
of people who were members of the Klan and or the Nazi.”  He also regrets using the 
word “communism.”  He cherishes much of what he has learned from his study of 
Marxism.  “The word communism, however, no longer describes my core beliefs.”  
Concluding his list of regrets, Johnson adds, 
I would note in passing that there is a passage in a very broadly read book, which 
says, “Now all who believed were together, and had all things in common and 
sold their possessions and goods, and divided them among all, as anyone had 
need.”  This saying comes from the second chapter of Acts, verses 45 and 46, in 
a book called the Holy Bible.  I think our culture would do well to ponder its 
implications as it relates to our economic structure and way of life. 
 
 Johnson also quotes Scripture as he clarifies a primary theological motivation for 
his work for the poor in Greensboro.  “Truth and sense of moral purpose require us to be 
partial, to take sides,” he argues.  Jesus “took sides.” 
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Jesus of Nazareth declared without equivocation in his inaugural sermon, “I have 
come to preach good news to the poor” (Luke 4:18)…I do not think for a minute 
that Jesus was against non-poor people.   If done properly, standing with the poor, 
the abused, and the neglected can be a way of standing for everyone.   
 
 Johnson’s testimony reveals that his inclusiveness, in this sense, encompasses all 
of Greensboro, including its core institutions.   
In my way of thinking, there can be no real ‘community reconciliation’ without 
substantial involvement of core institutions.  The roles of the power structure 
before, during and after the killings of November 3rd have been enormous and are 
critically important to understand…[E]nduring, quality change that includes the 
deepest and broadest reconciliation…will grow from the involvement of our 
political, economic, educational, law enforcement, and mass media institutions. 
 
He laments the “extraordinarily negative response by the Greensboro City 
Council to the request to endorse the [GTRC] process,” but he also invites them to 
reconsider.  He thanks Klan and Nazi members, as well as a police officer and several 
lawyers who have participated in the process, while encouraging those who have refused 
participation to reconsider.  Essentially, Johnson invites those who have been his 
“enemies” to join him in the journey toward truth and reconciliation, “an opportunity,” he 
says, “for all to learn and grow without a spirit of hatred or revenge.”  Summoning the 
image of table fellowship, he speaks hopefully, 
It is my deepest desire that those that I call the establishment and establishment 
apologists, the Klan and Nazis, poor blacks, Latinos, Asians, and whites can find 
our way to a common table.   I know that we are all connected and I want that 
connection to be on a basis of mutual respect and shared concern for the welfare 
of all. 
 
 Johnson concludes his testimony by adding to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s well-
known quote, “The arc of the moral universe is long but it bends toward justice”: 
So let us participate together in bending that moral arc just a little more towards 
truth, forgiveness, healing reconciliation and restorative justice for all.   I pray for 
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the strength to respect everyone, to love everyone, and to learn from everyone as 
we continue this journey.  May God bless all of us. 
 
 Together with the testimonies of Cardes Brown and Mazie Ferguson, Nelson 
Johnson’s words lightened Greensboro’s darkness by cutting through decades worth of 
false and misleading claims, “civilities,” official narratives, and the rhetoric of the power 
establishment.  All three pastors spoke in character—as ambassadors of the reconciliation 
of the God of Jesus Christ—in order to aid the reconciling purposes of the GTRC.  Until 
they stepped up to the microphone, most people in Greensboro had never heard their 
respective versions of the events on November 3.  Moreover, their testimonies were 
crucial to the GTRC’s work, and to the credibility of the GTRC’s final report.  Following 
their statements, these pastors have continued working in their respective places of 
ministry.  All three preach regularly at the churches they pastor, serving also as mentors 
to a generation of new leaders working to implement many of the GTRC’s formal 
recommendations. 
 
5.4  RECONCILING SERMONS 
 Christian preachers in Greensboro were the driving force behind the GTRC’s 
creation and work, and remain central to the success of its legacy.  Preachers played 
indispensible roles in every part of the Commission’s activities, beginning with its 
inception, and continuing through its organization and implementation.  Dozens of 
prominent international, national, and local pastors sat on either the National Advisory 
Committee or the Local Task Force, which preceded and ultimately appointed the 
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GTRC’s commissioners.  Another pastor, Reverend Dr. Mark Sills, was one of those 
seven commissioners.  The GTRC met with and drew inspiration from Bishop Desmond 
Tutu, who blessed and publicly endorsed their work during a speaking tour in North 
Carolina.  Preachers across Greensboro drew their congregations’ attention to the 
GTRC’s efforts during sermons and other church events.  The sheer volume of influence 
by people of faith on the GTRC is immeasurable.50 
It would be impossible to catalogue every noteworthy sermon preached in 
Greensboro about the GTRC for several reasons:  1) some of the preachers, like Otis 
Hairston, the former pastor of Shiloh Baptist Church, have since died; 2) many of the 
preachers who were closely involved with the GTRC’s efforts, such as Alfred “Chip” 
Marble, Associate Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of North Carolina, do not use 
manuscripts or notes; 3) some pastors approached for these sermons have been reluctant 
to share them; and 4) the controversial nature of these events meant the pastors of many 
mainline or establishment churches in Greensboro said little or nothing about the GTRC 
from their pulpits.  Nevertheless, this section will consider two sermons preached in 
connection with the GTRC.  The first is by the Reverend Dr. Peter Storey, a Methodist 
pastor from South Africa; the second is by Z Holler, retired Presbyterian pastor, co-chair 
of the GTRCP, and co-founder (with Nelson Johnson) of the Beloved Community Center.  
I will preface each sermon analysis by exhibiting features of each preacher’s basic 
theological convictions about reconciliation.  In terms of the sermons themselves, I will 
                                                
50 People of other faiths, especially Jews, have also been integral to the GTRC’s success.  In particular, 
Rabbi Fred Guttman, of Temple Emanuel in Greensboro (1995-), remains a prominent voice in the 
community, as well as a friend of the Pulpit Forum.   
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attend to the ways each preacher practiced the reconciling word as they sought the 
welfare of the city.  My ultimate aim in this section is to show how these pastors 
effectively lightened Greensboro’s darkness by subverting civilities with the proclaimed 
truth of Jesus Christ. 
Storey is the former President of the Methodist Church of South Africa, former 
prison chaplain to the late South African President, Nelson Mandela, and was, at the time 
of this sermon (April 2005), Professor of the Practice of Christian Ministry at Duke 
Divinity School.  His sermon emphasizes the necessary ingredients for an ecology of 
reconciliation.  That is, certain things must be in place before a divided community can 
pursue true reconciliation.  The address is an eloquent expression of deeply held 
convictions about reconciliation, which Storey has both proclaimed and embodied 
throughout the decades of his ministry.  For him, reconciliation is not a contingent 
Christian “value.”  It is Scripture’s primary subject, and, therefore, the church’s primary 
subject and agenda.  Reconciliation is the Christian’s ultimate reality, as well as, 
…the starting point for the Christian.  The impossible has happened.  Therefore 
let’s try and live in the impossible, into the impossible.  And in exactly the same 
way as I would argue that my departure point for what kind of world I preach is 
not the realities that we live with but the dream God has.  And God’s dream is the 
true reality… So, for me, that has always been utterly clear:  that Jesus has given 
us a picture of the world God wants to see—God’s dream for this world.  And 
our job is to realize that dream, to live into God’s future in the now, to live God’s 
future in the now.51 
 
His is an apocalyptic imagination, where the reality of God’s reconciliation has 
come upon us in the person and work of Jesus Christ, and continues to unfold in the 
                                                
51 Peter Storey, Personal interview, 13 November 2013.  For a more complete picture of Storey’s preaching, 
see Peter Storey, With God in the Crucible:  Preaching Costly Discipleship (Nashville:  Abingdon Press, 
2002). 
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church’s mission.  Living into this reality, preachers should preach “holistically,” so that 
each sermon addresses the “three levels of who we are, where we live, and have our 
being.”52  Though each sermon may not “hew to a specific text” in an expository way, it 
must always be biblically based, and “faithful to the broad message of Scripture.”  The 
preacher listens carefully, then, to both the text and the congregation’s present context.  
“Preaching that’s not contextual is not preaching…People need to be able to make a 
connection between the preached word and what is happening in the world round about 
them.  And the one interprets the other.  They speak to each other.”  
So persuaded by the gospel’s power to impact the present, Storey bristles at the 
false humility of the church’s preaching.   
Pastors seem to think…they are called to keep the peace between the Democrats 
and Republicans in the congregation, who are usually there on a scale of about 
60% Republican, 40% Democrat in a Methodist church.  And if I have heard it 
once, I’ve heard it a thousand times:  ‘You know this congregation is pretty 
divided between Democrats and Republicans, so I have to be very careful what I 
say.’  That, to me, is a non sequitur.  That sentence makes no sense.  What does 
the political affiliation of the people in the pew have anything to do with what he 
says?  Surely that is the last thing that should bother him.  He should be 
interested in what God says, and where Jesus’ affiliation is at any given 
moment.53   
 
Storey believes what he calls “genuine Christianity” in America has squandered its 
message by wrapping it in the flag, domesticating its radical message, and surrendering 
space in the public square to warped forms of Christianity.  These problems have led the 
church to relegate core strands of its mission and to abandon the poor and working 
classes.  “It’s a deep, profound tragedy that it had to be the Communist Workers Party 
                                                
52 Storey, Personal interview. 
53 Storey, Personal interview. 
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who came to Greensboro to stand for the people who were losing their jobs.  Why were 
the churches not there?  That’s the hard question that has to be faced.”54 
Storey preached in Greensboro from one verse of Scripture, Isaiah 42:9:  See, the 
former things have come to pass, and new things I now declare; before they spring forth, 
I tell you of them.”  He addressed his message, entitled, “God’s Peacemakers,” to the 
Faith, Prayer and Reconciliation Service at First Baptist Church on 10 April 2005.  The 
GTRC participated in the service as a central part of its focus.  “It was a big event,” 
Storey remembers, “with drama, interracial groups of kids performing… it was a serious 
attempt to bring the community together.”55  And, he noted, “I was pretty amazed that it 
was in the white Baptist church in that town, which I think took a bit of courage on the 
part of the pastor of that church.”56  The service came just a few months before the GTRC 
began its first round of public hearings, on 15 July 2005, which were entitled “What 
Brought Us to November 3, 1979?” 
Typical of his style, Storey’s sermon is forthright and compelling, full of stories 
and examples, and drawn directly from Scripture while being deeply contextual.  He 
begins by noting his desire to speak about all people of faith being God’s Peacemakers, 
committed to the ministry of reconciliation.  Wherever there are people “praying, 
teaching, working, struggling, negotiating, mediating, marching…and suffering” in order 
                                                
54 Storey, Personal interview. 
55 Storey, Personal interview. 
56 Storey, Personal interview.  The pastor to which he is referring is the Rev. Dr. Ken Massey, former 
senior minister of First Baptist Church, Greensboro.  In his newsletter articles leading up to the event, 
Massey writes, “The purpose of this gathering will be to call people of faith to prayer and participation in 
community reconciliation according to their own faith tradition.  No one is going to ask us [First Baptist, 
Greensboro] to approach reconciliation like Jews or Muslims.  They will pray and participate in their own 
unique way.  We will do so in a way that honors Jesus (I hope).”  Manuscript in my possession. 
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to “cross terrible divides that are tearing the world apart,” that is where God’s 
Peacemakers are.  These peacemakers are urgently needed because “there is a disease in 
the human bloodstream (an addiction really), that poisons the human soul…We are 
addicted to division.” 
Storey narrows his focus to his own Christian convictions, stating clearly that his 
“own faith is unequivocal…that in the life and death of Christ, God was busy making 
enemies into friends, and that God has entrusted us with that same ministry of 
reconciliation (2 Cor. 5:19).”  For Christians, “it is not a matter of choice, it is non 
negotiable:  reconciliation is an obligation.  We do it out of obedience, we do it for the 
sake of the world, but we also do it because unless we do, we become sick in our souls.”  
Reconciliation is also more than tolerance.  “Tolerance is when we hold on to our 
prejudices and resentments, but don’t speak of them publicly anymore, hiding them under 
a thin layer of civility…God surely has a more compelling dream for humankind.” 
He offers six points to the congregation, which he calls “non-negotiable steps—or 
objectives—we must include for reconciliation to have a chance.”57  The first is to 
“acknowledge each other’s permanency.”  That is, we must respect our opponents’ 
presence, and include them in the solution.  He quotes the late Percy Qoboza, who once 
said, “If there is a bloodbath in South Africa, what will be left afterward?  A majority of 
blacks and a minority of whites who will have to work out how to live together.  That’s 
what we have right now, so why don’t we sit down now and avoid the bloodbath?”  South 
                                                
57 “God’s Peacemakers,” Sermon by Peter Storey (First Baptist Church, Greensboro, NC:  10 April 2005) 
manuscript in my possession.  Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent Storey quotes refer to this sermon. 
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Africa’s first breakthrough in the struggle against apartheid was a “refusal to leave 
anybody out.” 
Second, there must be a “prime mover,” someone with enough courage to 
interrupt the status quo.  Storey recalls a particular individual who risked his life to ask a 
question in the presence of his enemies: 
With every killing the cycle of violence was ratcheted up, until one man took a 
radical step:  a humble Zulu mineworker walked into the barricaded hostel of his 
Xhosa enemies, and said, “I know you will kill me, but listen to this one question 
before you do: how many more must die?”  His courage touched his enemies to 
such an extent that they not only spared him, but one of their leaders offered to 
join him in seeking out a church leader…to begin a peace initiative that ended 
that terrible slaughter.   
 
Third, he says, “the parties must engage.”  Reconciliation can only happen in 
person, not at a distance.  It may begin with something as simple as two people in church, 
divided from one another for some reason, but choosing to pass the peace during worship.  
He then recalled how “very stiff and distant” the initial meetings were between 
representatives of anti-apartheid churches and the Dutch Reformed Church, which had 
supported apartheid.  As they addressed their grievances with one another, the conference 
“became a remarkable experience of confession, forgiveness and reconciliation.  It set the 
atmosphere that would enable us to launch the National Peace Accord that saved South 
Africa from civil war.” 
 Fourth, “the truth must be told.”  And this search for truth must seek not to bring 
retribution but healing.  “There are some deeds of the past that lie buried like toxic waste 
deep in our collective memories.  Unless we deal with those burial sites, the toxins will 
leak to the surface bit by bit over the years, allowing the past to poison the future.”  
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Storey acknowledges how frightening it might be to tell one another the truth.  This may 
require recognizing, respecting, and reverencing the suffering of those we have harmed.  
“It starts when we say, ‘Yes, this is what happened.’” 
 The fifth point asserts the importance of justice.  Quoting Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu, Storey says, “How can I reconcile with you when your foot is on my neck?”  Yet, 
he clarifies that this justice is not about retribution, but restitution.  The sign that we have 
transcended sentimentality is the moment we “sincerely look to changing those 
circumstances that hurt people and harmed relationships.” 
 Finally, he says, we must make space for newness.  And here is where Storey’s 
theology of reconciliation comes into a more complete view.  This “new thing” that 
happens is the reconciliation of God, and it wells up to affect change within each one of 
us.  He concludes with the stirring example of his meeting Roelf Meyer, former minister 
of police in South Africa’s apartheid government, during a pilgrimage through Alabama 
with other civil rights leaders.  “One afternoon, we South Africans spoke to the group and 
Roelf Meyer asked to go first.  This is what he said: 
I knew that we were travelling in the wrong direction, and I knew that would 
have to change. I just didn’t realize how much I would have to change. I didn’t 
change until I realized that it was not just my mind that was involved – I had to 
reach down deep inside to my soul. That’s where it had to happen. 
 
 Storey’s sermon asks citizens gathered in First Baptist Church from all over 
Greensboro to narrate their reconciling aims theologically, and to envision the GTRC’s 
work as having its origins in the mind of a God who entrusts to them the risky but 
rewarding work of peacemaking.  With reconciling words, and a genuine concern to seek 
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the peace of the city, Storey lit a candle in the darkness.  By enumerating the elements 
necessary for reconciliation, he offered “everyone with ears to hear” a lens through which 
to discern God’s dream for their city.  He did so with a uniquely Christian language, 
though without a hint of arrogance.  This pastor proclaimed the gifts of the gospel—as 
Jesus did—to disciples gathered closely around him, but also to those sitting in close 
proximity who might follow him—or might not.   For the hardest work of all still lay 
before the GTRC, from listening to testimonies and reflecting on their findings, to writing 
a final report that would be distributed throughout the city. 
 Other than Nelson Johnson, Zeb “Z” Holler was the local preacher most involved 
in the creation and the success of the GTRC.  As retired pastor of Presbyterian Church of 
the Covenant in Greensboro, and co-founder of the Beloved Community Center, Holler 
was a trusted voice for both black and white Christians throughout the city.  He served as 
co-chair of the GTCRP, through which the commissioners of the GTRC were selected, 
and remained an outspoken voice in the media as the Commission’s work progressed.  In 
2010, Holler published a collection of his sermons preached over four decades of 
ministry.  Close study of these sermons reveals that Holler—a graduate of Union 
Theological Seminary in Richmond, with a Ph.D. in Biblical Criticism from the 
University of Aberdeen, Scotland—is a penetrating exegete of Scripture.  His sermons 
also reveal a man who transcends categories.  He crashes through the tired paradigms of 
“liberal” and “conservative.”   Just as one begins to think he may be a dyed-in-the-wool 
liberation theologian, he suddenly morphs into an orthodox Trinitarian, or an expository 
or narrative preacher.   
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The most striking characteristic of his preaching, one that distinguishes him from 
so many preachers of this age, is that his primary subject is the God of Jesus Christ.  
Wherever one hears Holler utter the predicate, one has most likely just heard “God” or 
“Jesus” as the subject.  Holler tends to move out of God’s way, to let God speak on God’s 
own terms.  He offers no “points” or “principles for living.”  He does not make a habit of 
crafting catchy introductions.  Holler’s preaching will jar those more accustomed to 
hearing preachers assess their psychological health, or probe the depths of the human 
condition.  He is not at all interested in cheering people on as they try to “make a 
difference.”  He is a theologically grounded preacher, with an acute knowledge of church 
history and doctrine, and a deep conviction that the gospel is a fundamentally subversive 
message. 
 A quick scan of his sermon titles in the volume of his collected sermons quickly 
dispels any doubts about whether Holler is the type of preacher mainly interested in 
placating the congregation.  The following headings are representative:  “Jesus Enrages 
the Home Folks,” “Jesus’ Tough Love,” “A Call to Live Jesus’ ‘Impossible Possibility,’” 
“A Prince of Peace Who Disturbs Our Peace,” and “A Vulnerable, Suffering God.”  
Holler preaches costly discipleship with no apologies.  As Johnson, his longtime friend 
and colleague, remarks in the foreword, these sermons “engage the raw edges of life, 
including the many faces of our inhumanity toward one another.”58  Common themes for 
Holler include loving enemies; reconciliation; peacemaking; radical forms of 
                                                
58 Z Holler, Jesus’ Radical Message:  Subversive Sermons for Today’s Seekers (Eugene, OR:  Wipf and 
Stock, 2010) xi.  
  244 
stewardship; sharing wealth; adventurous, risky discipleship; and attending to the 
church’s resources of prayer, Scripture-reading, and fellowship.  The Gospels figure 
prominently in his text selections, though they are often coupled with Old Testament 
texts.  He tends to gravitate to Old Testament Prophets and Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount.   
   Interestingly, one of Holler’s most powerful “sermons” came in the form of a 
letter promoting support for the GTRC, which was distributed as a flyer for worship 
bulletins in churches across the city.  Entitled, A Plea to the Christian Churches of 
Greensboro, and written on behalf of the GTCRP, Holler urges Greensboro Christians to 
give their “confidence, respect, and full cooperation,” as well as their “full and 
enthusiastic support” to the GTRC.59  Acknowledging the suspicions and unresolved 
anger of many in the community after November 3, he appeals to Matthew 5:25-26:  
“Settle matters quickly with your adversary.”  Showing solidarity with his neighbor’s 
concerns, he includes himself in the first-person-plural address,  
We blamed the Communist organizers of the rally, blamed the Klan-Nazi group 
who did the killing, blamed Greensboro’s Police and officialdom for failing to 
prevent it, blamed the media for their reporting of it.  But as a community we 
have not troubled ourselves to get to the full truth in and behind the confusing 
stories that still surround those shootings, dividing us from our neighbors and 
weakening trust in our public institutions.60 
 
Before concluding with a moving invitation to “offer God the gift of a community 
healed of a painful episode of its past,” Holler introduces another key passage of the 
Matthean text (vv. 23-24),  
Should followers of Jesus pass up this unique opportunity to learn the truth that 
just might set us all free from our prisons of distrust?  Listen to Jesus again: ‘If 
                                                
59 Ibid., 130-31.  The document is also listed as “Appendix 3.” 
60 Ibid., 131. 
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you are offering your gift at the altar, and there remember that your brother [or 
sister] has something against you, leave your gift there in front of the altar.  First 
go and be reconciled to your brother; then come and offer your gift.’ 
 
 This letter is indicative not only of Holler’s theological concerns about 
reconciliation and loving enemies, it is also a typical example of the way many local 
pastors interacted with the purposes of the GTRC—through sermons, newsletter articles, 
Bible studies, flyers, hosting GTRC workshops, and attending GTRC functions.  This 
particular letter shows how Holler combines his passion for costly discipleship with his 
care for the city he has called home since July 1979.  
  The final sermon in Holler’s book was preached in September 2009 to the 
congregation at Faith Community Church, which gathers on the site of the Beloved 
Community Center.  The sermon provides a comprehensive look at the theological 
underpinnings of the Beloved Community Center’s ministry as it has tried to build on the 
GTRC’s legacy.  Entitled, “God Frees Us for Beloved Community,” and based on 
Exodus 3:1-12, it is the sermon in the collection that most directly addresses the 
Greensboro Massacre.  Impressive in its biblical scope, Holler draws from texts across 
the canon, from Exodus, Leviticus, and Deuteronomy, to the Gospels of Matthew and 
Luke.  The sermon is indicative of Holler’s preaching style and substance.  In it, he 
names the powers that imprison people “Pharaoh,” while naming God the great 
“Liberator,” who frees both the powerless and the privileged to befriend one another in a 
mutual pursuit of beloved community.  
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 First, Holler assumes Pharaoh’s voice, and delivers the bad news.  “I will not let 
them go!” Pharaoh says, “speaking from the perspective of the powers of this world.”61  
Pharaoh’s response is typical of the powerful “to the pleas and demands of the 
troublesome Moses types who…rattle society’s chains.” 
This NO! of the powerful may be accompanied by brutal repression.  Or lacking 
the stomach for that, the powerful may conspire with thugs who are willing to do 
their dirty work for them, as some of our Greensboro authorities conspired with 
the Ku Klux Klan and Nazis in 1979 to bring about the massacre of five labor 
organizers working with laborers in the textile mills. 
 
Pharaoh epitomizes the “spirit of those determined to dominate others.  But the “strange 
God who got Moses’ attention…speaks in a very different spirit.”  This God is “the 
eternal enemy of every form of slavery and oppression.”  Holler identifies the oppressed 
as the “victims of slavery in our nation’s past and of continuing racism in its present,” as 
well as “the children abroad who make our clothes and the migrants who raise the crops 
that nourish us.” 
 This Liberator God does not out-maneuver Pharaoh at his own game, but “deeply 
feels the pain of all the oppressed.”  This God’s “NO”—given in the Ten 
Commandments—is not a burdensome requirement, but the “indispensable basis for life 
as God would have it lived.”  Providing Scriptural support at each point, Holler describes 
the Commandments, together with humane laws “unparalleled in the ancient world,” 
Sabbath instructions, and the law of Jubilee, as “generous provisions” from the “Spirit of 
Israel’s Liberator God.”  These provisions stand in stark contrast “to the world of 
competition and domination” in which we live today.  “We are always tempted, and 
                                                
61 Ibid., 119.  Subsequent quotes will be from the sermon, 119-25. 
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regularly encouraged, to use our personal gifts and opportunities for our own self-
advancement and pleasure, at the expense of those who are disadvantaged.”  Our 
temptations block “the fullness of life that God intends for us all.”  The powers of the 
modern world have limited our choices to “community or catastrophe, life or death.” 
 The good news is that Jesus embodied God’s passion to liberate all people from 
Pharaoh’s spirit of domination and exploitation.  Jesus “came on the scene in the Spirit of 
God who told Moses…‘I know their sufferings, and I have come to deliver them.”  
Holler’s love of the common folk then shines through, as he illuminates the kinds of 
people with whom Jesus most closely identified.  “In his teaching, Jesus drew on the 
experience of farm workers, slaves, day laborers, and beggars.”  Jesus “couched his 
stories” in the lives of farmers, children at play, women living lives of courage and 
compassion in male-dominated society.  He “captured the realities of the experience of 
these ordinary, mostly forgotten or unappreciated folk as windows into, and parables of, 
the reality of God’s presence and purpose at work in the world.”   
Holler proclaims Jesus as the only alternative to Pharaoh’s way of domination, 
and describes Jesus as “allying” not with the “‘great ones’ of his society,” but with those 
most “vulnerable to the uncertainties of nature and the whims of the masters and 
employers who dominated their lives.”  But then Holler makes a homiletical turn toward 
both “the least of these” and those the society privileges or deems gifted.  Matthew 25:40 
is “Jesus’ final verdict as the Son of the liberating God of all.”  So, though God sides with 
the “least,” Jesus reveals that “the final significance of our lives will depend on whether 
we use our gifts and goods in the healing of the human community, or for our own 
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pleasure and profit and to curry favor with those who can return our favors.”  God is not 
opposed to the gifted and privileged.  In Jesus, he was present to the struggling masses as 
well as to the powerful and privileged.  God refuses to give up on any of them.  In the 
sermon’s most comprehensive statement, Holler claims, 
God’s desire, as Jesus embodied it, was a community in which there were no 
first- and second-class members, and no expendables—a beloved and loving 
community in which all were equally loved by God, and all equally called to love 
God and to love and forgive one another as freely and generously as they 
themselves had been loved and forgiven. 
 
 God’s call goes far beyond compelling us to be heroes who “on occasion forsake 
our comfort zones and offer handouts and used clothing and kindly smiles to those whom 
we deem worthy of our charity or our tax dollars or our friendship.”  No, God calls us to 
be “dangerously free” to “follow in Jesus’ way of identification with all who are captives 
in our time”—those without work, immigrants, those with poor wages, the sick children 
of poverty, drug addicts, homeless, and the growing numbers of prisoners.  And not only 
those, but we are also to identify as Jesus did with “those who are addicted to their own 
privilege and power, blinded by greed and by fear of loss of their wealth and status and 
power over others.”  Holler concludes that God’s desire is to “free us all” to be a 
“beloved human community.”  There is no other way to this community of radical 
freedom than through serving “our rabble-rousing, liberating God, who will be with us all 
the way.”  
 Holler’s sermon is an artful articulation of God’s vision for humanity.  We are 
freed to serve a God who shows no partiality.  The rich and powerful are not God’s 
enemies.  Slavery and oppression are.  Those society leaves behind are not the only ones 
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to whom good news is given.  But they are the ones with whom God calls us to identify if 
we would come to see and know Jesus Christ.  Beloved community is ultimately not up 
to us.  It is God’s gift to those willing to accept it as gift.  The sermon moves from bad 
news to good news, from death to life.  It reveals to us the world as Pharaoh would like it 
to remain, but goes even further in describing the world around us as God will ultimately 
have it.  It is a world that breaks through in the present wherever human beings give 
themselves to one another as God has given himself to us in Jesus Christ.    
To be sure, things always go missing from the printed versions of sermons.  
Looking strictly at this volume, it appears Holler’s sermons would not suffer to include 
more rhetorical flourish—readers may find themselves at certain points wishing for a 
dash of delectare.  Many of his points could be strengthened by shorter explanations.  At 
times, one gets the feeling that a dour Calvinist still lurks in the shadows of Holler’s 
homiletical imagination.  Holler might benefit from the poetic rhythms of speech, the 
rhetorical flair, and “musicality”62 of the African-American preachers he has befriended 
during his ministry in Greensboro.  Nevertheless, it is to Holler’s great credit that no one 
can blame him for shying away from telling the truth of Jesus Christ.  If Holler misses an 
opportunity to delight us, he makes up for it with prophetic vision.  For in his refreshing 
originality, he discloses the reconciling word in all its power.  If you come to the end of a 
Z Holler sermon and your imagination about God has not changed, if your heart has not 
                                                
62 For a fascinating description of this term, see William C. Turner, Jr., “The Musicality of Black 
Preaching:  A Phenomenology,” The Journal of Black Sacred Music, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 1988).  
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been softened, if your mind is still as made up as it was, if you still think your enemy is 
your enemy, you must not have been listening. 
  
5.5  CONCLUSION 
 Douglas Hall’s damning critique of modernity, with its empty promises of 
efficiency and technique, concludes by suggesting a way into the darkness.  “To know the 
darkness and to name it, then, would be the special task of the people of the cross in this 
society.”63  The darkness to which Christians must bear particular witness is that which 
“robs individuals and groups of their humanitas, while seeming to give them the very 
substance of the Good Life.”64  But here arises the “final temptation to a theology of 
glory,” whereby Christians endeavor to retain some vestige of triumphalism by using 
theology to reassert their superiority.  Our attempts to remember who Jesus is can never 
give us the clarity of vision necessary to usher in the kingdom of God.  The temptation 
remains to serve humanity by using an image of Christ that only accords with our own 
“absolute vision, definitive and unassailable.”65  We forget that,  
In our remembering, too, we are beggars.  There is nothing left us but the 
promise, from Jesus’ side, that he will be present in our remembering.  It is the 
promise from the cross to that first beggar, that to this remembering there would 
correspond a remembering from eternity.66   
 
Hall would have us place our hope in the cross, where the “‘Peace! Peace!’ of 
expectations unsullied by contradictory experience” cannot substitute for “the meeting 
                                                
63 Hall, Lighten Our Darkness, 256. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 257. 
66 Ibid. 
  251 
place of the real expectations and the real experiences of people.”67  Faith in this cross 
begins with “the courage to have failed,” the courage to name the darkness and one’s 
place in it.  
My hope in this chapter has been to let those preachers speak who have been so 
faithful and courageous.  More specifically, I have tried to show how the nature of their 
language and theology has been constitutive for reconciliation in Greensboro.  Some 
critics of the GTRC have tried to argue that it was merely a “Truth Commission” that 
failed to pursue any actual reconciliation, that the proceedings were biased toward 
victims and survivors, and that many of the GTRC’s proceedings were tarnished by the 
maudlin spectacle of “carefully edited” video montages from November 3.  Elizabeth 
Wheaton, a CWP critic who testified before the Commission, argues that the Andrus 
Fund’s own researchers “found that the effects of the truth and reconciliation process on 
Greensboro—its people, its government, its institutions—were negligible at best.”68  
Wheaton, of course, has her own biases, which one can quickly discern in the disparaging 
tone of her historical accounts of those who died on November 3.69  More importantly, 
Wheaton is indicative of those who do not understand that reconciliation is a journey, one 
that takes far longer than a few years to complete.  It is only ever truly complete in God’s 
own time.  But it cannot begin apart from saying, in Storey’s words, “Yes, this is what 
happened.”  
                                                
67 Ibid., 261. 
68 Wheaton, GREENKIL, 308-09.  The Andrus Fund was a major donor to the GTRC, giving nearly one 
million dollars to their efforts over a period of five years. 
69 See Wheaton, GREENKIL, 9-71. 
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Several things have escaped Wheaton’s meticulous attention to detail.  As Joseph 
Frierson, a staff coordinator for the LTF, explained,  
We called upon seventeen different organizations to appoint someone from their 
organization to go through all the names that would come from the community 
for those who were being nominated to serve on the commission…This entire 
work had truth, and community, and reconciliation tied through it.  Because 
when you’re sitting at a table trying to agree on a document, and you’ve got 35 or 
40 other people who believe that it should say this, and this, and that, and now 
we have to talk about why it should say this and that, versus what I feel, 
reconciliation is happening.  Truth is happening.70   
   
GTRC Commissioner Patricia Clark confirmed this dynamic.   
There was major camaraderie with the other commissioners.  Things would get 
tense, and I don’t think there was a time when at least one person on the 
commission wasn’t ready to walk away.  But we made a commitment to stay 
there for each other, so we really worked hard to work it out.  I think that was 
helpful.  Just going through the process of saying, ‘Okay, this is really, really 
hard, but we’re not going to give up,’ was also a model that we wanted to lift up.  
You know, things get difficult, but you don’t give up.71 
  
Not only did the Commissioners’ relationships epitomize reconciliation in their 
own sometimes-heated discussions.  Former CWP member, Nelson Johnson, has 
continuously sought to communicate and reconcile with Klan and Nazi participants in the 
massacre since the mid-1980’s.  In 1987, after learning of the KKK’s plan to march in 
Greensboro for the first time since 1979, Johnson “reached a spiritual, faith decision that 
I was going to find these Klan guys and ask them not to march in Greensboro.”72  After 
seeking spiritual guidance from two seminary professors, both of whom discouraged him, 
Johnson received blessings from two friends, and Rev. Otis Hairston, who encouraged 
him.  He typed up a statement, where he quoted from Matthew that “we love our enemies, 
                                                
70 Joseph Frierson, Personal interview, 24 January 2014. 
71 Patricia Clark, Personal interview, 6 November 2013. 
72 Bermanzohn, Through Survivors’ Eyes, 341.  Subsequent quotes of Johnson are from the passage 
beginning on 341. 
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pray for those who despitefully use us,” and then tracked down the home of KKK leader, 
Carroll Crawford.  Ignoring a sign that read, “No niggers allowed,” Johnson approached 
Crawford’s trailer.  After no one answered the knock, he slid the note under his door.   
Johnson later called Crawford, and after introducing himself, was greeted with a 
slew of cursing:  “Not that goddammed communist!”  Johnson tried to calm him.  “Go 
and look under your front door,” he said.  Crawford replied, “You’ve been to my 
goddammed house?”  “Yes,” Johnson said, “and I left a word for you.” 
They managed to have a conversation, where it was decided Johnson and 
Crawford would meet in person.  As Johnson drove to the rendezvous point, a service 
station off of the interstate, “I got nervous, so I stopped and prayed…Once I prayed, I felt 
okay.”  Arriving at the station, Nelson met Crawford, and agreed to follow him and his 
cohorts, eventually ending up at a Holiday Inn in Salisbury, NC.  Virgil Griffin, a leader 
in the 1979 Klan caravan, was among them. 
Johnson asked to pray with them, to which they responded, “Pray as much as you 
want.”  He did, and, after enduring another episode of cursing from Crawford, talked 
back and forth with the Klan members on the subjects of race and economics.  Finally, 
Johnson asked them, “Will y’all not march in Greensboro?”  They said, “Actually we 
don’t really want to march in Greensboro.”  Johnson believes the conversation changed 
their minds.  “But they went on to say that they couldn’t go back and tell the rest of the 
Klan they weren’t coming because Nelson Johnson persuaded them not to.”  They could 
not commit to canceling the march, but they “gave their word that even if they marched 
in Greensboro, they wouldn’t start anything violent.” 
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At different points in their meeting, both Johnson and the Klan were afraid the 
other might be leading them into an ambush.  Before they departed the Inn, the Klansmen 
asked Johnson if he knew why he was sitting in front of the motel window.  He said, “I 
don’t know.”  They said, “Because we got men inside several rooms, on the second floor, 
and they have a bead on you.”  Johnson thanked them for telling him, and asked if they 
saw any potential for a relationship based on things they could agree on.  The Klansmen 
said they “were open to talk.”   
After all, what better place to begin a reconciling journey than in the frame of a 
shotgun scope? 
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CONCLUSION 
One of the effects of the reconciling word in Greensboro has been to give people 
hope.  So I will conclude this dissertation by offering hopeful words about the Beloved 
Community Center’s (BCC) work in Greensboro, and by inviting two ministers who have 
led the BCC to have the last word.  Through their dedication to working for reconciliation 
over an extended period of time, and their love of both neighbors and enemies, Nelson 
Johnson and Joseph Frierson—together with many colleagues—have helped establish an 
oasis of peace in the heart of an American city.  As the BCC’s mission explains, they 
exist “to foster and model a spirit of community based on Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
vision of a ‘Beloved Community.’  In this spirit, we envision and work toward social and 
economic relations that affirm and realize the equality dignity, worth and potential of 
every person.”1 
Local pastor, Frank Dew, believes the BCC is the most significant bearer of the 
GTRC’s legacy.  “It has been a resource for the community in pushing for dialogue over 
a variety of issues, from educational issues to issues about poor people, to issues about 
police.”2  Dew, who continues to pastor the multi-racial church he founded in Greensboro 
in the 1980s, believes the BCC “has been a real gift to Greensboro in that they have 
continued to raise social justice questions that I’m not sure would have been raised had 
                                                
1 Beloved Community Center, website, http://www.belovedcommunitycenter.org/, accessed 8 March 2014.  
In December 2013, Joseph Frierson left the BCC in a formal capacity to join the pastoral staff of Mt. Zion 
Baptist Church in Greensboro.  He continues to work in partnership with the BCC. 
2 Frank Dew, Personal interview, 16 December 2013.  Subsequent quotations of Dew are from this 
interview. 
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they not been present.”  Retired Episcopal Bishop, Alfred “Chip” Marble, believes the 
BCC is a major part Greensboro’s potential to be a model of reconciliation for others. 
Greensboro, with its history, the sit-in movement, all that happened here—the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission…When I moved to Greensboro, I was 
blown away with the multiple peoples from all walks of life, and nationalities, 
ethnicities, races.  I was blown away.  And I had moved from Mississippi, which 
was primarily black and white, but also beginning to be brown, black, and white, 
with the Hispanic expansion in Mississippi.  But Greensboro had, I felt—and 
feel—a possibility of being a model city for the rest of the nation, for respecting 
the dignity of every human being, from whatever walk of life…And there are 
others who would hold up that vision as well.3 
  
Here, I will highlight Johnson and Frierson in order to show how the BCC 
pursues its mission in Greensboro with a very intentional approach to loving enemies.  
When you visit the BCC, you immediately notice its location on the edge of what was 
once the most dilapidated and neglected part of downtown Greensboro.  Some of the 
buildings in the surrounding neighborhood remain so, but others have been renovated.  
“This area has been changed,” Johnson says. 
When we got here about 18 years ago it was the most beat up area in town.  Right 
behind us where all those new apartments are was just the slummiest housing, 
and addiction was a big problem.  I was out there nailing a fence one day and I 
was talking with a guy.  When I went back to get my hammer somebody had 
stolen my hammer.  And I thought, ‘This is going to be a rough little place.’   
  
 Yet, Johnson was not cowed.  He and his wife, Joyce, together with a dozen other 
staff members, area clergy, and community volunteers, decided to continue their work on 
the site.  The BCC is also home to Faith Community Church, a non-denominational 
church Johnson serves as pastor.  In any given week at the Center, one will find people 
gathering for worship; tilling the community garden; eating in the Homeless Hospitality 
                                                
3 Alfred Marble, Personal interview, 7 February 2014. 
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kitchen (which feeds 200 people, four mornings a week); working on civic issues such as 
police accountability, energy efficient housing, voting rights, labor rights, and public 
education; and doing crisis ministry.  None of this would have happened without 
Johnson’s original determination to see the local people as potential friends. 
I had a decision to make…I’d come up here to get a book—and people had 
broken in the church and were cooking eggs.  When I came, they ran out.  I ran 
and caught up with them—though I’m out of shape—and I brought ‘em back.  I 
said, ‘Why do you break my window and come in like this?’  One said, ‘Because 
we were hungry.’  I said, ‘You know that I have worked to try to feed people and 
I would’ve given you some eggs.’  He wanted to know whether I was going to 
take him to court or not.  I said, ‘Well, I’m not going to discuss that.’  But the 
short version of this is that the choice I had was to make a decision that these 
people weren’t enemies.  And I could snapshot them, take a picture of them right 
there.  And if I freeze them in that frame, they would be permanently that to me.  
I think that actually negates potentiality.  And it allows actuality, which is a thin 
layer of what we can be, to override potentiality…We are capable of being the 
meanest, evil, no-caring people.  On the other hand we are capable of being 
enormously kind and generous.  The choice is:  which one do I want you to be?  
And therefore, I have to sow to that one.  I’ve worked it out that way, which 
allows me to be an agent of reconciliation without trying to compute too 
much…I know who I think you are.  I know who I want you to be.  And that 
actually anchors me.  And I know that because of Jesus Christ. 
  
Johnson eloquently articulates who he believes “the enemy” is from a theological 
perspective: 
I’m not thoroughly convinced that there is an enemy in the way we talk about 
enemies.  And I say that cautiously because a lot of bad stuff, ugly stuff, happens, 
and we are agents of it.  If you look at the kind of pattern that I see in 
history…there emerges out of a broken heart a need for affirmation.  And that 
affirmation often comes over against somebody else.  If you take the history of 
this country, for example, we can go down the road about who we are against at 
any given point.  And actually when you win your againstness—we humans 
celebrate our humanity, what we think is our humanity.  We throw confetti out 
the window, have bands and everything else.  And what we’re doing, I’m afraid, 
is scapegoating somebody in order to give some sense of affirmation to our 
injured self.  If there’s not somebody treating us wrong, if we’re injured like that 
we will invent somebody to be against.  That is a spirit.  And I think [St.] Paul 
talks about it:  we’re not fighting flesh and blood, but we are fighting something.  
And it is that spirit in the universe, which gets to be a mystery to me, that 
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indwells in us and can indwell in us.  But my deepest conviction is that it does 
not override the initial stamp—the image of God.  Therefore, most of us live our 
lives with a false identity.  We think we are this person or that person.  And our 
stamp contradicts that.  But actually as we think, we begin to behave that way.  
So the enemy is that spirit that distorts and confuses and divides.  And it is that 
that must be engaged.  It also constructs systems and methodologies that affirm 
the being of that.  But my faith is that we are captives of that, but we are not that.  
We are not primarily that.  So I use the term enemy cautiously.  I don’t like to 
call people my enemy. 
  
Johnson’s colleague and mentee, Joe Frierson, was hired to work at the BCC just 
after his graduation from NCA&T University.  He admits now how naïve he was about 
the job he was given to convince the community to pursue truth and reconciliation.  “We 
did a lot of outreach work to people who were possibly negative to the process, or spoke 
against the process, didn’t want to see it, felt as if we were going backwards, that this was 
not progressive,” he said.4  He had no idea people in Ireland, Peru, and South Africa were 
watching and waiting to see what might happen in Greensboro. 
Frierson has learned much about loving enemies from his mentor.  Citing Paul’s 
language of reconciliation in 2 Corinthians, he calls Jesus the “world’s greatest 
reconciler.”  Hence, 
I can’t look at the police officer as my enemy.  I can’t look at the city council 
member who voted against the Truth and Reconciliation creation process as my 
enemy.  I must see all of these people as my friend and my neighbor.  And I must 
not see myself in a lofty situation, as if I know it all.  I believe we all have to 
understand and share the truth together.  So we must hear each other’s realities, 
and passionately lay hold of what God has gifted in all of us.    
 
 Over the last decade, Frierson has risen as a trusted pastor and community leader.  
He is married, and intends to raise children in Greensboro.  He is devoted to this 
                                                
4 Joseph Frierson, Personal interview, 24 January 2014.  Subsequent quotations of Frierson are from this 
interview. 
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particular place.  He has a solid grasp of its history, its strengths and its weakness, its 
tendency to mask certain realities with “civilities.” 
Greensboro’s a city that really loves its image, and we’re trying to boost our 
image so that we’re attractive to businesses and attractive to different commercial 
projects and aspirations, and trying to keep people here…So Greensboro has 
always said, ‘No, we’re good.  Jobs are coming.’  And in order for it to say that, 
Greensboro thinks that we must leave those sleeping giants of the past alone, and 
we must push those things aside.  I believe businesses want to be in a city where 
people are able to talk about the issues.  I believe businesses want to thrive in a 
city where people are talking about the hardest issues as well as the easiest of 
issues.  I believe that is attractive.  So we’ve got to begin to change the way that 
we see culture.  We’ve got to change the way that we see business.  And…I think 
we can be that city.  We can be a model city. 
 
 Frierson also believes in non-violent, civil disobedience.  “There comes a time 
when we must use our bodies as a living sacrifice.”  As he has participated in community 
efforts with other clergy to draw attention to police accountability, he has joined their 
common refrain:  “We are willing to use our bodies as a representation for plight and plea 
for this work.”  
There is a certain level of joy—I can’t even describe it really—of knowing that 
you are doing something for righteousness’ sake, and that a jail cell doesn’t scare 
you; a judge doesn’t scare you; a police officer doesn’t scare you.  And I think 
that’s the place where the Apostles had to be, where they actually saw the 
sufferings of the present time were not able to be compared to the glory that shall 
be revealed.  And I am grateful—not in a prideful way—to say that I felt as 
though we were doing the work of Christ. 
  
 During my time conducting interviews and attending worship services in 
Greensboro, I have gained a renewed sense of hope, not only for this city, but also for the 
church catholic.  I have wondered if Bonhoeffer felt the same thing during his visit to 
America, when he claimed that “nowhere is revival preaching so vigorous and so wide-
spread” as among the African-American churches.  In Greensboro, though, the vibrancy 
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of Christian fellowship transcends race and class.  It did with those who participated in 
the GTRC, and continues in many of the relationships between those who care about the 
GTRC’s legacy.  The Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission should be 
regarded as an event that provided some closure for the many victims of the Massacre, 
and, to some extent, closure for the entire city.  But even more, the GTRC should be seen 
as a new beginning, as a model of how human beings can seek peace with one another, 
and as a sign of things yet to come.  That Christian preaching was one of the GTRC’s 
most significant catalysts is reason enough for hope.  Greensboro’s preachers have served 
as remarkable witnesses to the power of God’s reconciliation in Christ.  They have often 
done so at extreme risk to themselves.  Preachers like Johnson and Frierson, Cardes 
Brown, Mazie Ferguson, Z Holler, Otis Hairston, Gregory Headen, Clarence Shuford, 
Ken Massey, and Frank Dew, as well as young preachers like Wesley Morris and Irvin 
David Allen, have all preached the reconciling word, and for their efforts, Greensboro is 
doing a new thing for those who perceive it (Isaiah 43:19). 
  
____________ 
 
 One bitterly cold January morning, as I drove to an interview, I stopped near East 
Lee Street to view the site of the Greensboro Massacre.  There, at what is now the 
intersection of Everett and Bingham Streets, are new houses and a new community 
center.  An open field extends westward from the intersection on the other side—room 
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for even more new construction.  A mile in the distance, a single, industrial smokestack 
rises above the site as if to taunt it.   
The Morningside Homes are gone.  Also missing is the only beautiful, old tree 
that survived the new construction on the far corner lot, where Sandi Smith was shot in 
the temple.  There was no reason to remove it, but it, too, is gone.  Other than the streets 
themselves, there is no point of reference to connect the present with the past.  There are 
no memorials, no markers, no ribbons, and no flowers.  One would never know anything 
notable happened here.  The GTRC recommended the city construct a memorial on this 
site—a simple task, it would seem.  But there is only the gilding of new landscaping. 
I am reminded of something Wendell Berry wrote: 
This is a nation where  
No lovely thing can last.   
We trample, gouge, and blast;  
The people leave the land;  
The land flows to the sea.   
Fine men and women die,  
The fine old houses fall,  
The fine old trees come down:   
Highway and shopping mall  
Still guarantee the right  
And liberty to be  
A peaceful murderer,  
A murderous worshipper,  
A slender glutton, or  
A healthy whore.  Forgiving  
No enemy, forgiven  
By none, we live the death  
Of liberty, become  
what we have feared to be.5 
 
                                                
5 Wendell Berry, This Day:  Collected & New Sabbath Poems (Berkeley, CA:  Counterpoint, 2013) 105-06. 
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 Approaching the sidewalk, I noticed several of the new trees planted by the 
roadside were strangely twisted.  They were grotesquely different than the others planted 
with them, as if someone had cursed them.  I thought of the blood crying out of the 
ground in Genesis, and Cain asking, “Am I my brother’s keeper?”  I closed my eyes and 
tried to imagine what it must have been like to stand here on November 3, 1979.  But that 
was too much for me.   
Instead, I bowed my head and prayed, giving thanks that this cold silence would 
not have the last word. 
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